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EXPLORING A STATE WILDLIFE AGENCY’S ACCOUNT OF CONTRACTED WILDLIFE 
MANAGEMENT AND FACTORS INFLUENCING CONTRACT USE 
State wildlife agencies are charged with trust responsibilities for wildlife resources. 
However the authorities of the agencies do not encompass all those needed to fulfill the trustee 
duties. This compels engagement of other government agencies, non-government entities and 
private parties in state wildlife management through incentives, collaborative management 
approaches and public engagement processes. However, details about the use of contracts related 
to collaborative management efforts and the relationships between the use of contract tools and 
state wildlife agency funding is not available. Accounting records and interviews with agency 
staff and contractors provide an account of collaborative management contracting which is not 
reported elsewhere.  
An in-depth case study of Colorado Division of Wildlife’s (CDOW) use of contracts to 
accomplish wildlife management purposes was developed using accounting, appropriation and 
budget records and interviews with CDOW staff, state procurement staff and both non-profit and 
for profit contractors. A limited, interview only, case study of the Wyoming Game and Fish 
Department’s (WGFD) use of wildlife management contracts was use to explore similarities or 
differences between two state wildlife agencies. CDOW’s contract accounting records and 
legislative appropriations for fiscal years 1999 through 2010 used in the evaluation of the extent 
and changes in use. Twenty three interviews were conducted in Colorado and four with WGFD 
staff.  
 The 12 fiscal years of contract accounting and appropriation records were explored for 
hypothesized relationships suggested from the government contracting literature. It was 
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hypothesized that state wildlife agencies use of contracts differed from that described for other 
government agencies in the public administration literature in which contract use has been 
related to employee numbers or funding and shows increased use of contracts. The CDOW 
accounting records portray relatively stable levels of contract numbers. Service contracts, 
defined as all services and grant contracts, were not statistically related to total fiscal resources or 
staff levels. Total service contracts per fiscal year showed a small increase in numbers over the 
period however the expenditures on these contracts did not statistically differ. The number and 
value of contracts between CDOW and other government agencies or NGOs did not have 
statistically significant increases over the 12 year period. The value of grants contracts was found 
to be related to funds available. Further, grants and capital property acquisition spending was 
related to available fiscal resources.  
The informal semi-structured interviews were used to explored why and how extensively 
collaborative type contracts were used and to explore the benefits, difficulties and capacity needs 
related to their use. Contractor interviews focused on relationship with the state wildlife agency, 
difficulties in contracting with the agency and capacity issues related to contracting with either of 
the wildlife agencies. Interview content was analyzed using two approaches. One employed an a 
priori agency theory framework to code all interview transcripts. The second approach used a 
grounded theory based approach explore the themes related to collaborative contract use in the 
interview transcripts.  
An agency theory analysis was employed to provide insight into the agencies’ contractor 
relationships and the interaction of agency theory with collaborative management contracts. The 
analysis of the procurement and wildlife agency principle-agent conflicts employed a shifting 
principle identity in which procurement/accounting staff and wildlife staff roles were switched to 
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allow fuller characterization of the interview content. The conflict between the formal 
accountability based procurement procedures and wildlife staff’s need for more flexibility is 
represented by the moral hazard coding characterized as goal conflicts. Wildlife agency staff 
identified adverse selection elements of performance and asymmetrical information most 
frequently in relation to contractors which is consistent with the emphasis placed on experience 
and relationships and the reported limited number of suitable contractors.  
Two main thematic elements emerged from the interviews as influencing the extent to 
which collaborative management contracts are used. The first is a systemic theme which 
identifies elements outside of the wildlife agency and includes legislation, budget, procurement 
policies and available contractors. The second is an institutional theme which includes 
constructed realities surrounding the relationships with and role of procurement processes, 
wildlife management norms and professionalism. A decision model is developed form informant 
provided content. The decision model and themes are supported by the procurement staff and 
contractors and accounting records. The results from the WGFD case support the results from the 






While doctorates are sometimes considered individual pursuits, few would be completed 
without the support and assistance of others. I wish to acknowledge those who have provided 
support or assistance to me in my labors to this point. One group deserves special mention for 
their support and assistance. I am indebted to my family in their unflagging in their support and 
encouragement. I am fortunate and grateful to have found Dr. Tony Cheng who was not only 
interested in my proposal but also willing to take me on as a graduate student. His support and 
encouragement is greatly appreciated. I also want to thank my committee members for their time, 
assistance and advice. 
I extend my thanks to all of the interview participants for their time and insights as well 
as the Colorado Division of Parks and Wildlife and the Wyoming Game and Fish Department for 
supporting their involvement. A special thank you goes to Ms. Susan Boston of the Wyoming 
Game and Fish Department for her help and assistance. I also want to specifically recognize the 
following individuals for their assistance in a variety of capacities: Dr. Sonya LaFebre, Colorado 
State University; Ms.Velma Fuhrmann, Colorado Division of Parks and Wildlife; Mr. Ron 
Dunne, Colorado Division of Parks and Wildlife; Ms. Sandy Dunn Colorado Department of 
Natural Resources; and, Mr. Bill Levine, Colorado Department of Natural Resources. Finally, I 
want to recognize and thank my fellow graduate students Ms. Katherine Mattor, Ms. Patti Orth, 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... vi 
1)   Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
2)   Literature Review ..................................................................................................................... 7 
State wildlife agencies as unique units of study ......................................................................... 7 
Wildlife as a Public Trust resource ......................................................................................... 7 
Wildlife agencies’ Progressive Era roots ................................................................................ 9 
State wildlife management .................................................................................................... 10 
North American model and institutional features of wildlife management .......................... 12 
Contracting: the tools, types, challenges and capacity ............................................................. 13 
Devolution............................................................................................................................. 14 
Contracting – commodity, purchase of service and policy tools .......................................... 15 
Contracting capacity ............................................................................................................. 16 
Accountability and legitimacy .............................................................................................. 21 
Contracts in wildlife management ........................................................................................ 22 
Agency theory ....................................................................................................................... 24 
Reviewed literature synopsis ................................................................................................ 26 
3)   Methods .................................................................................................................................. 28 
General ...................................................................................................................................... 28 
Elements of the study plan dropped during implementation ................................................ 30 
Units of analysis .................................................................................................................... 31 
Data Collection and Analysis.................................................................................................... 31 
Description of the data sets ................................................................................................... 33 
Standardizing vendor names ................................................................................................. 35 
Separating the financial functions ......................................................................................... 36 
The “M” codes ...................................................................................................................... 36 
Creating the Access database. ............................................................................................... 37 
Queries and PAWS Statistics 18. .......................................................................................... 39 
CDOW appropriations, employee numbers and total expenditure data ............................... 39 
Wyoming Game and Fish Department contracting data ....................................................... 41 
Interview procedures ............................................................................................................. 41 
Interview analysis. ................................................................................................................ 43 
vii 
 
Personal narrative .................................................................................................................. 44 
Case study development ........................................................................................................... 44 
Ethical Considerations .............................................................................................................. 45 
Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 46 
4)   Personal Narrative .................................................................................................................. 48 
The back story ....................................................................................................................... 51 
Contract experience .............................................................................................................. 52 
5)   Characterizing A State Wildlife Agency’s Use of Collaborative Management Contracts 
Using Accounting and Appropriation Records ............................................................................. 93 
Synopsis .................................................................................................................................... 93 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 94 
Hypotheses ................................................................................................................................ 98 
Methods................................................................................................................................... 101 
Data preparation steps ......................................................................................................... 101 
Variables and test ................................................................................................................ 108 
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 109 
Additional considerations on grants.................................................................................... 123 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 126 
Limitations. ......................................................................................................................... 129 
6)   An Agency Theory Exploration of State Wildlife Agency Contracting: The Participants 
Perspective. ................................................................................................................................. 132 
Synopsis .................................................................................................................................. 132 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 133 
Literature review ..................................................................................................................... 134 
State wildlife agencies ........................................................................................................ 134 
Agency theory ..................................................................................................................... 135 
Methods................................................................................................................................... 138 
Interview procedures ........................................................................................................... 139 
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 143 
Contractors as agents .......................................................................................................... 156 
Agency elements ................................................................................................................. 158 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 162 
Characterizing the principals and agents ............................................................................ 162 
Agency theory and collaborative contracting ..................................................................... 164 
Limitations .......................................................................................................................... 165 
viii 
 
7)   The Influence of Procurment Systems and Institutional Characteristics on Collaborative 
Management Contracting by State Wildlife Agencies ................................................................ 167 
Synopsis .................................................................................................................................. 167 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 168 
Literature review ..................................................................................................................... 169 
Public trust doctrine and the Progressive Era ..................................................................... 169 
State wildlife management .................................................................................................. 170 
The wildlife management profession .................................................................................. 171 
Institutional characteristics of state wildlife management. ................................................. 171 
Contracting tools and challenges ........................................................................................ 173 
Contracting as policy. ......................................................................................................... 174 
Contracting capacity. .......................................................................................................... 175 
Boundaries .......................................................................................................................... 176 
Methods................................................................................................................................... 178 
Case study development ..................................................................................................... 178 
Interview procedures ........................................................................................................... 178 
Interview analysis. .............................................................................................................. 179 
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 179 
Decision to contract. ........................................................................................................... 181 
Systemic influences ............................................................................................................ 185 
Institutional features............................................................................................................ 195 
Contractor’s perspective ..................................................................................................... 199 
Procurement/contract administrator’s perspective .............................................................. 202 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 206 
Limitations .......................................................................................................................... 210 
8)   Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 212 
Literature Cited ........................................................................................................................... 219 
Appendix 3.1 Letters of Support ................................................................................................. 237 




1)   INTRODUCTION 
Government procurement by contract has a long history and evolving relationship with 
vendors as suppliers of public goods and services (Cohen and Eimicke 2008). Kettl’s (1993) 
narrative of George Washington’s difficulties with revolutionary war suppliers locates 
government contracting and vendor-government relationships at the beginning of the national 
purchasing record. Growth in government programs has widened the range of products and 
services procured by contract by different governmental levels and are the subject of numerous 
investigations (see for example Van Slyke 2003, Hefetz and Warner 2004, Brudney et al. 2005, 
Ni and Bretschneider 2007, Fernandez 2009, Brown et al. 2010).  
Over the past 40 plus years agencies in many parts of government have shifted from an 
employee based direct service delivery model to increased use of indirect contract based service 
delivery. Policy initiatives and political philosophies associated with increased use of contracts 
have focused on service enhancements without adding government employees or on efficiency 
generally associated with market based approaches (Frederickson 1996, Rhodes 1996b, Gilmour 
and Jensen 1998). A key outcome of these initiatives is the expanded use of third parties to 
implement public programs. Collaborative and public engagement efforts by government also 
increases the number of third parties engaged in governmental roles and task as both a contractor 
and as a participant. Public administration authors point out that using contractors to deliver 
government services or collect and manage information creates a variety of policy, 
accountability and management dilemmas for public agencies (Salamon 1981; 1987, 
Frederickson 1996, Kettl 1997, Gilmour and Jensen 1998, Kettl 2000b, Salamon 2004, Kettl 
2006). Salamon (1987 and 1981) refers to the use of contracts for provision of government 
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services as “third party government”. The use of contracted services and other indirect tools of 
government are located within the larger concept of agency governance (Salamon 2002a). 
The focus of much of the government contracting literature is directed at federal 
agencies. A limited number of researchers have used contracts by state and local governments as 
the focus of research efforts. The available state and local government contracting literature pays 
no attention to state wildlife management agencies and their programs. The bulk of that literature 
focuses on social services, public health, environmental enforcement and infrastructure 
contracting. Yet wildlife management is a well described government function divided into 
federal and state responsibilities. Federal responsibilities are broadly described as management 
and regulations related to migratory species, marine species, treaty species and federally 
determined threatened, endangered or candidate species. The individual states retain 
responsibilities for the other aspects of wildlife management. State responsibilities are delineated 
by the Public Trust Doctrine, relevant court cases (Sax 1970, Bean and Rowland 1997, Freyfogle 
and Goble 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010) and state statutes. The shared legal and historical 
backgrounds of state wildlife agencies suggest these agencies may share other characteristics as 
well.  
The framework provided by the Public Trust Doctrine presents state wildlife agencies 
with a dilemma in meeting their trustee responsibilities. State wildlife agencies have authorities 
to administer distributive policies effecting wildlife, for example controls on possession or take, 
but limited or no authority to manage the state’s wildlife habitats except for lands owned or 
controlled by the state wildlife agency. Lacking authority over the critical habitat component 
makes the state wildlife agencies success in its trust obligations dependent on the third parties 
controlling the habitats. Obtaining favorable consideration of wildlife habitat needs requires the 
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agencies to engage in collaborative or exchange based actions (Fleishman 2009). Many of the 
successful wildlife conservation initiatives from the early years of wildlife management which 
are embedded in current wildlife management programs were the result of government agencies, 
private organizations and individuals collaborating for a common cause (Trauger et al. 1995). 
Yet state level natural resource management is report as more closely matching the clientism of 
the 1960’s than the participatory and collaborative approaches more frequently seen in federal 
natural resource administration (Gill 1996, Nie 2004a, Koontz 2007). The formal and informal 
rules and common beliefs sustaining the professional management concept are also found to 
influence the partners selected and extent of an agency’s collaborative efforts (Milward and 
Provan 2000).  
State wildlife agencies use a variety of processes to facilitate planning or participatory 
processes. While increased understanding and commitments to collaborative management is 
essential, they are noted as insufficient in themselves to facilitate and maintain collaborative 
management (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Schusler et al. 2003). Structural support and 
processes are needed to sustain joint action (Schusler et al. 2003). At some point collaborative 
processes require some degree of sharing of authority or resources to be effective (Trauger et al. 
1995).  
As government agencies, state wildlife agencies comply with statutes, rules and policies 
intended to insure government accountability. Agreements involving money or special 
authorities, no matter their collaborative or delegation intention, are subject to accountability 
requirements that inform the controls, procedures and authorizations embodied in the state’s 
formal procurement and contracting process (deLeon and Varda 2009). This study proposes to 
use contract accounting records which are part of the accountability requirements as a means to 
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gauge the collaborative management activity in the Colorado Division of Wildlife1 (CDOW). 
The records for contracts for third party professional service provision and grants are used as 
indicators of collaborative management activity. Grants are viewed as inherently collaborative, 
requiring boundary spanning action (Agranoff 2007). Service contracts are more difficult to 
definitively characterize as the potential uses encompasses both delegated task and collaborative 
management implementation. However, Colorado’s fiscal policy requires service contractors to 
operate independent of direct control of the state as well as being independent entities (Controller 
2009b; 2010). The accounting records limit the ability to identify the specific purpose of the 
contracts themselves. In this analysis, service contracts are included as a contract type used to 
support collaborative management. 
In selecting contract categories as measures of collaborative management, it is recognized 
that other collaborative management support such as employees’ time or advice are not 
considered in the contracts. While these actions are important, the direct measure of shared 
resources and authorities through contracts captured in the state’s accounting system are the 
focus of this analysis. Further, the public administration literature describes the evolving and 
spreading use of indirect or third party service provision, yet little published information is 
available on state wildlife agencies’ use of indirect contract tools. This project will begin to 
address the limited information by exploring the extent of contract use in wildlife management a 
state wildlife agency2. Accounting records of a state wildlife agency and interviews of 
                                                 
1 Effective July of 2011, the Colorado Division of Wildlife and the Colorado Division of Parks 
and Outdoor Recreation were merged into a single agency, the Colorado Division of Parks and 
Wildlife. The term Colorado Division of Wildlife is used throughout this document as a 
reference to the agency’s name during data collection and as it appears on records and data sets 
used in this project. 
2 State wildlife agency as used in this document is used as a generic reference to state agencies 
responsible for fish, wildlife, non-game, and other variously termed wildlife responsibilities. 
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individuals with knowledge of contract use to accomplish state wildlife management needs are 
explored to address:  
• How extensively are service and grants used?  
• Has the use of contracts increased over time?  
• What reasons are given for contract use and are they similar to those in the 
literature? 
• How well does agency theory capture a state wildlife agency’s contract use 
considerations?  
• Are capacity, accountability or boundary management issues identified?  
A case study approach was used at the CDOW to explore these questions. The case study 
included analysis of the contracting records and interviews with CDOW staff, CDOW 
contractors, staff of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources (CDNR) and staff of the 
Colorado Attorney General’s Office. A small case study based on interviews with selected 
Wyoming Game and Fish Department (WGFD) staff is developed to compare with the CDOW 
case study. The chapter content following this introduction are: 
• A literature review 
• A methods summary 
• A Personal narrative- provides the reader insight into my history with the wildlife 
management field as disclosure and influence in the study 
• An analysis of overall contract use, use changes over time and factors related to 
contracts based on 12 fiscal years of CDOW’s official contract accounting records 
and legislative appropriations  
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• An agency theory based exploration comparing wildlife agencies, wildlife agency 
staff, contractors and procurement staff perspectives 
• Emergent themes from informant interviews on contract use decision factors, 
implementation considerations and capacity 
• Conclusion 
• Literature cited 
The content is primarily a single case study of the CDOW. A smaller interview based case study 
of the WGFD is compared with the larger CDOW case within the agency theory and contract use 




2)   LITERATURE REVIEW  
This review of the literature is presented in three general topic areas addressing state 
wildlife agencies, contract use and theoretical considerations as separate subsections. The first 
subsection covers a brief summary of the historical, legal and profession-specific characteristics 
of wildlife management in the United States emphasizing state wildlife management agencies. 
The second subsection is an overview of contract use in government settings, including capacity 
issues and challenges posed by contracts. The third subsection briefly covers select theoretical 
concerns related to this study. The topic areas facilitate exploring the hypothesized difference in 
contract use by state wildlife agencies and those of governmental agencies reported in the public 
administration literature. Individual chapters include literature reviews specific to the chapter 
contents that may not appear in this chapter.  
State Wildlife Agencies as Unique Units of Study 
The argument that state wildlife agencies are unique entities with distinctive 
characteristics that are expected to influence use of contracts and contractors requires some 
elaboration. The following section explores state wildlife agencies’ relationship to public trust 
resources and why they share similar legal, financial and historical origins which differ from 
other government agencies. The material covers the legal and historical background of state 
wildlife agencies in four areas: wildlife as part of the public trust doctrine; Progressive Era 
origins and expansion to present day state wildlife agencies; the relationship of non-
governmental conservation organizations to wildlife management agencies; and recent literature 
on change in wildlife management agencies. 
Wildlife as a Public Trust resource.– Freyfogle and Globe (2009) note that perhaps the 
single most interesting feature of wildlife in America is the legal position of wild animals as 
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owned collectively by the people with the states as trustees. Scholarly discussions and court 
decisions about the legal status of wildlife in the United States often start by attributing public 
trust doctrine to Roman legal traditions dealing with fishing and open use of waterways. The 
Roman legal concept was incorporated into English common law and transferred to the English 
colonies in North America prior to the American Revolution (Sax 1970, Connolly 2009, 
Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010, Bruskotter et al. 2011). With the success of the 
American Revolution, American law coalesced around a uniform legal doctrine that vested the 
citizens as beneficiaries of a public trust ownership of wildlife resources managed on their behalf 
by the states (Sax 1970, Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010). 
 State level court cases began appearing in which the courts applied and supported the 
legality of the public trust doctrine. In 1842, in Martin v. Waddell (41 U.S. 367, 407), the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the public ownership elements of the public trust doctrine in a case 
disputing access and use of oyster beds (Sax 1970, Connolly 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010). In a 
later case, the individual states’ trust ownership was significantly strengthened by the U.S. 
Supreme Court findings in Geer v. Connecticut (161 US 519 1896), where the key question was 
the ownership of wildlife. In Geer, the court concluded that the ownership of wildlife converted 
from the English government to the existing states at independence and to subsequent states as 
they were admitted to the union (Bean and Rowland 1997, Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller 
et al. 2010, Bruskotter et al. 2011).  
The Geer case created conflicts between the federal governments’ designated powers and 
states’ trust ownership which played out over time in different court venues. Ultimately the 
conflicts led to the Hughes v. Oklahoma decision (441 US 322 1979) in which the Supreme 
Court expressly overruled Geer, holding that the federal powers over interstate commerce was 
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superior to the state’s wildlife property rights. Yet the decision continued to affirm the powers of 
the states to protect and conserve wildlife within their borders (Johnson and Galloway 1996, 
Bean and Rowland 1997, Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010). State law, state court 
actions and federal court actions have continued to affirm the legal concept of wildlife as a 
public trust resource under state management while recognizing federal jurisdiction over aspects 
dealing with treaties, interstate commerce, endangered species and interstate transportation of 
wildlife (Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010). Bacheller et al. (2010) also reported 
that 41 states had clear mention of the public trust doctrine in their state constitution or statutes 
and 48 state agencies had mission and purpose statements consistent with public trust doctrine 
duties. They also report that 41 states had state case law recognizing public trust doctrine, eight 
had no case law concerning the public trust doctrine and one state had a single state case in 
which the public trust doctrine was not specifically accepted by the court.  
Wildlife agencies’ Progressive Era roots.– Samuel Hays’ (1959) overview of the 
conservation movement during the Progressive Era (which he defines as between 1880 to 1920) 
notes the movement’s support of professionalism and technical management of natural resources 
was a crucial element that bridged the goals of both federal government officials and 
conservation organizations. To meet these mutual goals, new administrative approaches and 
professional staff with scientific training were needed (Hays 1959). Gonzalez (1998) argues 
economic elite theory better explains the development of forest management policy during the 
Progressive Era, but also points to the involvement of government officials and conservation 
interest in development of what he terms “practical forest management”. The rational, 
technological approach favored by conservation groups complemented the governmental entities 
desire for efficiency which converged in the development of an instrumental, normative natural 
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resources management approach with government as the collective authoritative agent (Adams 
1992, Mullner et al. 2001, Nie 2004a, Dryzek 2005).  
State wildlife management.– State management of wildlife resources prior to the mid-
1800s was generally accomplished through statutory means to restrict the take of selected species 
or set the manner or timing of take. This was accomplished through legislative action and 
specially appointed “game wardens” (Leopold and Brooks 1933, Bean and Rowland 1997, 
Sherblom et al. 2002, Freyfogle and Goble 2009). In Colorado’s case, the first state legislature in 
1876 established a State Fish Commissioner and a set of fisheries related laws (Barrows and 
Holmes 1990). In 1891 the legislature enlarged the State Fish Commissioner position into the 
State Game and Fish Commissioner and added the first wardens as state employees creating what 
would become the CDOW (Barrows and Holmes 1990). The Progressive Era also witnessed the 
emergence of other state wildlife agencies (Williamson 1987) and many of the federal agencies 
charged with federal wildlife management responsibilities. Political support from non-
governmental conservation interests enabled the enactment of laws such as the Forest Reserve 
Act of 1891, the Lacey Game and Wild Birds Preservation and Disposition Act of 1900, and the 
establishment of the first federal wildlife refuge in 1903 (Williamson 1987).  
The conservation interest active in the Progressive Era have their roots in the local 
hunting or fishing clubs that began to appear in the early 1800’s, with the earliest reportedly 
dating from 1832 according to Brown (2010). New wildlife conservation entities appear during 
the Progressive Era time frame, often with founders that were active in the national resource 
discourse and policy setting arenas. Examples include the Boone and Crocket Club founded in 
1887 by George Bird Grinnell, Theodore Roosevelt and others; the Sierra Club founded in 1892 
by John Muir and others; the Audubon Society established in 1896 and as a national organization 
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in 1905; the Wildlife Management Institute in 1911; and the Izaack Walton League founded in 
1922 (Williamson 1987, Brown 2010, Izaak Walton League of America 2012, National Audubon 
Society of America 2012). These conservation groups along with others supported changes in 
wildlife law and management but were also policy insiders (Hays 1959, Gonzalez 1998, Brown 
2010).  
The concept of professional management of wildlife continued to develop after the 
Progressive Era timeframe defined by Hays (1959). Federal legislation directed at supporting 
expansion of programs and professional resource management lead to the Migratory Bird 
Conservation act of 1929 and the Pittman-Robertson Act of 1937 which is notable for providing 
excise tax funding to state wildlife agencies to manage hunted species (Williamson 1987). Later 
actions would expand similar funding to fisheries. 
 The demand for individuals trained in wildlife management increased as a result of the 
creation of government positions and lead to the emergency of a wildlife management profession 
in the 1930’s (Leopold and Brooks 1933, Swanson 1987). Brown (2010) notes Aldo Leopold 
became the first professor of wildlife management in 1933. Leopold is also credited as a key 
leader in defining the wildlife management profession (Organ et al. 2001). Other actions also 
influenced and shaped the wildlife profession including the Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit 
Program, a joint federal, state and university program for wildlife management research and 
training, established by federal legislation in 1935 (Poole and McCabe 1987, Organ et al. 2001). 
Likewise The Wildlife Society formed in 1937 by Leopold and others is active in establishing 
training requirements, wildlife management practice, credentials and certification (Swanson 
1987, Organ et al. 2001). These institutions remain active informants in wildlife management. 
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 North American model and institutional features of wildlife management.– Geist et al.’s 
(2001) presentation at the 66th North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference was 
not the first discussion of what has been called the North American model of wildlife 
management (the model) but it is perhaps the best known presentation. The model is a conflation 
of a historical success story as well as an argument about the future of wildlife management 
(Geist et al. 2001, Organ et al. 2001, Jacobson and Decker 2006, Dratch and Kahn 2011, 
Lepczyk et al. 2011, Nelson et al. 2011). Discussions of the future of wildlife management are 
linked to either a defense of the model or view the model as a point of departure to explore 
changes. More importantly for this review, the literature describing and discussing the model do 
not contest institutional characteristics of the model including its instrumental and normative 
practices, historical associations, benefits and accomplishments. Rather the discussions have 
largely argued the scope and desirability of change. 
The wildlife management profession and wildlife agencies have been characterized by 
various authors as an institution (Mullner et al. 2001, Jacobson 2008b, Buck 2009, Decker et al. 
2011). The institutional characterization follows DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991), Scott’s (1995) 
and Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) general characterization of institutions as having: regulative 
elements (i.e., formal rules and laws); normative elements (i.e., values and norms); and cultural-
cognitive elements (i.e., what people know and their social construction of reality).  
Gigilotti et al. (2009) reframes the elements of institutions and history into a wildlife 
management paradigm. The paradigm establishes boundaries and informs those in the paradigm 
how to frame problems, the accepted set of methods and tools available and how to behave 
inside the paradigm boundaries. The legal and historical background of wildlife management in 
the United States would suggest similarities in state wildlife management agencies would exist in 
13 
 
part due to path dependency (Greener 2002), which is also noted by writers describing wildlife 
management and the state wildlife agencies (Nie 2004a, Buck 2009, Jacobson et al. 2010 and 
others). The historical background of increased professionalization and development of 
credentials and training requirements in wildlife management would also be expected to 
contribute to institutional similarity (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 
Bartley et al. 2008). 
The brief overview of the origins and legal framework of state wildlife management 
agencies identifies similarities in state wildlife agencies. The similarities also mark the 
differences of these agencies from the public health and welfare agencies that are often the 
subject of scholarly inquiry. These features suggest state wildlife agencies use of third party 
contracts to achieve wildlife management goals will differ from the literature’s descriptions of 
local and state government contracting.  
Contracting: the tools, types, challenges and capacity 
Government agencies’ roles in delivery of services and products to citizens have evolved 
rapidly over the past 40 years into what has been termed collaborative government management. 
The context behind the changes are captured by the variously named “new public management”, 
“reinventing government”, “free marketism”, “small government movement” and “government 
as a business” references share objectives to reduced government size, increased efficiency, 
improve services through the use of policy tools such as contracting, grants and indirect service 
provision (Frederickson 1996, Rhodes 1996b, Gilmour and Jensen 1998, Salamon and Elliott 
2002). The result is continued expansion of government contracting with an increasing range of 
contractors or, as Salamon (1981; 1987) terms them, “third parties”.  
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Government’s expanded use of contractors to deliver services, obtain complex products, 
or process information creates variety of policy, accountability and management dilemmas that 
are different from and more complex than those found in direct service provision (Salamon 1981; 
1987, Frederickson 1996, Kettl 1997, Gilmour and Jensen 1998, Kettl 2000b, Salamon 2004, 
Kettl 2006). Salamon (2004) also notes another important outcome of the “reinventing 
government” efforts is a further expansion of third parties use of public authority and funds 
which Salamon calls third party government.  
Devolution.– Devolution in public policy generally refers to one or a combination of two 
elements. The first is moving governmental authority and decision levels from higher levels of 
central government agencies to lower government levels—i.e. federal to state or state to local 
government where limits on government size may result in inclusion of local interest and outside 
contractors (Ellwood 1996, Auger 1999, Gainsborough 2003, Goodsell 2004, Romzek and 
Johnston 2005). The second element applies market approaches, private sector incentives and 
other mechanisms to government programs in ways that effectively move government authority 
or resources outside organizations (Ellwood 1996). The two concepts can be mixed and take 
many forms but all exhibit increased contract use (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Van Slyke and 
Roch 2004, Romzek and Johnston 2005). Essentially devolution is a decentralization of 
government authority, responsibility and resources (Bartley et al. 2008). 
Public administration literature references devolution in connection with defense, public 
safety, and social welfare areas. However, reports of devolution in natural resource management 
are limited. Mutter et al. (1999) reported that devolution of federal natural resource policy 
making and regulatory authority to the states had not occurred. Yet criticism of the devolution of 
land and environmental management by the U.S. Forest Service, Department of Interior and the 
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Environmental Protection Agency appear contemporaneously to Mutter et al.’s report (Coggins 
1999). Natural resource activities noted as most often devolved are licensing, fee collection, 
planning of land and water use, and environmental standard compliance (Bartley et al. 2008). 
 Natural resource literature also devotes significant amounts of attention to management 
approaches involving partnerships, collaboration, co-management or co-operative environmental 
management as devolved decision making tools to achieve various goals (Plummer and 
FitzGibbon 2004). Successful application of these tools depends on some degree of 
decentralization or devolution of authority and resources, either directly or indirectly (Arnstein 
1969, Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, Burns and Cheng 2005, Fung 2006). Management of public 
lands or waters which are wildlife habitats, typically federally owned ones, is the subject of some 
authors who discuss devolution of federal government roles (Nie 2004b). Wildlife management 
as a specific topic is not directly found in the devolution literature. 
Contracting – commodity, purchase of service and policy tools.– Government purchases 
can be thought of as either simple, commodity type purchases or complex products or services 
(DeHoog and Salamon 2002, Curry 2009, Kettl 2009, Brown et al. 2010). Brown et al. (2010) 
defines simple products as market based exchanges of easily defined products with verifiable 
cost, quantities and quality which are available in markets with large numbers of buyers and 
sellers. Under these conditions, purchase contracts are relatively complete specifications with the 
roles of buyer and seller fully described and competitors exist to provide backup to any given 
supplier (Brown et al. 2010). Complex products on the other hand are not easily defined, making 
the cost, quality and quantity difficult to fully develop and where competitive markets are limited 
or nonexistent (Van Slyke 2003, Van Slyke 2007, Kettl 2009, Brown et al. 2010). Purchase of 
16 
 
service contracts where the recipient is an external party are considered complex products 
(Kelman 2002). 
The complexity of the product, the vendor and who is served largely determines the 
degree of specificity and formalization of contracting processes (DeHoog and Salamon 2002). 
DeHoog and Salamon (2002) identified three approaches to contracting for services based on 
characteristics of the contracting environment. In a competitive contracting environment, formal 
request for proposals and competitive bids are used. Negotiated contracts, based on request for 
qualifications or similar approaches are used to negotiate for services. Cooperative or relational 
contracts are used were positive relationships, often described as trust, have developed and a 
desire to work with the provider in the future is present (DeHoog 1990, DeHoog and Salamon 
2002, Brown et al. 2006).  
Government uses contracts as the vehicle to enable collaborative management tools such 
as grants, incentives, and waivers (Kettl 2002a). Salamon (2002a) argues that the demand for 
efficiency has emphasized government use of indirect tools which are managed and settled 
through legally binding contracts. Both Kettl and Salamon locate the skills need in government 
to match and manage the indirect tools including providers, contract content and reporting within 
an agencies general procurement processes (Kettl 2002a; b, Salamon 2002a). 
Contracting capacity.– Gargan (1981) noted that governmental capacity is simply the 
ability to “do what it wants”. However, Gargan elaborates on the “do what it wants” statement to 
argue that a set of agreed-to definitions of capacity, its sources and measurement do not exist and 
yet local governments differ in their ability to get things done. Gargan (1981) argued that authors 
use capacity in a rhetorical manner rather than in some measurable term. Argranoff and McGuire 
(1998) also comment on the “mysterious” nature of capacity and capacity building reported in 
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public administration literature. Others suggest capacities and skills differing from those 
employed in a traditional, hierarchical, direct government are required and specific to the tool 
used (i.e., contracts, incentives, or grants) (Kettl 2002a, Salamon 2002b, Brown and Potoski 
2003a, Fernandez et al. 2008). Kettl (2002a) and Gargan (1981) both view the performance of 
government or a government agency as equivalent to the ability to manage the indirect tools 
applied while maintaining accountability of all parties.  
The complexity of the different collaborative management tools, their application, the 
policy purpose and the application environment conspire to frustrate formulation of widely 
applicable capacity measures. Honadle (1981) opined that a “consensus definition of capacity” 
was unlikely and that definition of the concept in relation to its application was more appropriate. 
Examples of the differing assessments of capacity include linking capacity to inputs such as 
staffing or spending (Bowman and Kearney 1988) or rules to direct or restrict behaviors of 
political and administrative actors (Hou et al. 2003). Looking specifically at contract use within a 
state government agency, O’Neil (2007) identified information on contracting and management 
support as closely tied to capacity while Mead (2002) related state level capacity for welfare 
reform to the states’ political and administrative culture. Donahue et al. (2000) examined 
selected cities for relationships between city performance and personnel management concluding 
that some characteristics of personnel management influenced the cities’ performance ratings on 
surveys and hence represented measures of capacity. Farazmand (2009) argues the global nature 
of complex problems and proposes that governments at all levels need 11 administrative 
capacities which Farazmand summarized as: structural; process; cultural or normative; 
institutional and organizational; learning leadership and managerial; strategic human resources; 
financial resources; cognitive; technological; ethical accountability and legal/constitutional 
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(democratic representation, responsiveness and fairness); and, developmental (capacity in 
administration and administrative development) (Farazmand 2009).  
From a collaborative management viewpoint, capacity descriptors often reference 
characteristics needed to build, support or sustain collaborative process (Fleeger and Becker 
2008, Garcia-Ramirez et al. 2009). Gazley (2010) points to the importance of collaborative 
capacity created by the age of the partnership and the extent of its activities. A collaborative 
network’s ability to effectively coordinate the members activities highlights the need to make 
“things work” as well as fostering changes in underlying assumptions and beliefs to support the 
work (Nowell 2009). Complex problems being addressed through collaborative efforts face the 
problem of maintaining capacity to sustain both the institutional commitments to the goals and 
the social capital supporting the partnership (Weber et al. 2007).  
A framework to organize the different characterizations of capacity was presented by 
Hale and Slaton (2008). They employing a development timeline of capacity descriptors from 
early concepts of government capacity built on inclusion of public organizations and the local 
environment in deliberations (as in Gargan 1981,  and Honadle 1981) to the contemporary 
concepts of public entities in networked environments such as those described by Agranoff 
(2007), Weber et al. (2007) and Provan and Milward (2001). The timeline description of capacity 
conforms with several authors’ positions that capacity is not a static set of parameters but is a 
dynamic characteristic related to the specific environment, objectives, collaborative management 
mechanisms and the parties.  
Accepting the proposition that capacity descriptors are related to the specific 
circumstances allows some general characteristics to be described. Capabilities important in 
management of contracts which underlie many of the indirect government tools can be grouped 
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into “programmatic” or “operational” skills. Programmatic skills are characterized by Salamon 
(2002b) as activation, orchestration and modulation skills. Operational skills are often specific to 
functional capacities including goal setting, negotiation, implementation capability, financial 
management capabilities, evaluation capability, communication and bridging abilities (Kettl 
2002a, Brown and Potoski 2003a). Generally the literature supports the view that indirect modes 
of government action are not self-executing and require active, program level management in 
which policy goals and choice of tool (regulations, contracts, grants, incentives etc.) are meshed 
to the environment and operating skills.  
A consequence of contracts and other indirect government tools is the development of 
networks focused on policy issues. These networks are composed of government agencies, 
organizations and individuals involved in the program (Kettl 2002a, Salamon 2002b, Cohen and 
Eimicke 2008, Johnston and Romzek 2008, Koliba et al. 2011). Not surprisingly, the 
programmatic level capacities for management of indirect government programs described by 
Salamon (2002b) share similar skills or capacities with those suggested for engaging with policy 
networks (Peters and Pierre 1998, Milward and Provan 2000, Kettl 2002b, Cooper 2003, 
Agranoff 2007, Koliba et al. 2011). Further, networks composed of government officials and 
contractors are noted for creating additional challenges in complex product or purchase of 
services projects. The interdependency of the parties in these circumstances creates questions 
about the boundaries between public and private actions (Frederickson and Smith 2003, Kettl 
2006, Agranoff 2007, Brown et al. 2010). Boundary management capabilities needed in third 
party service contracting for complex products are different from the more commonly found 
agency skills associated with procurement contracts (Kettl 2006). 
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Boundaries in organizations can be roughly equated to where or how lines are drawn 
between where the organization ends and its environment begins, i.e. what is of the agency and 
what is not (Hernes and Paulsen 2003). Hernes and Paulsen (2003), taking a research 
perspective, note that working with organization boundaries can create a dilemma due to 
boundaries’ potential to exist as an inner mental structure of the observer or as an external 
structure of an organization. The realist view of boundaries is at the heart of Kettl’s (2006) 
construction of five boundaries in governmental agencies. He describes mission, resources, 
capacity, responsibility and accountability as the important organizational boundaries challenged 
by indirect service provision and associated networks (Kettl 2000b, Kettl 2002a, Sullivan and 
Skelcher 2002, Kettl 2006). The organizational dynamic introduced into government agencies 
from the inclusion of non-governmental parties is that boundaries are interpreted and shifted by 
stakeholders from inside and outside of the agency (Rafaeli and Vilnai-Yavetz 2003). Buck’s 
(2009) summary of wildlife management agency capacity and boundary challenges follows 
Kettl’s general outline of agency boundaries.  
In summary the capacity literature provides a framework to ask questions about a wide 
set of characteristics ranging from relatively easy determined empirical measurements like 
number of employees or agency funding levels to less concrete concepts such as agency 
boundaries or strategic management abilities. The conclusion drawn from this literature is 
capacity measurements and the importance attributed to certain factors is dependent on the 
circumstance and theoretical basis. In this study, the capacity and boundary literature serves as a 
point of departure that provides a linkage between the factors that limits an agency’s ability to 
accomplish what it wants to get done and boundaries and capacity needs. 
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Accountability and legitimacy.– Public administration scholars note that when contractors 
serve in traditional direct governmental service functions they are positioned between the agency 
and its policies. In this position contractors take a more central role in public policy formation 
and implementation (Gilmour and Jensen 1998, Kettl 2000b). The role change increases the 
complexity of program management for the agency while adding access points for related 
networks, often described as horizontal networks due to their arrangement around a policy or 
issue and outside the agencies’ administrative control (Kettl 2000a, Salamon 2002a, Kettl 2006). 
As Kettl notes, in these networked arrangements elected officials and citizens continue to expect 
stable, direct government provision of services and direct relationship between program 
objectives, funding, government employees and accountability as found in traditional 
hierarchical government. However, the delivery of program services in networked third party 
systems do not respond to traditional budgetary tools and organizational controls since these 
controls do not directly impact the third parties and negatively impacting the agency’s ability to 
manage the complex systems (Kettl 2000b, Salamon 2004, Kettl 2006). The local nature of third 
party program delivery also facilitates the recasting of programs to more closely align with the 
third parties own or local objectives which further confuse accountability (Posner 2002, Salamon 
2004).  
Collaborative management tools create accountability and legitimacy questions as goods 
and services normally considered direct government services are delivered by others (Gilmour 
and Jensen 1998, Milward and Provan 2000, Posner 2002). The accountability problem is larger 
than the simple management of contracts or contractors as suggested by Cohen and Eimicke 
(2008). Contract oversight and management of contractors is important but additional challenges 
to legitimacy and accountability emerge when third party providers directly engage in political 
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processes that affect the program (Kelleher and Yackee 2009). The insider status of parties in a 
policy network also affords more influence politically and administratively over programs and 
diminishes the influence of out-of-network parties (Kettl 2002b).  
Skills reported as useful in addressing the accountability and legitimacy challenges in 
collaborative management settings are often grouped into one or more of the following 
categories: skills to deal with contractor’s political advocacy; maintaining agency accountability 
in circumstances where contractors use programs to pursue their perspectives and goals; 
communication skills for multi-party networks; management skills required in horizontal 
networks; and maintaining agency legitimacy with public while third parties are the public face 
of the program (Posner 2002, Smith and Ingram 2002, O'Toole and Meier 2004, Salamon 2004, 
Van Slyke and Roch 2004, Kettl 2006). Legitimacy may also be expressed as control and 
authority as noted in the previous wildlife management paradigm literature. Control and 
authority are anticipated to be important considerations in state wildlife agencies use of 
contracts.  
Contracts in wildlife management.– State wildlife management has a number of 
distinctions previously reviewed including public trust doctrine relationships and no local 
government component. These features differ from the federal-state-local government 
frameworks typically found in service delivery in social and protective services settings reported 
by authors such as Kettl (2006) or Salamon (2004). Many studies of government capacity have 
largely focused on federal agencies or on health and social service programs at the state and local 
levels exemplified by Gainsbourough (2003) report on the variation in state government’s 
response to devolution of welfare services.  
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Searches based on the key words of state agencies, public trust doctrine and collaborative 
management yield few results outside of environmental regulatory topics and institutional 
change topics (see for example Jacobson and Decker 2008, Buck 2009, Jacobson et al. 2010). No 
specific linkages between contracting, contract management and contracting capacity within 
state wildlife agencies surfaces. However the literature on natural resource agencies contains 
numerous references to efforts to manage and/or engage the public, communities, contractors and 
corporate interest in collaborative management, regulatory processes and local decision making. 
These efforts are variously labeled but most often identified as collaborative management or 
public participation. The efforts are often related to specific management topics, wildlife species 
or geographic locations. Generally the descriptions offer no assessment of agency capacity, 
capacity needs or contract impacts. The reports primarily focus on collaborative processes and 
social interaction (see for example Leach 2006, Ansell and Gash 2008, Margerum 2008).  
State wildlife agencies would be expected to be subject to similar efficiency and growth 
limitations which lead to the enlarged roles of contractors as reported in the public administration 
literature which (Frederickson 1996, Rhodes 1996a, Gilmour and Jensen 1998, Kettl 2000b, 
Kettl 2000a, Salamon 2004 and others). Employees of natural resource agencies reportedly view 
contractors variously as political allies, service providers, sources of labor and sources of 
expertise to less positive assessments as incompetents and in some cases as threats to agency 
goals or objectives (Jacobi and Wellman 1983, Trauger et al. 1995, Foster 2001 and personal 
observations). Contractor’s assessment of contract administration and management of contractor 
relations by state wildlife agencies are not represented in the literature.  
Natural resource agencies are often portrayed in the literature as viewing third parties as a 
way to benefit the agencies objectives by completing tasks, “leveraging funds” (i.e., looking for 
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cost sharing, generating political support for the agency and its programs), managing or 
providing volunteers, or analyzing projects for suitability to distribute to other non-agency 
parties (Jacobi and Wellman 1983, Trauger et al. 1995, Foster 2001). Reports of third party 
impacts on wildlife agency policies typically focus on the outside parties as representatives of 
either traditional user groups or interest groups not aligned with traditional wildlife user groups 
(Mutter et al. 1999, Nie 2004a, Jacobson and Decker 2008, Buck 2009). Examination of third 
party service provider impacts on wildlife agency policy, capacities and agency boundary issues 
are not evident in this literature. 
Agency theory.– Exploring contracts and use of contractors necessarily invokes 
consideration of agency theory. Simply described, agency theory presents the aspects of a 
relationship where one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent) using a 
conceptual contract as a prop or construct to highlight the elements of the relationship 
(Eisenhardt 1989, Shapiro 2005). Agency theory is applied in many settings and allows different 
academic disciplines to apply discipline specific definitions to highlight aspects of the 
relationship. General application of agency theory assumes all parties are self interested, risk 
adverse, have bounded rationality, that conflicts exist among the parties, and that information 
about the system is a commodity with a cost (Eisenhardt 1989). The formal literature cites two 
types of agency problems: moral hazard, generally characterized as the shirking agent, and 
adverse selection, generally characterized as an unfortunate selection of an agent arising from the 
agent’s misrepresentation of their abilities (Arrow 1985, Eisenhardt 1989). In both cases, the 
problem occurs when the principal cannot easily or inexpensively verify the information about 
the agent or the agent’s actions (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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Four broad agency theory applications can be identified based on different settings and 
elements. Agency in law predates agency theory and has a long legal tradition including 
liabilities and criteria for determining agency (Shapiro 2005). Ross (1973) is credited with 
describing agency theory in economics where it is often labeled principal-agent theory with 
accompanying mathematical models. Attention is focused on “contract problems” related to 
bargaining, incentives and monitoring agent performance (Ross 1973, Shapiro 2005, Lane 2009). 
Barry Mitnick proposed a political science and sociological version of agency theory focused on 
control of agents, sanctions and agency cost (Moe 1984, Bowie and Freeman 1992, Shapiro 
2005). Moe (1984) notes political science’s greater reliance on the economic formulations which 
fostered development of rational choice theory. Early on, White (1985) noted what he called the 
“social plumbing” agency theory provided in social settings. Using Mitnick’s formulation of 
agency theory expanded the application into social settings using norms, social controls, 
networks and professions (Mitnick 1992, Shapiro 2005). Agency theory has been adapted to 
widely varying circumstances: how resource distributions can be influenced (Carpenter and 
Feroz 2001); monitoring and sanctioning in organizational settings (Weimer 1995); incentives 
and agent responses in governmental reform (Dixit 2002, Frederickson and Smith 2003, 
Worsham and Gatrell 2005); and performance evaluation under uncertainty and risk sharing 
(Eisenhardt 1985).  
Government contracting for services creates at least two different agency relationships: 
one between the voters (principals) and the bureaucracy (agent), and the second between the 
contractor (agent) and the bureaucracy (principal) (Kennedy and Malatesta 2010). It can be 
argued that, in government, many principal agent relationships are created simultaneously and, 
depending on the setting, network arrangements result. The existence of multiple principal and 
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agent roles for members of service provision networks has been described and agency theory 
applied as an analytical framework (Provan and Milward 2001).  
Criticisms of agency theory have focused mostly on the self-interested individual aspect 
of the theory which ignores cooperative behaviors (Lambright 2009). Stewardship theory or 
relational contracting behaviors are invoked in situations where agents are not expected to be 
self-interested maximizes such as when non-profits under contract provide services related to 
their mission (Lambright 2009). Agency theory is also criticized as misunderstanding the 
conflicting interest problems created in multi-principal systems where the agents cannot opt out 
of acting for the many principals (Shapiro 2005). Ultimately agency theory’s scope is limited to 
providing direction on how a principal can control its relationship with an agent in ways to 
promote goal alignment and reduce opportunistic behavior through monitoring, sanctions and 
incentives (Van Slyke 2009). It should be noted that the incentives, sanctions and monitoring 
posited in agency theory as controls are considered less effective than traditional structural 
controls of government agencies (Whitford 2002).  
 Reviewed literature synopsis.– This chapter reviews literature covering a range of topics 
which are revisited in the later chapters. Two general topic areas have been presented. The first 
covers literature related to the history and features of state wildlife management agencies. 
Included is a brief historical account of state wildlife agencies and selected topics that address 
institutional characteristics, policies and collaborative management. This literature establishes 
the unique, shared features of state wildlife agencies and some discussions of transition in 
agency policy and management. These characteristics are hypothesized to influence the use of 
third parties in state wildlife management programs. 
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 The second area explored in this review includes devolution, accountability, legitimacy, 
and capacities related to use of contracts by government agencies. Included is an overview of 
agency theory which is employed as an analysis tool to explore relationships between wildlife 
agency staff, contractors and procurement staff. A summary of the limited literature describing 
state wildlife agencies use of contractors is also provided.  
This study intends to begin to address the small volume of literature on state wildlife 
agency use of contracts by examining one wildlife agencies use of contracts, the relationship of 
contract use to employees and financial resources and changes in use of outside third parties in 
wildlife management. Additionally, the literature’s suggestion that a wildlife institutional 
paradigm influences the use of outside parties is explored through interviews with parties 
directly engaged in wildlife contracting. This study focuses on contract use data and influences 
that underlie contract use decisions. Contracts for wildlife management services and grants are 
indication of collaborative management actions and are key to in engaging “outside” or third 




3)   METHODS 
General 
References to the use of contracts by state wildlife agencies and specific contract capacity 
references do not appear in the literature. The focus of this research is to explore a state wildlife 
agencies’ use of outside parties to obtain services or actions directly supporting wildlife 
management objectives. The working assumption of this exploration is that state wildlife 
agencies engaging third parties to perform wildlife management functions will involve the 
exchange of money, materials, or grants of authority that results in a recorded contract. The 
contracts may have different names depending on the parties, type of arrangement, and other 
factors but all will share the characteristic of being recorded under rules prescribed by a state’s 
fiscal management policies. Additionally it is assumed that recorded actions involving goods, 
materials, services, authorities or money will be maintained in the state accounting records as a 
commitment document which includes all contracts and purchase orders and are referred to 
collectively as contracts here. The accounting records established a point of departure for 
assessing how contracts are used in state wildlife agencies. The state’s fiscal rules set the scope 
of the agreements reviewed. Accessing wildlife agency accounting records were anticipated to 
require agency agreement and the records were anticipated to differ based on the individual state, 
wildlife agency and state fiscal practices.  
The focus on contract use and agency contracting capacity limited the sources of 
information to the state wildlife agencies themselves and potentially other agencies which might 
control or maintain accounting records. A limited number of individuals within a state wildlife 
agency were anticipated to have firsthand experience and knowledge with contracts, contract use 
patterns, contract management, and monitoring of contracts. This assumption is based on 
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delegation of authorities to negotiate or approve contracts within organizations (see for example 
Controller 2009a, Controller 2010). The information regarding a contractors’ experience with 
state wildlife agency contracts is limited to the specific contractors and was anticipated to vary 
based on the characteristics of the contracted tasks.  
Publicly available accounting records for state wildlife agencies were expected to contain 
information on the identity of the contractors, information on the amount (monetary size) of the 
agreement, and accounting details specific to the agreement. Information about agency capacity 
was not available from the accounting records and required information from individual 
informants. The emergent nature of the data, the limited sources of relevant information coupled 
with the unknown distribution of agency data sources and contractors presents a significant data 
collection task when applied as a wide scale inquiry of the individual states. To reduce the scale 
of the data collection efforts, a sequential exploratory data collection strategy (Creswell 2009) 
coupled with a purposeful sampling and data collection approach (Teddlie and Yu 2007) was 
employed. Potential informants were not randomly distributed within the organizations due to 
the patterns of delegation of authority. Broadly described, the data collection steps employed are 
as follows: 
1. Selection of two state wildlife agencies.  
2. Obtain public records on budgets and contract information for the selected agencies.  
3. Establish contact with employees reported in the records as contract managers.  
4. Conduct interviews with selected agency contract managers.  
5. Establish contacts with agency suggested contractors. 
6. Conduct interviews with willing contractors. 
The data types are expected to consist of accounting records and interview transcripts. 
The different data types require mixed qualitative and quantitative analysis methods. Accounting 
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records are expected to contain numeric data and textual data along with standardized codes. 
Agency employees and contractors were expected to supply verbal information via interviews 
and perhaps other data types such as printed records, reports or brochures. The sequential 
exploratory approach adopted uses the data from the quantitative analysis of the accounting 
records to inform the qualitative phase. The stages are graphically depicted in Figure 3.1.  
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Qual = Qualitative methods primary; quan = Quantitative methods secondary;  
Quan = Quantitative methods primary 
 
Figure 3. 1 Sequential exploratory data collection design per criteria in Creswell (2009). 
 
Elements of the study plan dropped during implementation.– The original research 
proposal included an added step not depicted in Figure 3.1. This step anticipated the 
development and administration of a survey tool canvassing 48 state wildlife agencies and 
selected wildlife contractors on the themes developed from the two state wildlife agency cases. 
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unavailable. Complications with data availability from one state wildlife agency also added to 
the survey development cost concerns.  
 Units of analysis.– Data collection efforts focused on the CDOW and the WGFD. The 
selection of the Colorado and Wyoming wildlife management agencies was based on proximity 
to Colorado State University (which would allow for onsite interviews) and the author’s prior 
employment with the CDOW. Past work experience provided a personal knowledge of state 
wildlife agencies in general but also specific knowledge of the CDOW and contractors in 
Colorado. The political and demographic characteristics of Colorado and Wyoming were 
expected to provide a comparison of state wildlife agency implementation of third party wildlife 
management. Agreements to participate were obtained from the CDOW and the WGFD (see 
Appendix 3.1). Each agency agreed to provide publicly available accounting information and 
allow access to employees for interviews. The agreement provided for employee choice in 
participation and did not mandate participation. Contractor contacts were based on interview 
content and participant recommendations. Participation by contractors was strictly voluntary. 
 Data Collection and Analysis 
 Formal contact was made with both CDOW and WGFD to establish desired employee 
contact procedures for each agency and request for at least 5 years of contract accounting 
records. The requested data are public records in both states. The request asked for electronic 
formats where available. Contract accounting records from Colorado were supplied as individual 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for fiscal years 1999-2010 (12 complete fiscal years). The data sets 
were created by using a standard system transaction report query of the Colorado Financial 
Records accounting system (COFRs). The data reported purchase orders and contracts attributed 
to the CDOW including interagency agreements and other contract-like transactions as required 
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by state fiscal rules. Generally state fiscal rules require “commitment documents” (i.e., purchase 
orders, contracts or similar instruments) when the purchases from an individual 
vendor/contractor equals or exceeds $5,000 in any single fiscal year (Controller 2009a).  
In the case of the WGFD, the agency contact arranged a meeting with a financial section 
supervisor to address the contract records request. The meeting revealed that WGFD’s ability to 
provide a five-year contract use or accounting record was not feasible due to a recent change in 
Wyoming’s accounting software. The WGFD Assistant Director for financial services related 
that Wyoming’s change in state accounting software disabled the older accounting software 
system and older records were archiving as printouts. WGFD did not retain printouts beyond the 
fiscal year close out. It was further reported that agency records might not be available as 
individual records as Wyoming elected to archive a printed record of the state complete financial 
record. It was suggested that a current fiscal year report could be created provided that 
completion could be delayed. Subsequent follow up request did not result in data sets 
comparable to the CDOW data. However, a limited data set for a single fiscal years professional 
service contracts was provided. The limited scope of the data set did not support a quantitative 
analysis but was used to make initial interview contacts. The limited WGFD contract data set 
shifted the plan of study to a single case study employing a smaller interview-based case for 
triangulation and confirmation purposes.  
The CDOW contract data analysis was not as straight forward as this brief introduction 
would suggest or as was assumed at the planning and study outset. Analysis was complicated by 
the large number of entries, the accounting structure and obscure interpretation keys required 
interpret and transform the data for analysis. It should be noted that the transformation was a 
complex undertaking and relied in some cases on the investigators past experience with the states 
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accounting system and contracts. Without the experience, a reconstruction of the data set could 
differ from those presented here. To help the reader understand the transformation steps used to 
change the original accounting records into the database used for other analysis steps, Table 3.1 
provides a listing of the main data transformation steps using the section headings following the 
table as guide to the data preparation and transformation steps applied. 
Table 3. 1 Key to data transformation steps by subsection title. 
Subsection Heading Purpose Actions Taken 
Description of the data set Review of Excel data sheets 
Identification of data 




Standardize and group 
contractors by name 
Standardize names and add 
“interagency” to appropriate 
transactions 
Separating the financial 
functions 
Fracture the accounting data 
structure 
Separate awards, payments 
and adjustments into separate 
data fields 
The “M” codes 
Determine action taken in 
modified transactions 
Assign modified transactions 
to data fields 
Creating the Access database 
Create a single data set for 
analysis 
Create the database structure, 
data import and quality control 
Queries and PAWS Statistics 
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Data analysis 
Query development and data 
analysis 
 
Description of the data sets.– The CDOW accounting data contained data on the fiscal 
year, contract numbers, fiscal system coding and dollar amounts for each transaction related to 
an individual contract. Contractor identity was reliably included for non-state government 
vendors but was not included on all state interagency contracts. Descriptions and comments 
related to contract purposes or descriptions of action were not included in many cases. The data 
sets originated as standard system transaction report queries available within the COFRs system 
and the reports were captured as Excel spreadsheets. Request for definitions of codes used in the 
data, including purchase codes and classification codes were made simultaneous with the 
accounting data. The State of Colorado Procurement Manual (Controller 2010) was obtained 
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from the Colorado State Controller’s Office web site (http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/DPA-
SCO/DSCO/1249666995594) and a CDOW organizational unit procurement and account code 
list was obtained from the CDOW Planning and Budgeting staff. These code lists were used to 
group and categorize the accounting records for analysis. 
The accounting data spreadsheets were examined to understand the data structure, 
potential data management needs and identify data interpretation issues. The examination 
revealed the need for care in the use and manipulation of the data sets. The data origin from an 
accounting system limited direct analytical actions. For example, summing the dollar amounts in 
one of the spreadsheets yields a sum of $0.00 due to the accounting reports design. A single 
contract may have multiple entries to report actions such as adjustments in the contract amount, 
multiple payments, changes in codes used, cancelation of all or parts of the contract, transfer of 
part or all of the contract to another fiscal year or other modifications. 
The data sets also contain data entry changes as each record is entered into COFRs by a 
purchasing or accounting employee, who changed over the time. These changes appear as 
differences in data entry conventions such as differing spellings or abbreviations used for 
vendors’ names (i.e. US Forest Service, Forest Service, and USDA Forest Service all refer to the 
same federal agency), and use of the description and memo fields. The sometimes missing 
vendor identification for state intergovernmental agreements previously mentioned is also related 
to different data entry personnel. A more difficult to resolve and significant data interpretation 
and analysis challenge arises from the account and funding code changes recorded in the data 
sets. The funding and account changes typically employed multiple transactions (reported as 
individual entries or records) with equal positive and negative values but with different codes 
used for accounts or fund types. Unfortunately most of these transactions do not have descriptors 
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or comments, however, a modification flag code indicates a change was made. Determination of 
contract expenditures required comparing and matching records flagged as being modified for 
amounts and funding codes to identify payments or contract amount modifications from those 
which were internal accounting code changes.  
The data set is comprised of 79,361 records which mandated a database application to 
manage and manipulate the data set. Microsoft Access 2007 was selected and a trial import of a 
single fiscal year data set from the original Excel spreadsheet was used to verify the integrity of 
the data import and test reporting and analysis routines against a smaller data set. Trials of 
different algorithms to prepare the data set for analysis proved unreliable due to data 
characteristics previously noted and proved time consuming to verify appropriate processing. As 
a result, Excel was used to prepare each fiscal year’s data set for analysis and the resulting 
prepared data set was imported into Access. Data preparation steps included identifying vendor 
naming inconsistencies or variations, identifying fiscal year roll forwards, separating contract 
increases and payments from account code changes, identifying contract terminations and 
categorizing coding change impact.  
Standardizing vendor names.– Data set preparation began by creating copies of the 
original accounting reports and archiving the originals as reference sets. Working copies of each 
fiscal year were sorted by vendor name and contract number. The sorted data was scanned for 
varying naming conventions. Vendor naming was standardized in cases indicating data entry 
differences related to abbreviations, spellings, name shortening or key stroke errors. To illustrate 
the previously mentioned identification differences, the variations on the U. S. Forest Service 
was standardized as U.S. Forest Service while Colo State University, Colorado State University 
and CSU were standardized as Colorado State University. Contract entries that contained no 
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vendor name but coded as interagency contracts or the comment field identified the contracts as 
interagency agreements were given a vendor name of “Intergovernmental”. In cases where the 
actual agency could be identified, the agency name was entered. 
Separating the financial functions.– The spreadsheets were sorted on the comment field 
and all transactions that were noted as “rolled in”, “roll forward” or “lapsed” or “contract closed” 
or similar descriptors were located. The dollar amounts reported in the “Amount” cell for these 
entries were moved into one of the three added spreadsheet fields named “Rolled In”, “Rolled 
Out” and “Lapsed”. The individual spreadsheets were also sorted on the transaction type field 
and contract number. Values reported as payment vouchers were moved to a new “PV Amount” 
field. If the code was for an intergovernmental payment, the value was moved to an “IA 
Expended” cell.  
The “M” codes.– Addressing the funding changes within the data sets was a larger 
challenge both within the fiscal years and between fiscal years due to multi-year contracts and 
contract roll forwards into a future fiscal year. The task required a fiscal year by fiscal year 
evaluation of the suspect contracts. The individual spreadsheets were sorted by contract number 
and transaction date. Each contract entry was scanned for a “M” code in the modification flag 
data field. The “M” code indicated that the entry was modified by the accounts and control staff. 
“M” codes identify several potential actions including roll forwards, roll ins, fund changes, 
partial payments, reductions to the contract or the payment of the contract by supervising 
accountants outside of the CDOW. The range of actions or combination of actions in a single 
entry made interpretation of “M” coded transactions by using a programming algorithm 
unreliable. A manual review and classification was applied to the data sorted by contract number 
and transaction. Each contract with a modified flag was evaluated and categorized. Those 
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recording payments by accounting staff outside the CDOW had the value in the “Amount” cell 
moved to the ‘PV Amount” cell thereby recording it as an expenditure. Rolled in amounts from 
prior fiscal years were left in the “Amount” cell and copied into the “Rolled In” cell indicating 
contracted amounts for that fiscal year and the multiple fiscal year link. Amounts identified as 
rolled out were moved to the “Rolled Out” cell identifying a movement of contract amounts to 
the next fiscal year.  
Funding and administrative coding changes were identified by comparing the transaction 
date, identical dollar values and comparing the accompanying financial coding for changes. In 
cases identifying coding changes, no adjustments were made to the data set which maintained the 
contract value. Some entries contained information in the comments or description cells that 
provided guidance on the entry and eased classification. A limited subset of entries could not be 
classified based on the data available in the transaction record. Where the intent of the change 
could not be determined, no changes were made to the data set. Completion of these steps 
resulted in all fiscal year data spreadsheets appearing as depicted in Table 3.1 which displays 
sample data from fiscal year 2005 for illustration purposes.  
Creating the Access database.– An Access database with a structure matching the 
spreadsheets (Table 3.1) was created and the data from each spreadsheet was sequentially 
imported by fiscal year. Verification of the import of all spreadsheet entries was monitored by 
the incremental increase in record numbers before and after each import. A visual inspection of 
the database following each spreadsheet import verified all database fields were populated. 
Running sums were used to confirm comparability of totals between the Excel and Access data 
sets as each fiscal year was added in Access. The completed database was subject to queries, 
reports and other actions to explore the data and format data for analysis. The original research
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Table 3. 2 Data format of Excel and Access data files using sample data from fiscal year 2005. 
Fiscal YR1 PURCHASE ORDER VENDOR NAME TRANSACTION DATE MOD FUND APP ORG PROG 
2005 OEPBA05000000297 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY PVPBAAV050000946 3/18/2005  410 50O 5780 7120 
2005 OEPBA05000000297 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY PVPBAAV050000946 3/18/2005  410 60O 6710 7550 
2005 OEPBA05000000297 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY OEPBA05000000297 5/25/2005 M 410 60O 6710 7550 
2005 OEPBA05000000297 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY OEPBA05000000297 6/1/2005 M 410 21O 2120 7550 
 
 
  (Continued from above) 
 
 
OBJT SO GBL Comment DESCRIPTION AMOUNT Tran Type IA expend PV Amount Rolled In Rolled Out Lapsed 
4220  CASH  DIVISION OF WILDLIFE  PV  -$212.50    
4220  CASH  DIVISION OF WILDLIFE  PV  -$2,762.50    
4220  CASH   -$637.50 OE      
4220  CASH   -$212.50 OE      
 
 
1 Fiscal YR= Fiscal Year, Purchase Order = Contract, agreement or purchase order number, Vendor Name = Contractor, 
Transaction = Individual transaction identification number, Date = Date transaction entered, MOD = Modified entry, Fund = Agency fund identification, APP = 
Appropriation identification, ORG = Agency organizational unit identification, PROG = Program identification number, OBJT = Code identifying purchase type, 
SO = Sub-object code used to further identify purchase type (applies to only select object codes), GBL = General budget ledger identification, Comment = 
Comment field, Description = Contract or transaction descriptors, Amount = amount encumbered by contract or modifications to the encumbered amount, Tran 
Type = transaction type code, IA expended = Interagency agreement payment amount, PV Amount = Payments made, Rolled In = Contract amounts rolled 
forward into this fiscal year from previous fiscal years, Rolled Out = Contract amounts rolled forward into the next fiscal year, and Lapsed = Encumbered 
amount remaining unexpended at the end of a contract and subtracted to make the encumbered amount equal to $0.00. 
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proposal suggested the comment and description fields would be useful for thematic analysis 
(Braun and Clark 2006, Grbich 2007) which proved to be an erroneous assumption. The basis for 
the proposal was the official description of the purpose of these fields. Actual use of the fields 
did not match the actual use. This analysis step was abandoned after examination of the data set 
revealed sporadic, inconsistent use of the fields with little data about the purpose or use of the 
contract itself.  
Queries and PAWS Statistics 18.– Queries of the database were used to explore and 
develop understandings of the content and refine queries used to summarize and consolidate data 
for analysis. Data intended for statistical analysis were saved as Excel spreadsheets for import 
into SPSS, Inc.’s PASW Statistics 18 analysis software. Excel was used to visually review and 
standardize the format of data (variable names, spacing etc), combine query results and in some 
cases create new logical or calculated variables prior to import into PASW 18. Spreadsheets 
were imported into PASW 18 and all data sets were visually compared prior to analysis. 
CDOW appropriations, employee numbers and total expenditure data.– Legislative 
reports detailing appropriations and expenditures were obtained for all fiscal years in the 
accounting records plus an additional fiscal year prior and post those in the data set (Joint Budget 
Committee 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 
2011). The reports for fiscal years 2002 through 2011 were obtained from the Colorado 
Legislatures Joint Budget Committee Staff Reports web page: 
http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/jbc/apprepts.htm. Reports for fiscal years prior to 2002 
were not available electronically and were made available by the CDOW or the Colorado 
Department of Natural Resources (CDNR). The appropriation reports provide summaries of the 
state’s official budgets in dollars and employees numbers (reported as full time equivalents or 
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FTE) for all Colorado state government agencies. Generally each report contains an agencies 
prior fiscal year expenditures and FTE use. The reports also contain summaries of adjustments to 
the appropriations that occur due to legislative action, vetoes, grant changes, federal program 
changes, administrative action or other actions. The collection of reports for the fiscal years 
before and after the contract data timeframe provided a record of the appropriations and 
expenditure data covering the contract data fiscal years. Appropriations and expenditures of state 
and federal funds are consistently reported across the time period but other report elements were 
modified or eliminated. Reporting procedures for full time equivalents (FTE) allocations have 
changed over time, however additional data on FTE use from the CDOW allowed calculation of 
comparable FTE data for the period. Data from the appropriation reports were entered into Excel 
for further analysis and importing into PASW 18. The CDOW provided copies of its zero-based 
budget request and supporting budget schedules, the agency’s formal budget request submitted to 
the Colorado Legislature’s Joint Budget Committee for fiscal years 2002 through 2010 
(Colorado Division of Wildlife 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008). Prior to 
fiscal year 2002, these budget documents were not required and a comparable data set was not 
available. Printed copies of the CDOW portion of the budget request schedules and the Joint 
Budget Committee’s standardized forms covering the 2000 through 2010 fiscal year budget 
requests were also made available by the CDOW Budgeting and Planning staff. The data in the 
budget schedules is the same as in the zero-based budget request but presented in a summarized 
structure. As with the Joint Budget Committee appropriations reports, there are variations in the 
format and some data elements over the time period. These reports were used to compare and 
cross check the spreadsheet data from the zero-based budget request.  
41 
 
Wyoming Game and Fish Department contracting data.– WGFD was unable to supply 
fiscal year accounting data similar in scope or content to the CDOW data. A list of contracts 
described as “professional services” for fiscal year 2010 was provided. The data set, in an Excel 
format, included vendor names, object coding, contract numbers, descriptions, amounts and 
information on the organizational units managing the contracts (Frank 2011). The contract data 
was described as a professional services subset of contracts used by the WGFD during fiscal year 
2010. How this abbreviated data set might be compared or characterize to the 2010 CDOW data 
was not clear. Both data sets contain categories of contract services identified as “professional 
services”. The descriptors of contract codes provided by the WGFD suggest that the professional 
services classification shares some common elements with a similarly name category used by the 
CDOW. However, differences in the official category descriptions questioned the extent of 
comparability and excluded direct comparison of the WGFD fiscal 2010 data to the CDOW data. 
Lacking comparable data sets precluded development of a case analysis of contracts and budgets 
of the WGFD as originally planned. The WGFD case was modified into a small confirmatory 
case using the 2010 WGFD data set to identify contract managers as initial interview contacts.  
Interview procedures.– The interview process was similar in both the WGFD and 
CDOW. The process began with a review of the accounting data to establish the collaborative 
management contract users within each agency. High volume users were identified and interview 
contacts arranged with the assistance of the CDOW and WGFD contacts. Request for interviews 
were made directly with the contract administrators identified in the accounting data. Contacts 
followed the Colorado State University Social, Behavioral & Education Research Protocol #09-
1432H. Potential informants were contacted by phone and the purpose of the contact and the 
research project explained. Each was asked if they wished to participate. If the potential 
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informant agreed to an interview, the interview process was described, a time and location set, 
and a letter of introduction along with a copy of a formal consent agreement was provided 
electronically. At the agreed time and location the informant was contacted and the introduction 
materials and research description were covered verbally. No potential informants withdrew 
following the initial verbal description which was followed by review and completion of the 
informed consent agreement. After completion of the consent agreement, the interview began. 
Initial interviews started with CDOW staff. Identification of additional informants was 
incorporated into the interview through request for suggestions on important agency or 
contractor contacts. The request for suggested contacts follows a network or snowball sampling 
process (Teddlie and Yu 2007) to identify key informants. The WGFD selection process was 
similar.  
The interview format was semi-structured and conversational (Patton 2002b, Glesne 
2006). Each interview consisted of an introduction, acknowledgement of the confidentiality and 
consent agreements, including agreement to recording, transcript production and possible follow 
up contact. None declined the recording or production of a transcript. Two participants declined 
either the receipt of a review transcript or interest in follow up contact. Prior to the interview 
start a brief description of the interview process and an outline of the interview scope were 
provided. The verbal outline gave noticed that they would be asked to verify their consent to 
participate, the organization they worked for and a brief description of their responsibilities. 
Upon completing this interview initiation procedure, the recorder was started and the interview 
proceeded using open-ended “how” and “why” questions (Yin 1998, Patton 2002a, Glesne 2006) 
to explore contract use, experiences, attitudes, monitoring, and relationships with the contractors. 
Themes that emerged from the initial interviews were explored as part of later interviews to 
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develop a clearer understanding of emerging themes and provide triangulation on the themes and 
concepts (Decrop 1999, Charmaz 2005). 
All interviews were voice recorded using a Sony digital recorder. The digital files were 
imported into Sony’s Digital Voice Recorder software and verbatim transcriptions produced 
using MS Word. Following the research protocol, individuals named in the interview were 
identified by codes in the transcripts. Exceptions were in cases where the individual was a public 
official and their name was integral to the context, as in a reference to the state’s governor. 
Codes used in the transcript were created by using the state U. S. Postal Service state 
abbreviation and a sequential number corresponding to sequence the individual was contacted or 
appeared in the interview transcripts (e.g. CO-01). The code for an individual was used in all 
subsequent transcripts and materials where the individual was referenced. A linked list of codes 
and subjects’ names and contact information was created and secured as described in research 
protocol. The contact data was used to communicate, respond to inquiries and facilitate member 
checking (Yin 1994, Creswell 2009).  
Interview analysis.– Interview transcript management and analysis followed a grounded 
theory like approach described in several different research traditions (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 
Charmaz 2005, Fendt and Sachs 2008). Interviews were transcribed and sent for member 
checking if consent was provided. Member checked transcripts were imported into QSR 
International's NVivo 9 software for review and coding. Grounded theory coding approaches 
were used to code and build comparisons of the data (Charmaz 2005, Fendt and Sachs 2008). 
Initial coding was unstructured and developed from the interview content (Bazeley 2007). As 
coding progressed, axial type coding was applied (Strauss and Corbin 1990). As additional 
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analysis approaches, a structured agency theory and institutional theory based tree coding 
scheme was applied to the open coded transcripts (Bazeley 2007).  
Personal narrative.– The researcher’s past CDOW employment may have improved or 
complicated data collection and interpretation. To address past experiences and locate the 
researcher’s position and frame of mind, a personal narrative (Rhoads 2003, Nash 2004, Wall 
2006) was developed along with the interviews. Auto-ethnographic techniques (Chang 2008) 
were employed to focus the personal narrative on the researcher’s past experiences in his wildlife 
management career and compare recollections and reflections on service contracting in three 
state wildlife agencies. The narrative covers similar topics asked in the interviews and uses a 
loose chronological structure with reflective comments relevant to each part of the narrative. 
Case study development  
 The case study construction contemplated during the research design phase called for 
two exploratory case studies based on contracting records and interviews. The cases were 
expected to provide the basis to construct a survey of all 50 state wildlife agencies. As previously 
noted, the single year, limited contract data set provided by the WGFD resulted in reconfiguring 
plans for replicated cases studies into a single case with a small confirmatory case. Lack of 
research support funds necessary to develop, validate and conduct a survey of all state wildlife 
agencies eliminated the survey elements. The resulting modified case study design is best 
characterized as an exploratory (revelatory, in Yin’s terms), single case design (Yin 2003; 2009) 
compatible with hypothesis generation rather than theory testing (Levy 2008, Seawright and 
Gerring 2008). The Colorado case uses the contract accounting data, budgetary data and 
interviews as the data sources. 
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A total of 23 interviews were conducted in Colorado with representation from the 
following groups (number of interviews per group in parenthesizes): agencies administering 
CDOW contracting (3), CDOW field staff (4), CDOW program staff (11), for-profit contractors 
(2), non-profit contractors (3). The key areas explored in the interviews were:  
1. How extensively are contracts used for biological or habitat objectives? 
2. Why are contractors used? 
3. How do the participants describe the agency-contractor relationship?  
4. To what extent were capacity and boundary management issues identified? 
5. How does the agency respond to capacity and boundary concerns? 
A smaller interview-only case was developed from interviews with four WGFD program 
staff. The purpose was to compare elements or themes developed in Colorado and provide 
insight on the extent the CDOW case might be representative or idiosyncratic (Yin 1998, Decrop 
1999). In the Wyoming case, contracting data was limited in amount and scope. The limited 
accounting data set was not used in comparison or construction of the case study. The two initial 
interviews were purposely selected from the contract administrators listed in the WGFD 2010 
provided accounting data. Selection of the two initial interviewees was based on the individuals’ 
appearance in the accounting data as administering larger numbers of service contracts. Two 
additional interviews from referrals were conducted. Attempts to arrange additional interviews 
proved unsuccessful within the available timeframe.  
Ethical Considerations 
This research involved interviewing individuals from different organizations and was 
reviewed and approved under provisions of research involving human subjects under the 
“expedited review” process of the CSU Research Integrity and Compliance Review Office 
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(website http://web.research.colostate.edu/ricro/default.aspx  assessed on September 17, 2009) 
prior to data collection. The Colorado State University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
application for review of the research plan and a proposed introduction letter were submitted in 
October 2009. Initial review resulted in the addition of a formal participant consent form and 
CDOW and WGFD participation letters (see Appendix 3.1). The amended proposal was 
approved as #09-1432H in November 2009 and remained an approved protocol until November 
2012. Confidentiality and record management requirements remain in force under this protocol. 
Limitations 
 This research makes the methodological choice to measure and analysis collaboration 
using contract records for selected types of contracts. This choice uses the number of contracts 
and dollars expended as measures of collaborative management. These measures do not consider 
other actions that a state wildlife agency might employ to support collaborative management 
including non-monetary support and employee time. Additionally the categorization of the 
contract data may not be fully equivalent to collaborative management contracts. The data set 
does not support an assessment of collaborative components or delegated type task. While the 
contract data provides a year to year comparison of contract volume, expenditures and categories 
used as a measure of collaborative management, the data is also understood to contain an 
unknown number of contracts that contain delegated elements.  
This research relies on the assumed willingness of the wildlife agencies and their 
contractors to cooperate with the research project by providing data and employees for 
interviews. As previously noted, the agencies were supportive of the project but other limits 
interfered with data availability and some individuals chose not to participate. All agency 
interviews were voluntary and assume the willingness, openness and truthfulness of the 
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informants. Similarly, the contractors interviewed were assumed to be willing participants who 
were open and truthful. Reliance on interview data is subject to the general limitations of bias 
created by poorly constructed questions, inaccuracies in recall, reflexivity by the interviewee’s to 
give interviewer what is wanted, and response bias (Yin 1994, Creswell 2009).  
Six specific limitations are identified in methods used in this research project. First, the 
contract use information is from an accounting information system built on a transaction, rule-
based, accounting metaphor which does not provide information on content, objectives or 
outcomes of the contracts it records. Second, collection of interview data via a network/snowball 
sampling regime could miss outlying cases or contrary data. Third, contractors or their 
employees may be inclined to omit or limit what they may believe to be uncomplimentary 
comments and thereby limit development of the understanding of the contract environment. 
Fourth, the researcher has limited knowledge of the WGFD and is reliant on participants and the 
official agency liaison for explanations and clarifications of agency specific content. Fifth, the 
researcher’s past employment and participation in contracting could introduce unrecognized bias 
into the analysis or interpretation. Sixth, the restructuring of the research project into a single 
case study and a small confirmative case does not provide a replicated case which limits 




4)   PERSONAL NARRATIVE 
A postmodernist? I don’t think so. Nope, I’m a trained and certified wildlife biologist 
who has spent many years supervising biologists, wildlife law enforcement agents, and various 
specialists, engineers and others as an administrator of state wildlife programs. One thing I 
know; being a wildlife biologist doesn’t generally provide room for a lot of alternate world 
views. As a former state wildlife agency manager and administrator, I don’t think many 
employees of state wildlife management agencies would say their work could be interpreted as 
post-modern. Yeah, I have called it other things, but postmodern wasn’t on the list. I’ve also 
been called a lot of names while engaged in wildlife work and postmodern isn’t in that list either!  
Yet, I have been accused of applying what I would call a pragmatic-relativistic approach 
by some who are stronger adherents of wildlife professional orthodoxy. In many cases I tend to 
think that what something looks like depends on where you’re standing. But not being a poster 
child for what professional norms suggest a real wildlife biologist is or does just makes me a 
poor example, not a postmodernist. Right? After all, I’m not going around reinterpreting events 
using critical theory or constructing different outcomes from a given set of facts. No, what I 
mean is there are three sides to every story: yours, mine and the cold hard facts, to paraphrase 
Don Henley. Still, getting the “facts” on paper is still an important task! Or, as I have often 
advised staff, “he who writes history makes history”. I also regret, as I move forward with this 
narrative, some who would provide the “your” version of the content are no longer among us. 
It’s a loss that I feel more acutely as I sit and compose this awkward and what strikes me as a 
somewhat embarrassing chapter. And so here I am! 
 What I am attempting with this effort is often labeled a personal or scholarly narrative 
(Nash 2004). These types of efforts are routinely described in qualitative methods scholarship as 
49 
 
a postmodern application based in ethnographic theory. A personal narrative did not come to 
mind during early conversations with my advisor. Rather, discussions about how I might be 
influenced by or deal with my background and experiences were straight forward discussions of 
disclosure and guarding against bias. Let me be blunt. My history, this research and even some 
of the data discussed in other chapters are directly linked. In fact, the relationship of agency 
policy to my experiences was a significant rationale in why I started this degree quest. Within the 
accounting data used in this study, traces of my decisions and actions are preserved and now are 
a part of this project. I look at these records and consider the cold accounting system data in light 
of the missing discussions, arguments and other influences leading to the contracts. Who I was in 
the agency and what I knew about the contracting and accounting systems also played a part in 
obtaining the wildlife agencies support and participation in this project.  
Early on, I thought that maybe a longer “thank you” acknowledgment section, or perhaps 
some sort of curriculum vitae, could serve as an adequate disclosure. That would be an easy and 
safe way to deal with disclosure, I thought. You know the drill. Blah blah degree from here, 
worked there, so on and so forth. But the relationship to the data and interview participants 
nagged me. Could I separate how I looked at wildlife management, the people interviewed and 
the data from my past? Maybe it was really just a big help in making sense of the data and wasn’t 
a problem. Yet the more I considered my role in this project, the more a simple “Hi, I’m not the 
standard Ph.D. student. I have the following work history in state wildlife agencies” type 
disclosure did not seem adequate. Exposure to current thought in qualitative research methods 
only served to doom the simple CV disclosure and seemed to work against the idea that my past 
was only positive aid to the interpretation of state wildlife agency contracting and capacities.  
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 The idea to use a personal narrative was sparked during a discussion of contested roles 
and narratives in ethnographic work. A grad student discussing his trials in keeping the roles of 
student and teacher clearly framed as he played both roles within the same setting led to a 
discussion of narratives as both social constructions and performance (Atkinson and Delamont 
2006) and how personal stories are used in research (Fraser 2004). Somewhere in this wide-
ranging discussion, the use of one’s own personal story to promote understanding (Rhoads 2003) 
was added. Pragmatically here was a way to deal with my presence in the data set and as the 
principal in an analysis role. 
Personal narrative sounded like a good way to move beyond a CV with the added benefit 
of being a “scholarly” way to address my past experience. I proposed a narrative as a solution to 
the question of disclosure. That led to the practical problem of how to do one and not look too 
stupid in the process. After all, this Ph.D. process was a test of the potentially worthy and 
looking bad didn’t strike me as a good option. The personal narrative was counter to my 
interpretation of the wildlife profession’s continuing efforts to develop greater acceptance as a 
rigorous, science based discipline and moving away from “less rigorous” approaches. I began to 
wonder how a personal narrative would be received in natural resource studies. I mean, look at 
the natural resource literature and you don’t see many articles based on ethnographic methods! 
Funny how quickly a solution becomes the next problem. I’ve always been working on the not-
looking-too-stupid part so at least that was not a new revelation or task.  
I started looking at what I could find on the use of personal narratives as disclosure 
approaches. One can find a variety of material, but what becomes clear is that the narrative is 
more than a disclosure. Personal narrations focus on selected topics that go beyond disclosure 
and into revelation (Rhoads 2003, Ellis 2004, Nash 2004, Wall 2006, Chang 2008). Not only do 
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they reveal what is said, but also what is felt to be important, construct of the past, affiliations 
and other revelations. What I think I am doing is revealing how I know about contracts and my 
experiences in the arena. What you get depends on where you’re sitting.  
 The back story.– A Southern kid living next to his grandparents’ dirt farm (defined as 
cows, vegetables and a day job to support it) who decides in 9th grade that he wants to be a 
wildlife biologist rather than a mechanical engineer. The engineering thing was because I liked 
tinkering with and building cars and still do. It’s not that I had a real good picture of what a 
wildlife biologist did, but that’s what I decided I wanted to do for the “rest of my life”. Like the 
ongoing joke in the wildlife profession about what one visualizes the wildlife professional doing 
(handling animals, planting habitat, etc.) and what one really does (reports and public meetings), 
I had my own romanticized vision of what being a professional wildlife biologist was all about. 
I received encouragement from an information and education guy in the local game and 
fish office as well as from a federal warden stationed in a nearby town. Regrettably, I can’t recall 
their names as I write this. Time is cruel that way and is a limitation to keep in mind as you read 
this. I got what turned out to be realistic advice from a second cousin who worked as a biologist 
for the game and fish. His advice was, “If you want to hunt and fish a lot, be a doctor or lawyer 
or such, because a biologist’s job isn’t about that.” He also outlined how in fact, you tend to 
work the most when it is the best time to hunt or fish and being a biologist meant spending a 
large amount of the time dealing with people, both co-workers and the public, plus the 
paperwork. Undeterred, I earned a bachelor’s degree in wildlife biology from Utah State 
University in 1972. This is the point where the focus shifts to experiences with and reflection on 
contracting and wildlife management.  
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Contract experience.– The attempt to provide a narrative that has context and insight into 
the use of wildlife contracting raised a challenge about how to portray recalled experiences. 
Vignettes recounting specific instances or themes focused on specific topics or points came to 
mind. Vignettes without some framing would lose the anchors of time which are important to the 
topic. The concepts of governance and new public management are tied to specific timeframes in 
public administration thought and would also have a temporal relationship to contracting and 
wildlife management. So, consider the following text as a kind of interview transcript. A 
response to the unseen questions that ask: What type of work experiences did you have with state 
wildlife agencies? How did the work environment and attitudes of the agencies compare? How 
were contractors or contracts used to accomplish your work? And what reflections do you have 
on contracts, contracting capacities and challenges in using contracts?  
The narrative flow is from my earliest experiences forward through my career. It is very 
much a postmodernist construction when you consider it is my recollection and interpretation, 
which is more impressionistic than empirical, particularly the earlier parts. My effort is to reflect 
the settings, rationales, capacities and concerns as I recall and understood them. It is not to 
develop case studies of the agencies or any particular action. I will begin the wildlife agency 
experiences with one observation. As with many things, ironic elements seem to appear when 
one takes time to reflect over longer time frames. Here I sit today, writing up parts of a project 
that explores state wildlife agencies and their use of contracts and, ironically, my narrative kicks 
off with my first paying job as a contract biologist for a state wildlife agency. What are the odds?  
The on-ramp to my career looks like what was common to me and a number of my fellow 
graduates; that is, having a wildlife degree and a wildlife biologist’s job in 1972 was not 
synonymous. Probably is the same today. I had a barely adequate draft number so military 
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conscription was no longer a given. Job rejection notices get discouraging over time, but you 
keep trying, looking for the job opportunities you can find which are largely government agency 
jobs or grad school project money. There weren’t job postings in private industry. It looked more 
and more like I was going to be managing a heavy equipment parts house in Costa Rica that my 
dad had in line for me as a plan B to raise money for grad school.  
I happened to see a short notice show up on my advisor’s bulletin board a few weeks 
before graduation. The notice was that the West Virginia Division of Wildlife (WVDW) was 
accepting applications for short term researcher positions. They were deciding who to accept in a 
matter of days and said to air mail support documents. I was thinking it was a position in their 
research unit. As it turned out, West Virginia did not have a position and was not offering one. 
They couldn’t get approval for FTEs (full time equivalents or permanent positions) from the 
legislature. WVDW had decided the research work was a priority and could be done by short 
term “contract positions”. They had engaged West Virginia University as a partner to help 
finesse a contract approach through the state personnel department which bypassed the position 
requirements and provided joint management of the research.  
The short story is I signed an agreement to conduct a white-tailed deer research project. I 
recall that three other contract research assistants were signed around the same time. I also 
applied for admission to West Virginia University with the WVDW’s encouragement. My 
contract with the WVDW ended in June of 1974 and I fulfilled my wildlife biology master’s 
degree requirements in wildlife biology in December 1974. Time has erased many of the 
details—like how I got paid and all those kinds of administrative matters—but not the 
memorable two years with a cast of characters whom I recall fondly, count a friends and 
appreciate to this day.  
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The end of the contract signaled the beginning of another job search with applications, 
resumes and all the other trappings. Almost nine months passed from the contract’s end until I 
got a call that I had been selected to fill an Assistant District Biologist position with the WVDW. 
Thinking about this period and my time with WVDW, it strikes me that I cannot recall contracts 
again being used for research or other biology type projects during my employment with 
WVDW. I don’t know why. Perhaps the restrictions on hiring loosened, although I don’t recall a 
surge in hiring. Rather a few positions were added over time. The assistant position I was hired 
into was created from an existing position for example. Perhaps administrative policy changed 
such that those types of contracts were no longer available, or perhaps WVDW was not satisfied 
with the results. I do recall there was some unhappiness in the research section with the delay in 
completion of one of the contract research projects. The unhappiness was related to the 
contractor not completing the documentation at the end of the contract. WVDW really had no 
way to enforce the production of a report as I recall the contract terms. Beyond not getting the 
final report in a timely fashion, I think this was an issue because, and my recall is a bit sketchy, 
the research contracts were funded by the unexpected availability of federal aid funds. Since the 
contractor did not write the final reports, someone on the research staff had to do it. In any case, 
the circumstances leading to the research contracts may have been serendipitous convergence of 
events or was found to be problematic as with the completion reports. But then this may all be 
rumor, as by then I was working for the management branch, rather than research. Sharing of 
those sorts of troubles usually did not easily cross the research-management internal boundaries.  
In the management side of WVDW, I spent some time as an Assistant District Biologist, 
applied for and was promoted to District Biologist, which was a supervisory position tied to a 
geographic area. As an observation, the WVDW was a tight-knit organization. The WVDW saw 
55 
 
itself as a professional organization and disputes and arguments were expected to be framed and 
handled professionally. Generally, behind the scenes discussions and negotiations settled 
conflicts so that the public presence of the organization was unified. On the whole, the feel was 
more supportive of the individual members and protective of the organization. The agency 
primarily managed a set of distributive policies using its best information and professional 
judgment. While organizations such as the Wildlife Federation, Trout Unlimited, Ducks 
Unlimited and the Wild Turkey Federation had chapters in the state, I recall only low-level 
involvement in wildlife management activities with some engagement in the regulatory issues. 
Ducks Unlimited and the Wild Turkey Federation provided the occasional set of transport boxes 
for relocation efforts, for example. Habitat development activities were small. For example small 
water developments were completed using Wild Turkey Federation funds and the projects were 
used by the local chapter for fund raising. Local groups like the Logan County Coon Hunters are 
memorable because of their testimony at regulation hearings, but these groups were not active 
outside of the regulatory arena, except in the case of the raccoon hunting club’s persistence in 
wanting to import raccoons for release. The clubs were also politically active on trapping and use 
of dogs regulations. A defining feature of the WVDW was it was a relatively small wildlife 
agency that was financially dependent on federal assistance programs and the Sikes Act. 
I didn’t use contractors to perform inventories or create management plans. I don’t recall 
other supervising biologists or the research section using contractors although that could have 
occurred. Although grants were used to cost share research activities through West Virginia 
University from time to time, they were often in conjunction with other grantors. Like all the 
management supervisors, I purchased commodities like post, concrete and, in a particularly flush 
year, a dump truck. Services like car repairs, outhouse pumping and swimming pool pump 
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repairs (which is another story) were routine. I did have the occasional small, hour-based 
contracts for earthmoving related to wetland development and repairs and the rental of a single 
engine aircraft for radio tracking bears. Mostly I recall that the budget did not have a lot of room 
for much beyond day-to-day payment of staff plus the operations and maintenance related to 
staff and a series of management areas. You were always on the lookout for resources that could 
be used as cost share with federal funds or federal work programs for habitat work on the 
management areas or to obtain extra manpower. If you could get the right grants, you hired 
recent wildlife grads to perform wildlife management tasks. Some of the wildlife grads transition 
through these programs on to permanent positions.  
Various types of “agreements” between the state and corporate or other governmental 
agencies allowed WVDW to use private or government lands for public hunting and fishing. 
Generally WVDW was obligated to perform day-to-day management tasks while the other 
parties’ involvement was providing a lease-hold to the state. Some management areas also had 
one or more sharecropping agreements with local farmers. These agreements allowed farming of 
selected parts of the wildlife areas in which a portion or “share” of the crop was left for wildlife 
use. The idea was to obtain a wildlife benefit without incurring the direct cost of farming the 
property.  
Sharecropping administrative controls required the agricultural practice be described in 
approved management plans and annually approved by the supervising biologist by use of 
standardized agreements. The agreements were administered by the property technicians. Most 
sharecroppers preformed as expected and were largely problem free. Sharecroppers were often 
long-term contractors and were known and trusted by the property technicians. The weakness in 
the system was monitoring and, in cases of poor performance, enforcement by the property 
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managers. When a disagreement arose, most often there was no documentation of monitoring or 
estimates of the “shares” available. One of the more memorable cases, a seemingly small dispute 
about the location and approved practices demonstrated how poor monitoring and political 
engagement creates a poor and unpalatable mix. The inability to obtain the performance needed 
was ultimately resolved by allowing the agreement to expire and no longer offering 
sharecropping on that parcel of land as the politics of the situation overrode other concerns. 
Looking back on the WVDW years, it seems to me that the agency largely attempted to 
do work internally. The research projects that required large amounts of manpower, telemetry for 
example, drew on research and management staff as needed. Contracting was largely restricted 
to commodity items. The contracts for heavy equipment, noted earlier, were targeted and the 
engineering elements of the wetland management were designed under federal assistance 
programs by the Soil Conservation Service (now Natural Resource Conservation Service, or 
NRCS). In a sense, the design work was a noncontract effort to obtain skills and abilities not 
available within the agency. Grants and contracts with West Virginia University were common 
through the research section. Management staff and individual professors at the university did 
cooperate on management projects, in informal ways. Management biologists responsible for 
districts that included National Forest worked with cooperative agreements for management 
under the Sikes Act. I don’t know the extent of those efforts as National Forest lands did not 
occur in my district. Contract use was limited enough that the single purchasing officer for the 
WVDW handled the contract development while coordinating contract administration and 
monitoring with the field staff. I don’t recall discussing third party wildlife service providers 
outside of the university and the Forest Service. I remember the time as one with simpler 
demands on the agency and an agency that had to rely on staff while getting by on limited funds.  
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Budgetary turmoil was once again underway in the WVDW heading into 1978 and in the 
midst of potential furloughs or layoffs, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission 
(GFWFC) offered me a Regional Biologist position. I took the offer, though the decision to leave 
WVDW was not easy. It was not a hard economic decision, as the Florida position paid better, 
but the affinity for the WVDW and its staff was strong.  
The culture and internal politics in the GFWFC came as a bigger surprise than my 
investigation of the agency led me to expect. West Virginia used a Department of Natural 
Resources model that placed law enforcement and other resource categories, such as forestry, 
into separate divisions. Florida’s GFWFC was a constitutional agency and had functional 
divisions such as law enforcement, fish management and game management overlaid on a 
geographic-based regional manager system which reported independently and directly to the 
agency director. As a regional (supervising) biologist with a staff I essentially had two bosses. 
My boss in wildlife management signed my evaluations and was three steps removed from the 
director. The regional manager on the other had could talk to the director with a phone call. 
Making the political environment all that more tricky was a strong inter-divisional competition. 
Not unsurprisingly, the different divisions developed strong alliances and, depending on the 
personal proclivities of the regional manager, conflicts between the division supervisors and 
regional managers occurred. The regional managers often came out ahead. The regional biologist 
knew that. 
The competitive atmosphere was abetted by the game management and fish management 
divisions being staffed largely by college grads while the law enforcement division was staffed 
with fewer college graduates and more individuals with law enforcement or military experience. 
Work hour rules for law enforcement personnel and legislative support of increased law 
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enforcement pay rates resulted in many law enforcement employees being paid more and 
working fewer hours that those in other divisions. In many cases the local wildlife organizations 
were vocally pro-law enforcement and were often lukewarm to critical of other wildlife program 
initiatives.  
This environment proved to be a constant irritant. Supervisors had to be constantly on 
their game to avoid inflaming even small events or perceived slights while mediating the 
occasional divergent instructions from the Tallahassee staff and the regional managers. Most 
regional managers came from the law enforcement background and used a military style 
reporting relationship. Regional mangers spoke of an open approach to management, but at the 
point where biological staff advocated actions not supported by law enforcement, a rules and 
policy enforcement approach was the tool of choice. A good outcome from my time in Florida 
was the lessons in the art of reading internal political winds and the overt and covert deployment 
of power.  
Contract wise, I had little opportunity with anything but commodities. The struggle in my 
short tenure was finding the funds needed to keep existing program staff and operations moving. 
The GFWFC, much like WVDW, had several agreements with large landowners to operate 
public hunting or fishing areas under varying requirements or restrictions. Several of these were 
large holdings, for example Green Swamp and Fish Eaten Creek Wildlife areas, but others were 
smaller, such as Shell Island shore bird refuge. In many of these arrangements, the GFWFC was 
a lease holder for the purposes of providing public access for hunting and fishing. Perhaps the 
most unusual of these arrangements was the Avon Park Air Force Bombing range program, 
which provided limited amounts of public hunting on an active Air Force bombing range albeit 
under a rigid set of requirements and access provisions. As an active bombing range during most 
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of the year, it provided a number of challenges to me and the staff who performed wetlands and 
uplands management. It’s one of the few places I have been where armed hunters went through a 
military access point onto an active military base to hunt.  
As an aside, simultaneous with my start with the GFWFC, the agency also started a 
nuisance alligator control program. Alligators were still under the Endangered Species Act 
umbrella, but were sufficiently prolific to cause public safety concerns and bad press, 
particularly accounts of attacks on humans. An agreement was reached with the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service for the GFWFC to establish a control (i.e. kill) program for alligators that met 
set threat criteria. The GFWFC hired or, in some cases, appointed existing employees as regional 
coordinators for the program. However, the agency decided not to dedicate current employees to 
the actual control work. Reportedly, this decision was reached because the law enforcement staff 
wanted to be relieved of the growing time demands and insufficient staff was available from the 
other divisions to cover the workload. The wildlife division did not have sufficient employees to 
assume the program without abandoning most other program objectives for example. The result 
was a hybrid arrangement of a regional coordinator, part time administrative staff and contract 
“trappers” engaged under a licensing type arrangement. Trappers were individuals who 
committed their time and equipment to pursue and kill specifically identified nuisance alligators. 
The trappers signed license agreements (contracts) with the GFWFC that outlined the operating 
procedures, requirements and considerations. The contracts required the trappers to be available 
to respond to agency permits to remove alligators at the direction of the coordinator, provide 
reports and skin the alligators and preserve the hides and, later, the meat for sale. The hides were 
collected by the GFWFC and sold at auction and the proceeds shared with the trappers.  
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In many ways, GFWFC used contracts like WVDW. The nuisance alligator program 
functioned and operated similarly to the sharecropping arrangements. Lease hold agreements 
were common and as were cooperative agreements between the University of Florida and the 
wildlife research unit. Operations funding was tight and the demand for staff was high. Outside 
interest groups were more active in Florida than in West Virginia, but the focus was mostly on 
regulations, law enforcement or demands that the GFWFC perform in some prescribed manner. 
At the time, the Big Cypress and Kissimmee River/Everglades restoration were politically active 
issues that attracted national and local interest group attention. I don’t recall groups or private 
companies offering or soliciting wildlife related work, but the number of active non-
governmental wildlife interest groups was greater than in West Virginia. There were consulting 
firms offering to perform environmental document preparation and evaluation and land trust 
were more active in Florida than West Virginia. Florida did have access to funds that were used 
to acquire lands which did engage land trust or species related interest in purchase decisions.  
My ongoing effort to get back to the west was rewarded with a job offer by the Colorado 
Division of Wildlife (CDOW) in mid 1979. I knew a small handful of people working in 
Colorado from my undergraduate years at Utah State University. Beyond that I knew the agency 
was viewed by other state wildlife agencies as a top agency. CDOW had a widely recognized 
research unit and was an active participant in wildlife meetings with many of its upper staff in 
various leadership positions in The Wildlife Society (the wildlife management professional 
organization). I was hired as a program specialist, a position created as part of a reorganization 
effort by the CDOW director. The position I held was a new classification in the agency. My 
work unit was a new staff organization as well. It was exciting to sign on with CDOW and check 
off a personal goal of returning to the west!  
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I was amazed at the amount of resources—both employees and dollars—that were 
available compared to my cash and people starved days with WVDW or GFWFC. But the place 
was competitive, both for resources and professionally. The professional competitiveness applied 
internally and externally. Challenges to proposals or issues were common place, often with a 
‘we’ve tried that before’ rejoinder. One had to “prove” themselves to have standing in issues 
discussions. Proof of worthiness at least in my case may have had a lot to do with being an 
outside hire directly into a desirable staff position. This is not to say the people in the agency 
were rude or unpleasant. Rather it seemed to me to be a learned behavior. The competitiveness 
showed up in other ways as well. At one point, an organizational consultant, working under the 
auspices of the Western Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies, was conducting team 
building and organizational development exercises using a survey tool called Life Style 
Inventory (Lafferty 1989). The survey tool provided individual and agency profiles based on 12 
general characteristics that are common to many organizational change efforts. The overall 
agency profile of the supervisory level and administrative level was described as competitive 
with a mix of judgmental and oppositional characteristics. The competitive results surprised few. 
The judgmental and oppositional elements, I felt, had roots in the law enforcement background 
of a large number of the individuals in the group surveyed. As with any new hire, an early task is 
learning the positional and acquired power of the individuals in the organization. It was clear 
early on that the main channels in the agency were big game, fisheries and the field operations. 
The program specialist position I held did not have a budget and was a classic staff 
position. The intended purpose was to encourage development of state wildlife areas based on 
management models similar to other mid-western states. Missouri was often cited to me as an 
example of the desired property management outcomes. A committee impaneled by the director 
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had developed a property planning format for all state wildlife areas immediately prior to my 
tenure. However, planning was not mandated or incentivized nor was the planning format 
required or enforced by policy. The complexity of the plan format and lack of consequences for 
ignoring it sidelined most property planning. Additionally, aspiring for a mid-western small 
game property management model wasn’t realistic for many Colorado state wildlife areas due to 
the lack of moisture and inadequate irrigation. State wildlife areas with fishing were better able 
to match management’s objectives while big game properties were highly variable. There was 
also a mismatch between the stated objectives for the state wildlife areas, the existing funding 
and the willingness to invest the necessary funds to achieve the higher management objectives. 
On occasion, plans were completed and then dismissed during budgeting processes as too 
expensive and unrealistic. Ultimately agency administrators decided to place the management of 
the properties and the property technicians under the field operation supervisors. These 
individuals were responsible for law enforcement, public response and information and 
education. This effectively ended property management planning as contemplated at the time I 
was hired. 
In the same time frame, some administrators also criticized other habitat based programs, 
such as the private land pheasant program as too expensive compared to what was being done in 
neighboring states. As one of my assignments, I was tasked with evaluating cost and 
recommended changes to the program. During this evaluation, several biologists, me included, 
were sent on a field tour of Nebraska by the agency administrators to “learn” how their roadside 
pheasant habitat program worked as a way to improve Colorado’s program. The Nebraska Game, 
Fish and Parks, who put on the tour, wondered why we were interested in their program. 
Nebraska’s habitat didn’t look much different from Colorado’s until you went far enough east to 
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be in more favorable moisture regimes. The trip reports did not change the attitude that the 
program was too costly and not meeting expectations. There were merits in the arguments about 
cost and benefits, but the interest to address then was not sufficient. The program was phased out 
and became remembered as yet another case of we tried it and it didn’t work. Significant 
improvement to eastern plains grassland habitat would not make significant headway until the 
Federal Farm Bill’s Conservation Reserve Program arrived a few years later. 
I took away the understanding that there was a price point on some programs. I adjusted 
and began to do what I could to facilitate property management, encourage improved habitat 
management approaches and deal with a variety of assigned tasks (AKA, staff work). I was 
given other work details, such as the “forested lands book” project, or a bear and lion hunter 
report database and so on. One found out directly that some programs in CDOW enjoyed 
preferred status. The non-game and habitat programs were most often not as well resourced as 
the regional operations or the hunting and fishing programs. What the habitat management 
biologist wanted was staff to help with developing plans, inventory and background tasks 
supporting habitat and property development. What they got was temporary (six month) 
positions which were often tasked to draft the management plans. Most of the temporaries were 
recent wildlife graduates, often with limited direct experience in habitat management or planning 
who were trying to get experience and end up hired full time (sounds familiar). Interestingly, 
much later, in yet another iteration of property management planning, staffing was addressed by 
contracting with an engineering firm to develop plans. 
In the initial property planning process, some approved property management plans did 
receive implementation funding. The funds were primarily capital construction funds. This 
worked in cases where the plans called for building impoundments, fences, access points, 
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irrigation facilities and the like, but this funding could not be used to maintain them. 
Maintenance cost came out of the operation funds allocated to the property manager. Capital 
funds also didn’t work for recurring non-capital tasks such as plantings, control burns or similar 
activities. Those dollars had to come from the operating budgets. Added to the operational cost 
either cannibalized the budget of the property manager or depleted another organizational units 
operation as funds were transferred or request made to increase property operations. The limits in 
operational funds led to attempts at “creative contracting” or packaging projects in a way that a 
soil conservation district or the State Forest Service could bid on capital projects which also 
contained a substantially amount of ongoing management projects. The creative contracting 
experiments did not prove consistently successful. A new approach would be successful at first, 
but, when emulated elsewhere, state purchasing or the controller’s office refused to approve 
them. Additionally the contract partners lost interest in long-term projects, particularly those with 
contract issues or ones that did not match their own agency’s objectives and budgeting.  
A new director came along in 1984 with a reorganization of the upper administrative 
structure of CDOW. After a bit of test-taking, internal scuffling about the test and who should be 
appointed, I was appointed the regional manager for the Southwest (SW) Region. This was not 
without internal discussion of one’s professional credentials and, specifically in my case, lack of 
a law enforcement background. To boot, I was an outside hire, not a CSU grad and who knows 
what else. The regional manager position is at a level where the tides of internal and external 
politics washed back and forth with some regularity. But it was a great position, even with the 
included target on your back. One dilemma a regional manager faces are the demands by the 
agency and political overseers for uniformity and conformity to policy, while addressing local 
differences and implementation needs. One of the other regional managers summed up the 
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dilemma with the observation that “the role of senior management was to grant exceptions to 
general policies”. The conformity versus implementation dichotomy would recur often in my 
tenure in the SW and play a large role in my movement to a different position. 
One objective I had was strengthening the core management competencies and 
accountability of the supervisors in the SW region. I also wanted to maximize the region’s 
flexibility through increased budgetary flexibility, focusing full-time employees into key areas 
while using temporary positions or other mechanisms as needed outside the core areas. FTEs (or 
the ability to hire someone) were highly prized and holding or getting additional FTEs were 
ongoing efforts. Total FTE numbers were controlled by the legislature and were distributed by 
agency administrators through the agency budget. The budgeting process was arranged so that a 
filled FTE was maintained and did not require the budgeting or justification. So if you had a 
filled FTE, the costs were handled for you. Only vacant FTE were subject to a budgeting process 
and potential reallocation. Under this system, all a cost center supervisor had to plan was the 
operating and capital equipment side of the budget, plus any request to fill or obtain new FTE. 
Temporary FTE positions could be funded from more sources than a full time FTE and I used a 
strategy of maintaining full time FTEs and increasing temporary FTE through the budget 
process. Effectively temporary FTE requests were privileged in the budget process while full 
time employee requests faced intense scrutiny and ultimately limited success. I maintained the 
agency “favored” or “expected” positions, i.e. the ones the agency would not let you change or 
reduce, such as District Wildlife Managers or Senior Wildlife Biologists, while adjusting 
temporary FTEs upward and employing some contract services.  
I don’t recall that there were many private companies or non-governmental groups that 
offered or where interested wildlife service type work at the time. My staff and I worked with 
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organizations like Water for Wildlife, National Wild Turkey Federation, DU, Colorado Wildlife 
Federation or Trout Unlimited but the groups were not soliciting or interested in performing 
contracted work for the agency during that time period. In fact, they expected the CDOW to do 
the work while they used projects as fundraising opportunities.  
Without contractors, most short-term work tasks went to temporaries. There were some 
temporaries who had worked as temporary employees over a number of years (fifteen in one case 
I was familiar with). Contracting for wildlife related tasks did occur, but it often mimicked 
temporary employment. Generally it was an individual, often a recent wildlife graduate, who was 
placed on a temporary personal services contract to work on tasks similar to how temporary 
employees were used. If they were good and fit in, they could end up being switched to a 
temporary position and back and forth over multiple year periods. Some of these individuals 
ended up learning the agency sufficiently that they out-competed others when hiring exams were 
given ending up in a permanent position.  
By way of an example of this type of contract from the 1980s and into the early 1990s, 
one of my staff and Denver support staff wanted the region to allocate a permanent FTE to hire a 
geographic information specialist (GIS). At that time, GIS had just begun to move from 
mainframe applications to local workstation applications. It was unclear the extent of the benefit 
to the region from allocating both a FTE and the cost of equipment given the uncertainties about 
the GIS software and benefits of local processing. A trial was arranged using a temporary 
position along with acquiring some equipment. A temporary was hired and as the temporary 
position was ending, the project goals had not been fully achieved but significant regional 
interest in the trial project was present. To keep the experiment in place, a temporary 
professional services contract was arranged using a local employment agency who hired the 
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individual effectively moving the project onto a contract. The cycle of temporary and contract 
repeated until a FTE and funds became available to make a full time position.  
Contracting by the SW region, excluding commodity purchases, was used in three ways. 
Primarily, contracting was used to obtain expertise that was not available through agency staff. 
In addition to the GIS work described, I would include the examples of a contract with a 
pomologist and an economist to evaluate the consequences of deer and elk damage to fruit trees; 
contracts for stream habitat plans to obtain fluvial and stream bed morphology expertise; or small 
demonstration contracts on elk, deer and bear exclusion techniques aimed at testing different 
damage prevention techniques. Contracts for direct project management, specific expertise and 
access to other resources were the objectives in agreements with the State Forest Service for 
timber management and control burns, or with the State Engineers Office for water right 
analysis.  
The second application of contracts was cooperative or collaborative agreements with 
other governmental partners for habitat management or public access. These agreements often 
had a variety of names and formats based on the partner. Habitat projects, for example, were 
variously named depending on the federal land management agency but all had similar scope of 
work descriptions. Interestingly, multi-party agreements were uncommon largely resulting from 
incompatible federal agency agreement formats. Instead, individual coordinated agreements were 
used that required external coordination. In the habitat agreements, the federal agencies managed 
and completed the projects according to mutually agreed plans. These projects were frequently 
but not solely cost-sharing projects. Projects with federal land management agencies totaled over 
several million dollars during my time in the region.  
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The third general uses of contracts were also habitat oriented but were not with a federal 
land management agency. The more unusual ones were agreements that governed relationships 
with the sovereign Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute tribes. CDOW ownership of trans-
mountain water rights also created a variety of annual water exchanges, conservation pool and 
water management agreements to benefit wildlife habitat and stream or lake habitats. 
Sharecropping agreements were less commonly used on state wildlife areas in the SW Region 
than in other parts of the state. However, sharecropping agreements, predominantly grazing 
agreements, were used periodically for habitat management, public access exchanges or as 
tenancy conditions included in easement or property sale terms.  
A less common, but specifically focused purpose of contracts was to avoid bureaucratic 
conflicts or conflicts in regulatory requirements between parties to projects. An example is a land 
exchange agreement between the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the Trust for Public Lands and the 
CDOW to replace (“exchange”, as worded in the contract) lands that were condemned for a 
federal water development project on a state wildlife area. The state wildlife area lands were 
originally acquired using federal assistance and required the CDOW to replace the lands if they 
were “lost”. However, the federal condemnation action provided only monetary compensation. 
State requirements did not allow the CDOW to hold the condemnation funds, making it 
impossible for the CDOW to comply with all the requirements associated with the land. 
Agreements were negotiated with the Trust for Public Lands and the Bureau of Reclamation, 
which allowed the CDOW to identify exchange lands and avoid the negative consequences 
arising from the condemnation actions. The agreement was drafted as a “land exchange” between 
the three parties; funded by the condemnation action proceeds and filed as part of the federal 
court condemnation action. This took some work by the region and Attorney General’s Office to 
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devise an agreement all parties would sign. Without the cooperation of the Trust for Public Land 
and the Bureau of Reclamation, it would not have been possible to complete the “exchange” and 
keep the CDOW out of a diversion finding.  
A final piece of the condemnation action adds an ironic twist to the collaborative 
atmosphere described. The lands subject to the condemnation were originally acquired by the 
CDOW with the assistance of The Nature Conservancy (TNC). A condensed summary of the 
acquisition starts with the landowner wanting to sell his entire holdings. CDOW did not have the 
funds or authority to directly purchase all of the lands. TNC brokered the sale by allowing 
CDOW to purchase the land in 3 transactions over 3 years from TNC. TNC inserted a clause into 
the deed requiring their approval of any changes in use or disposal of the land. As a result, TNC 
was a party to the condemnation and CDOW offered allow TNC to participate in selecting 
replacement lands and to include the restrictions on the replacement lands. TNC rejected the 
offer and asked for compensation and filed a competing compensation claim with the Federal 
Court and jeopardizing the replacement agreement. TNC did not wish to maintain its status on 
the replacement lands and instead wanted full control of another state wildlife area elsewhere in 
the state. CDOW reluctantly agreed, allowing the “exchange” agreement to be completed. While 
this agreement averted a much larger set of legal and fiscal difficulties for CDOW, the belief that 
TNC had betrayed the CDOW and was untrustworthy was widespread in the agency. Hard 
feelings and unwillingness to partner with TNC took a number of years to subside. 
I saw this as evidence of a shift in outside group’s delineation of boundaries between 
CDOW and their interest. TNC was making notice of the distance between its past roles and its 
new role and relationship with CDOW. I understood that TNC’s action was focused on its own 
management and fund-raising objectives. These objectives were not incompatible, but there were 
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fewer direct overlaps. From the CDOW side, the results identified that objectives other than 
wildlife were now part of future partnership consideration and coercion was potentially a part of 
future NGO relationships. To many in the CDOW, this made TNC look like other contractors 
who manipulated the agreements to benefit themselves. This action increased my perception of 
the shifts in the way interest groups asserted their interest and were viewed by CDOW. The 
internal, privileged status enjoyed by some interest groups was eroding. The change in my 
attitude did influence a number of negotiations on future joint projects. “Avoid future TNC like 
problems” was added to the mental check list.  
A few observations stand out from this time. I don’t recall the presence or availability of 
contractors offering to contract the type of wildlife work CDOW was focused on. In fact, I more 
clearly recall having to look for potential contractors. Consulting firms with wildlife biologists 
on staff were around but were primarily engineering firms focused on environmental assessments 
or environmental impact statements. In the case of many of these firms, their work products 
ended up being reviewed by CDOW staff. In some cases there were issues with analysis. The 
disagreements were often minor, but they did not build CDOW staff confidence in using 
contracted biological services outside of university wildlife programs. The private biologists 
were viewed as being subservient to the clients rather than fully representing wildlife. My recall 
is that it was not until a SW Region field employee opted to resign and start a biological focused 
for profit consulting firm that a wildlife management focused contractor was available.  
One group of entities the CDOW routinely looked to for biological expertise and services 
was colleges, Colorado State University (CSU) in particular. Some professors had long-running 
contract work with CDOW. Historically, cooperative agreements have been part of the CDOW 
research programs with the CSU Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit. Other research and 
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research-management projects have been contracted with different CSU departments. For 
example, the Department of Human Dimension in Natural Resources has been a partner and 
provided services in various studies and research projects. CSU contracts were most often 
administered by the research section or the directors’ immediate staff. Regional projects for 
training or skill development were generally administered through these existing contracts rather 
by separate agreements.  
During this mid 90’s timeframe, the agency was being increasingly criticized by 
organized groups representing: local and state level hunting and fishing groups; state level 
groups interested in threatened or endangered wildlife; state level groups concerned with outdoor 
education; and other groups with specific wildlife-related programs or interest. The criticisms 
were broad and changed depending on what group was speaking. Classic examples from this 
period are the spring bear hunting, mountain lion and trapping controversies covered in other 
literature (see for example Gill 1996, Nie 2004a). During the early parts of the conflicts, staff 
complained that “the biology” was being ignored, professional advice was not sought, or 
political expediency was decisions rather than biological considerations. Those inside and 
outside of the agency did not think they were being heard and in some cases felt the CDOW was 
supporting inappropriate policies and/or favoring interests that should have little or no role in 
wildlife decisions. Typically consumptive user groups argued for politically conservative and 
status quo policies and for limiting CDOW spending on non-consumptive programs. Suggestions 
from some consumptive user groups were intended to minimize or marginalize the input of non-
license buyers. The conflicting views and occasional bad manners further polarized the issues 
and the public. Internal management decisions began to be reviewed with new criteria focused 
73 
 
on determining if the decisions could withstand political review by members of the legislature 
allied with the different factions.  
Interestingly, in the midst of all this, my office was picketed, in part because of a set of 
elk season recommendations. The protest made the state news services and I got to talk with state 
legislators and staff in the Department of Natural Resources. As one might expect, my peers had 
fun with this. None could recall a similar event in CDOW’s history to that point. While the SW 
Region prided itself in being a leader and first to try out new ideas, this was unexpected and 
unwanted. In the end, the elk season recommendations remained, largely due to support from 
other hunting groups. During the same general time frame, the Colorado Trappers Association 
and United Sportsman’s Council distributed bumper stickers that read “Colorado Division of 
Wildlife—The Evil Empire” as a way to voice their displeasure with the CDOW and the Wildlife 
Commission over actions on bears, trapping and threatened species management.  
Consumptive groups in the hunting and fishing camps continued to fracture into more 
advocacy coalitions, sometimes reflecting interests which would not previously have been a 
specific wildlife interest. As an example, an all-terrain vehicle users group emerged to focus on 
use of these vehicles in hunting and fishing. The different interests within the general hunting or 
fishing groups sometimes fractured into specific entities supporting fishing with bait or barbless 
hooks only. The main point is the increase in the number of groups which defined themselves by 
a method of take like bow hunters or muzzleloaders or a species of interest like elk or mule deer. 
These interests pushed their “brand” and used it to position the groups in the regulatory and 
legislative arena. This diminished the voices of older generalist groups like the Colorado 
Wildlife Federation or the United Sportsman Council.  
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I would note that some wildlife interest groups did engage in wildlife management 
projects through volunteering to assist in projects or by “sponsoring” a project, which generally 
meant cost sharing on a habitat project or relocation effort. Often the organizations used these as 
tie-ins with fund raising. With many of these groups, one did not hear much except if they were 
involved in regulatory issues. During my time in the region, wildlife interest groups were rapidly 
evolving as money, technology and political success drove changes. Like-minded individuals 
found it easier to find and communicate with each other. Communication facilitated fund raising. 
Interest groups of all types began to focus on wildlife issues and outcomes not just locally but at 
state and federal levels. Money also bought groups new capacities, including legal resources and 
public relations support. Within Colorado, the Great Outdoors Colorado (GOCO) legislation 
played a significant role in strengthening and building capacity in “conservation” groups. GOCO 
started lottery money flowing to the CDOW and to other entities in the state for inventory or 
habitat protection projects. While there was an ongoing disagreement between the GOCO Board 
and the CDOW on the use of the so-called “wildlife quadrant” funds, the reality was that, to 
complete large projects, coalitions were required to compete for the large grants. GOCO’s 
treatment of the funds as “grants” with specific targets also favored partnership-oriented projects. 
These partnerships generally did not extend beyond the project but did impact the working 
relationships of the CDOW. Land trust which had occasional projects in cooperation with the 
CDOW increased their attention on CDOW habitat protection interest to gain CDOW’s 
participation and access to funds. Participation in GOCO projects also required additional 
different types of analysis to satisfy the GOCO Board and staff. The project analysis and 
approval requirements lead the land trust and other organizations to add staff or hire contractors. 
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CDOW found that its species conservation and habitat programs were being watched by a variety 
of interest groups hoping to add their project or become a partner.  
Most managers in the CDOW recognized the tumult and change underway in the state’s 
wildlife management environment. I don’t think many recognized that the internal competition 
would become the field outside interests would plow and plant for yet another reorganization. 
The internal and external competition amplified the public’s disagreements on wildlife 
management and then telegraphed to the state’s political leaders. The Wildlife Commission and 
the CDOW undertook an update of the states strategic wildlife plan through an extensive public 
involvement effort. The update was completed after several delays and frustrations. The existing 
political managers and the Wildlife Commission decided that to address implementation of this 
new strategic plan, a performance audit was needed.  
What emerged in 1994 was a performance audit and reorganization known as 
Management Review. Unlike previous reorganization efforts which were mostly internally 
driven and managed, this one was big, public and expensive. The Deloitte and Touche LLP 
consulting firm was contracted, lots of money spent, meetings and reviews conducted, interest 
groups engaged, and a couple of years invested in developing the audit and reorganization 
proposal. The agency got a new director a few months ahead of the final reorganization plan, 
which was presented to the Wildlife Commission in June of 1995 and subsequently adopted 
(Davis and King 1995). It took a few months of discussion before decisions on how the changes 
were to be implemented were settled. In May of 1996, I was formally told my job and much of 
the regional organization was either abolished or consolidated into other regions. My 
employment options were either move to a vacant position in Denver or exit state service. I 
chose to become the State Wildlife Manger for Habitat Programs in Denver.  
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One would think I’d be used to reorganizations at this point, given that they featured as 
turning points in my career at CDOW! This one was different. It is interesting to note that in a 
matter of a few years, the SW Region was reestablished. In the process I got into some hot water 
for commenting that it is easier to rearrange the deck chairs than it is to manage the ship. Kettl’s 
comment on resorting to reorganization in a fractured environment has more meaning given 
these circumstances. 
My first priority in Denver was to assemble a new version of the Habitat Section from the 
left over organizational parts served up by Management Review. Relative to responsibilities, the 
Habitat Section was under resourced. The Habitat Section staff knew it as well. Contracting 
became a way to fill in, basically substituting operational funds for staff. As more species 
conservation actions sifted into the unit, contracting became more widespread. The limited 
availability of staff was a recurrent theme in the section. 
Boundaries about what issues fell to the section and what fell to others were poorly 
described from the Management Review documents. Conflicts on whom and how to deal with 
habitat and species not hunted or fished had been an ongoing debate between the Terrestrial and 
Aquatic sections since I started with the CDOW. The reorganization intensified efforts to stake 
out boundaries of the organizational units as few units in the CDOW escaped reconfiguration. A 
running disagreement involving the Habitat Section and regions emerged over local 
environmental reviews and communication protocols related to habitat field work. The assigned 
responsibilities and organizational design made reaching lasting arrangements hard to obtain. I 
also think the competitiveness around resources and control of agency policy thwarted long-
lasting resolution. Frankly, I probably did not help much as I did not make addressing the 
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conflicts a priority. Other direct and pressing matters were always present which precluded much 
beyond first aid application when a serious conflict arose. 
The Habitat Section used a wide range of contractors to accomplish its objectives. 
Contractors were engaged in water quality, in-stream flows, water rights investigations, GIS, real 
estate appraisals and grant programs for wetland improvements, easements, land purchases and 
habitat improvements. Species and habitat inventory work used a variety of providers. Contracts 
with CSU, CU, Colorado Natural Heritage Program and a riparian vegetation classification firm, 
were frequently used. GIS, database programming and model development were contracted with 
the Natural Resource Ecology Lab at CSU. Contract-based landowner programs ranging from 
small habitat grants to large scale demonstration projects like the Owl Mountain Project and the 
Farm Bill Project were active.  
The Farm Bill project deserves special notice because it evolved into a vehicle that added 
contract habitat field biologists. The program was initially contracted with the Colorado Natural 
Heritage Program at CSU, but on subsequent rebidding was awarded to the Rocky Mountain 
Bird Observatory (RMBO). The RMBO contract required four biologists to be hired and 
operated using grant funds obtained by CDOW from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural 
Resource Conservation Service. The CDOW and RMBO provided match and in-kind services 
under this grant. The contract between RMBO and CDOW establishes an objective setting and 
monitoring process involving all the partners. Day to day operation and decision making is 
handled by RMBO’s staff. What began as four biologists in a contract has grown to include 
additional biologists and I have been advised that the Wyoming Game and Fish Department has 
entered a similar agreement with RMBO. The contract created a number of challenges, not with 
the concept or actual implementation but in contract administration and the roles and authorities 
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of the parties and biologists. Despite the complicated logistics of the program, it has grown as an 
important private land advice and services provision mechanism for private land wildlife habitats 
using contractors to deliver services that would normally be provided by federal or state agency 
staff.  
The Habitat Section exercised a variety of real property responsibilities which included 
fee title, easements, leases, water and other management of the CDOW’s real property holdings. 
While the section used some specialist positions as coordinators of the real property, most 
specialized tasks related to the properties were contracted. The most commonly contracted 
services were appraisals, title insurance, water right engineering evaluations, environmental 
evaluations of various types and boundary surveys. Boundary surveys by statute were capital 
construction items funded and managed by the Engineering Section.  
Contracted wildlife or habitat inventory projects were an ongoing task. Most were 
contracted through universities. CSU, which includes CNHP, and CU were the most frequent 
species inventory providers. Contracted inventories were used most in cases where the expertise 
needed was not available in the Habitat Section or schedule and workload conflicts required 
outside assistance to meet agency priorities. Some inventory projects were short duration and not 
routinely repeated. These types of projects were suited for contracting to academic institutions 
which benefited the CDOW by avoiding training cost, providing work opportunities to skilled 
students, monitoring by academic experts and as a way to scout potential employees.  
Using GOCO funds in CDOW projects drove establishing partnerships with interest 
groups that likely would not have occurred without GOCO monies involved. The GOCO Board’s 
interest in funding large projects and in spreading GOCO dollars to lots of different parties led 
CDOW to create or participate in a variety of different agreements, grants and contracts. In some 
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cases CDOW and other interest developed joint project proposals for GOCO funding, such as 
The Nature Conservancy and CDOW critical habitat protection proposal. In other cases the 
CDOW was required to “participate” in projects. At times the basis for the participation was 
strained and driven by the wildlife quadrant dollars included in the project which were often 
questioned by the CDOW. These questioned projects fostered doubts about the reliability of the 
other partners. From my view, GOCOs insistence on expediency and political tradeoffs in some 
cases created burdens that were passed on to future partnership opportunities. 
Land trusts also had their own problems with funding and project cost. They often 
wanted CDOW to step in and help them out. All kinds of events can happen and put project cost, 
scope or funding make up at risk. However, it was easy to figure out which land trust would 
work with their partners from their approach to the project. Some seemed to wait until a few days 
before an easement or land closing, announce a crisis and expect the CDOW to immediately 
provide the money to fix the problem. As a state agency, providing a check to anyone involves a 
lot of steps. Writing big checks involves a lot of steps and doesn’t happen quickly. With the 
funds the Habitat Section used to provide habitat protection grants, the approval process, record 
keeping and time requirements were large. That was particularly so if federal assistance funds 
were involved. The end result was that last minute changes of any size just weren’t possible and 
the resulting complaints about the CDOW’s collaboration often ended up lodged with legislators 
and Wildlife Commission by the supposed partners. I couldn’t change the rules, but I did have to 
deal with explaining why the CDOW wasn’t being obstructionist and trying to sabotage some 
local land trust’s project. Two things happened as a result: one, an understanding of which land 
trusts behaved this way was developed; and, two, grant reporting and monitoring requirements 
increased. A portion of the Colorado land trust community was not pleased with the added 
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requirements and voiced their displeasure to the GOCO Board, Wildlife Commission and the 
CDOW Director. Some accommodations were made but the basic requirements remained. 
The Wetlands Initiative program was an important program that became a problem for 
me for two different reasons. One was lack of attention to the administrative requirements by the 
program’s prior administrators and the second was the lack of records and project details when 
the program was moved to the Habitat Section. Changes in the states contract amendment and 
cost sharing documentation converged with the movement of the program to create a 
convergence of grant partners who were unwilling or unable to adjust to the new operational 
environment and few records existed to determine what had been approved beyond the original 
grant contract. Sadly, some of the recalcitrant partners were long-time partners in the wetlands 
and other habitat programs. Contract amendment requirements, fund expiration and payment 
limits triggered a crisis the new wetlands program manager was not able to head off. The 
program went sideways. A public blowback occurred at a Wildlife Commission meeting where 
some partners publicly criticized the CDOW’s management of the program, specifically 
criticizing the program coordinator, and, as a remedy, asked the Commission to give specific 
direction to the CDOW to support the groups involved in the program and reinstate past program 
practices (similar to Mutter et al. 1999 description of activity in program implementation). 
Changing the state’s contracting requirements was more than any of those concerned could 
accomplish. 
Changes in the state contracting requirements and process became more frequent during 
my time in the Habitat Section. With little notice, routinely used contract options were modified 
or eliminated by the State Controller, the Attorney General or other approval bodies. Court 
challenges to uses and types of contracts modified the when and with what entities contracts 
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could be used. Examples of these changes include imposing requirements to determine if service 
contracts were warranted, restrictions on vendor selection and significant restrictions on sole 
source contracts. Accounting, renewal and modification requirements increased the time and 
staff cost to implement and manage multi-year contracts. This was particularly applicable to 
contracts using matching funds. The matching fund accounting was the largest contributor to the 
wetland program contract blow-up described above.  
The political climate of the state had also changed and the ideological concerns on open 
markets and market efficiency became central to contracts. The change impacted evaluation of 
past contracting relationships with state educational institutions such as CSU and DU. The 
Department of Natural Resources leadership felt that negotiated multi-year intergovernmental 
agreements were not in the best interest of the state and the CDOW agreements should be open 
to all bidders. Additionally sole-source or intergovernmental providers were also eliminated 
under the philosophy that the private sector would provide the best value. The shift to the 
bidding process had little effect on commodity purchasing, but service contracting ended up in 
turmoil. I observed there were not a lot of private firms willing to bid on the wildlife work the 
Habitat Section was offering. In many cases, the successful bidders ended up being the previous 
contractors from the negotiated contracts but with price increases. Most said the prices increased 
in response to the new cost of bidding and complying with the added purchasing requirements. 
Over time the restrictions on intergovernmental agreements loosened, but other elements like 
bidding requirements did not. One question that arises from this experience is: what was the 
source of the lack of bidders for the wildlife biology sorts of services? Had the ongoing 
contracting with universities discouraged the development of non-governmental parties capable 
of contracting the services? Was this more of a market-based outcome in which private 
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companies didn’t find adequate opportunities to enter the market? Was there some sort of barrier 
to entry in wildlife services for nongovernmental entities? Seems there were a number of 
nongovernmental interest groups willing to do some types of wildlife work, but their capacities 
and interest varied. There were few commercial entities but they specialized in specific areas, for 
example, lab services or nuisance animal work which had customers outside of the CDOW. 
 Enhanced contract bidding requirements created a second problem in wildlife contacting. 
This issue arose from added specificity need on what product, commodity or outcome was 
requested, by when and so on. Basically, it’s the “if you can’t describe it, how can you bid it and 
you probably shouldn’t be buying it” argument (Donahue 2008). Some wildlife work has 
existing standards, procedures or protocols that can form the basis of a purchase order request or 
RFP. As an example, survey procedures and protocols are established and available for many 
mammal species through the American Society of Mammalogists. Adding locations, skill 
requirements and reporting requirements to one of these protocols makes developing a scope of 
work for bidding and contracting relatively straight forward. In cases where protocols don’t exist 
or a non-standard approach is needed as in the case of creating the scope of work for a 
population distribution and density survey of some mollusk species where very few individuals 
are skilled presents a challenge. The challenge gets difficult to solve when staff does not have the 
skills and is trying to find someone who does. Purchasing administrators are often unsympathetic 
to claims of difficulties and often respond that if you want a contract, you’re going to have to do 
this scope of work without consulting the likely bidders. Making matters worse in some cases 
purchasing staff sometimes second guess the biology or need. The problem is the CDOW knows 
the general description of the survey it needs but may not have staff expertise to specify a 
detailed scope of work. The general outline is rejected as too vague or questioned by the 
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purchasing staff. The people who know how to do these surveys are the ones CDOW staff would 
talk to about how to design the scope of work but CDOW can’t because purchasing rules would 
disqualify the bidder if they did. So this contracting difficulty is skirted in a slightly clumsy, two 
step strategy of bidding a two-part scope of work which ask for a plan for a survey based on the 
loose general scope of work and then a second element of implementation of the submitted plan 
upon CDOW approval. The first deliverable becomes the scope of work for the survey. CDOW 
will evaluate the plan and if approved the contractor implements the plan they designed as the 
second part of the contract. This approach solves the problem of obtaining professionally 
designed scopes of work, but introduces the next difficulty of modifying the contract terms to 
accommodate changes in the scope of work created by the new plan and any increased cost and 
raising the potential of having the modification denied due to low initial bids. 
The complex management of bid-based approaches for some wildlife tasks led to 
development of a number of grant approaches to a variety of needs particularly in the wetland 
and habitat programs. Incorporating elements of the contract bid process into a grant program 
format performs as a “bid” in evaluation and selection of grant proposals. CDOW could go 
directly to contract with a grant applicant based on a grant solicitation process, so long as the 
grant proposal, AKA “the bid”, and the contents of the contract were comparable. CDOW 
internalized the contract process to gain some control over the timelines and process. Not all 
participants were happy. Some successful grant applicants chaffed over reporting demands, 
contract provisions and timelines associated with the process. Accounting staff regularly 
complained about the legitimacy and robustness of the bid evaluation and negotiations.  
Developments at the Department of Natural Resources contract unit added more time and 
administrative process to contracts. Some individuals who were delegated approval authorities 
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by the State Controller’s Office became skeptical of some contracts, vendors and contract 
provisions. This led to more documentation requirements and delays in contract approvals. 
Events in other agencies or on administrative decisions, such as the consolidation of all 
information technology policy and contracting into the Governor’s Technology Office added 
time and staff demands to contracting. Prior to these changes, IT services had been available 
through open state awards on software maintenance and some types of programming support. 
State awards were preapproved vendors for selected services or commodities within specified 
price ranges or hours used. With the consolidation of IT management, the awards became 
unavailable and all IT procurement was handled by the IT office. In many cases the political 
rhetoric about streamlining state requirements and using the market to obtain the best deal for the 
state was at odds with the increasing complexity imposed by the contracts. While the political 
interests were championing more outsourcing and partnerships, the administrative process was 
increasingly difficult and less attractive to bidders. The state’s reaction to contract problems was 
more review and approval requirements without an increase in staff, adding to the process times 
and frustrating contractors and administers alike. 
My Habitat and Species Conservation Section time covers an even more active and 
contract-dependent operation. This suggests the extent, importance and perhaps capacity of 
contracting depends on what CDOW organizational unit is considered. The Engineering Services 
Section is likely the largest contract user in the CDOW. They use capital construction funds to 
construct or replace structures through a statutorily controlled process. Projects using capital 
construction funds must be completed by contractors. However, looking at strictly wildlife 
inventories, plans, research and so on, the extent of contracting seems to depend on the 
organizational unit. Some organizational units use few outside service providers while others use 
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more. Comparatively, the Habitat Section was much more active than the SW Region and the 
Aquatic section. Looking at wildlife research tasks, the Terrestrial and Aquatic Sections were 
more active due to allocation of research funds to the two sections but were less likely to contract 
for other types of wildlife services. Why should there be differences in the units’ use of 
contracts? Two factors stand out to me: First, agency policies on FTE and fund allocations to the 
different units influenced use as suggested by the research example. Second, I think that 
employee skills more directly with the tasks preformed by the Terrestrial and Aquatic Sections as 
compared to species conservation or habitat tasks. So all things being equal, existing staff is both 
suited to and used more widely for most task in the Terrestrial and Aquatic Sections.  
Available staff gives an organization or organizational unit more control and discretion as 
described in a good bit of the public administration literature. Fewer staff with an adequate 
budget should point toward more contracting. Habitat was not privileged in terms of FTE. This 
limited the skill sets available to apply to objectives or tasks. Contracts were a vehicle to address 
both products and skills using money. An example is the RMBO Farm Bill biologist. Here the 
inability to obtain FTEs, even with outside funds to pay the cost, led to contracting the work and 
locating the positions and capacity provided in a third party. Similarly, limits in staff and skills 
resulted in inventory and habitat surveys being contracted to for-profit, non-profits and 
intergovernmental entities. 
As contract administrative tasks grew, several positions effectively became program or 
activity contract coordinators. They were tasked with planning, following the procurement 
process, coordinating contract development, administering the contract, monitoring and 
evaluating contractor performance and administer payments. The assignment of this task 
restricted the time available for these biologists to perform other tasks. Some were good at 
86 
 
contract coordination, others less so. It was also a “learn by doing” situation. Only minimal 
training on basic contract procedures was available from the Department of Natural Resources, 
the Department of Personnel and Administration or the State Controller’s Office. Advice from 
peers and supervisors was often the source of advanced contract management information. The 
demands of the contracting process were generally a poor match with the disposition of wildlife 
biologists who felt they should be doing biology not paperwork. This conflict in conception of a 
biologist role was a constant irritant that led people to look for ways to lighten or avoid 
contracting burdens. One manifestation was extensive use of intergovernmental agreements 
when available. This favored contracts with CSU, CNHP, CU and other state or federal agencies.  
Ongoing contract projects presented different challenges. For example, the Farm Bill 
biologist contract had to be rebid periodically. This created a great deal of anxiety among all 
parties. The field biologists worried they might end up without a job, RMBO worried they might 
have to lay off staff and impact their landowner relationships, NRCS worried they would end up 
with work they didn’t have the staff for or cost share problems and so on. RMBO had the 
advantage of knowing the program, there are no guarantees. After all, they had won the program 
from CNHP in an earlier rebidding. The rebidding is also disruptive to projects during and for 
some time after the process is over, even if there is no change. This is similar to what has been 
reported in other settings (Milward and Provan 2000). 
 The Farm Bill biologist contract presented additional issues for the CDOW. Who 
(organizationally) are these biologists and how do they fit in with the CDOW? Are they doing 
CDOW work, or NRCS work, or RMBO work and how can one tell? Do they get invited to 
CDOW meetings? Does CDOW get invited to RMBO Farm Bill staff meetings? Can the 
biologists “speak for” the CDOW while working with private landowners? This relationship has 
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been evolving. These and other questions were not settled during my tenure, but the contract 
benefits are such that the partners have expanded the program. CDOW has hired several of the 
Farm Bill biologists into permanent positions supporting the benefits of exposure expressed by 
CDOW staff.  
The contracting circle in my career was closed several months after I retired from the 
CDOW. I started a small wildlife consulting company and I got a call from a CDOW program 
supervisor about my willingness to perform a data quality analysis and assurance task on 
property inventories records and real property insurance program. A month later I was a CDOW 
contractor. Basically, I presented a proposal to complete a part of the CDOW’s original request 
by the deadline required. The agreement was sealed by a purchase order, the product delivered, 
pay received and all were satisfied so far as I knew. I thought the process worked adequately, if 
slowly on the paperwork side. A few months later in a new fiscal year, I was asked to submit a 
proposal to address two new property inventory problems by the CDOW. My proposal was 
accepted. The first task was completed, accepted and payment made. However, as I started the 
second task, the CDOW requested a modification to the scope of work while retaining the 
original compensation delineated in the purchase order. The change CDOW wanted was a 
reaction to an emerging issue in the federal aid lands inventory. However, the state’s unfolding 
budgetary crisis of that year included executive orders freezing all outside professional service 
contracting. That meant that CDOW could not amend or issue a new purchase order. Basically, 
they felt the task they wanted to substitute fit within the task description of the original purchase 
order even if the new task was not described in the PO but they could not change or issue a new 
purchase order. I ultimately agreed to complete the work requested. It took a long time to get 
paid. I don’t know the reason for the delays and found CDOW agreeable to correct the oversight 
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when asked to fix it. It made me appreciate the complaints I had heard from vendors about the 
state’s lack of attention to final payments near the end of a fiscal year.  
Why didn’t the CDOW bid this project on the open market rather than negotiate a 
purchase order? I think the contract administrator had two considerations. One was the desire to 
have someone who knew the CDOW and its records and the second was related and that was 
time. CDOW was attempting to use available year-end funds which meant they did not have time 
to bid the work, and weren’t required to in any case. Within the timeframe of the PO, there was 
not sufficient time for someone to learn the data. From the manager’s view point, the work could 
be broken down into discrete parts and completed over different fiscal years suiting both the 
funds available and also avoiding a competitive bidding process. But why contract this out at all? 
I asked about this and, as I recall, the response was priorities: there was no position to task this to 
and, even if there were, it would probably be cheaper for me to do it than staff. Would I have bid 
on it as a competitive bid? I don’t know. I’m inclined to say no, as the current requirements are 
at best an expensive annoyance for a relatively simple low risk project. Since that time, other 
provisions added by the legislature have made contracting for state agencies considerably less 
attractive for individuals or companies that employ state retirees. However, if I did bid on a 
contract, the price would increase significantly due to the added state requirements on insurance, 
purchasing registration and contract provisions.  
How similar are the three state wildlife agencies? It depends on what is considered and 
how one looks at them. So it doesn’t take long to get back to the postmodern idea of “it 
depends”. I will attempt to make sense of them and the time setting of the experience. As 
agencies, they share a large set of characteristics surrounding the public trust doctrine, hunting 
and fishing, user paying, and professional wildlife management. The North American Model 
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(Geist et al. 2001) is a significant paradigm that informs the agencies and their employees. The 
three agencies also share a general historical narrative about the origins of state wildlife agencies 
and the development of professional wildlife management (Brown 2010). Individual agency 
differences exist in the organizations’ functional arrangements and the details of the historical 
path each organization has traveled. This historical path has been mediated by the wildlife 
resources of the state, state politics, and the populations of the state. State wildlife agency 
employees (particularly biologists, though it also seems to me to be true of most state wildlife 
employees) share a number of beliefs, norms, and behaviors related to wildlife management 
(Jacobson 2008a, Buck 2009). I found it useful and interesting to observe meetings attended by 
different state wildlife agency employees and note that, while there were disagreements about 
policies, management prescriptions or other topics, the extent of disagreement is framed with 
extensive and unspoken agreement over a wide range of policy and management views. The 
shared viewpoint is also evident in the similarities in descriptive or professional jargon used by 
employees from different state wildlife agencies attending national conferences. Another way to 
see this shared outlook can be found in interactions between wildlife biologists from state and 
federal agencies. The biology frame of reference is shared, but there is a difference that can be 
seen. I am not referring to agency mission differences (which do exist), rather, the individuals’ 
adoption of an identity related to being in a state wildlife agency relative to a federal agency. 
How can I relate the attitudes about contracts and contract use in the three wildlife 
agencies? I don’t think the experiences are suitable for direct comparison. The gulf of time 
separating WVDW and GWFC from the CDOW is too large and development of non-
government sectors and the roles in wildlife management do not support a direct comparison. 
However, I think comparison of institutional attitudes and operational environments may be 
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made. The irony of starting my career as a contractor for a state wildlife agency and ending it as 
a contractor for a state wildlife agency makes a nice story arc. One could observe how little has 
actually changed. However, that fails to capture the numerous changes in the political 
environment, proliferation of non-governmental organizations, and public engagement in the 
wildlife management environment over the same period.  
Excluding commodity purchasing and focusing on contracted wildlife work, my 
experience suggests a better descriptor of state wildlife agencies use of wildlife service 
contracting is experimentation driven by necessity. Successful experiments are repeated and 
adopted if the environmental factors remain. If the drivers of the experimentation change, the 
experiments stop. The “preferred” mode to address skill needs or added task is to hire staff to 
satisfy both control and capacity building desires. If hiring is not practical, a search of other 
options generally leads to the so-called indirect tools of grants, contacts and agreements. 
Experimentation has been facilitated by the increase in the numbers of “acceptable” contract 
partners. Expanded availability of wildlife service contractors beyond the traditional Co-op Unit 
and University partners has enabled wider experimentation and adoption of third party service 
provision that now include contract biologists. While a good bit of contracted wildlife work fits 
the description of discrete services, grants for habitat protection, public facilities and biologist 
contracts clearly fall into third-party service provisions described by authors such as Kettl 
(2002a) and Salamon (2002a). Enthusiasm for contract use is tempered by the availability and 
degree of difficulty in securing trustworthy contractors through a procurement process. If the 
contracting process seemed to take as much effort as was lost by assigning staff, contracts lost 
their appeal. Perceived risk of contract failure and need to control process dampened the interest 
in contacts in ways similar to those reported by Brown and Potoski (2003b).  
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Figuring out how to obtain, administer and otherwise deal with contracts or grants was a 
“learn by doing” process in all three agencies. Some instructional materials, mostly related to 
what needed which document was available in all the agencies but little added training or support 
was provided. Your peers might or might not be helpful or experienced. In general, the employee 
or cost center supervisor requesting or suggesting a contract ends up with the task to obtain and 
administer it. All three agencies had purchasing officials with varying interest in helping a 
biologist with contracting. While not universally true, it seemed to me that as my career went on, 
more of the purchasing staff viewed themselves as rule enforcers as compared to a shepherd. If 
you found one who was less inclined to think their job was enforcement, you tried to get all of 
your contracts through them. Distributed administration of contracts works OK with fewer, 
simpler, defined contracts but as complexity and numbers of contacts rise, distributed 
administration becomes less desirable. At CDOW, we ended up with coordinators for different 
types of contracts such as the CSU Co-op Unit or the wetland program described earlier. The 
underlying reality remained: you had a biologist or supervisor turn into a contract administrator, 
learning the task in a learn-by-doing approach. Sometimes that works, other times not so much.  
A common theme cropped up in the grant programs and the biologist contracts. The 
commonality was a continuing and low-level conflict over what and who the program or project 
was. The conflicts arose from the issues of control and to what extent the program challenged 
CDOW management practices or outcome desires. The challenges could be described as agency 
problems, i.e., who is the principal and who the agent? Others, while appearing to be straight 
forward agency problems, are more complex and I think reflect the shifts in boundary 
understandings in the CDOW. What is a part of the agency and what is not? The multi-party 
92 
 
contract biologist highlights this challenge, as did the controversy over a series of contracts with 
Ducks Unlimited to manage some state wildlife areas.  
So, it depends - but some things don’t. So here are the caveats. I have been afforded 
many experiences, met a number of wonderful people and a few who aren’t. A number of 
individuals served as mentors and lights along the occasionally dark paths. At the time events 
may seem random but in the rearview mirror they look suspiciously less random and more linear. 
I would not be writing this but for that. I am grateful to those guides and perhaps too seldom 
acknowledge their gift. I don’t regret my decision to be a wildlife biologist. I appreciate the 
opportunities, the individuals and the agencies. It’s been a great trip! As I often told staff at 
awards ceremonies, I saw working in a wildlife agency as much more than just a job. As I 
conclude this chapter, the reader may reflect on this and the other vagaries of my condition that 
can skew my recognition and construction of my version of the ‘cold hard truth’. As such, this 




5)   CHARACTERIZING A STATE WILDLIFE AGENCY’S USE OF COLLABORATIVE 
MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS USING ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION 
RECORDS 
Synopsis 
Collaborative management contract use by the Colorado Division of Wildlife (CDOW) 
was explored using 12 fiscal years of state contracting and appropriation records. Service and 
grant contracts are defined as collaborative management contracts for analysis purposes. 
Hypothesized relationships between funding, personnel numbers and the extent of collaborative 
contracting were tested using appropriation and accounting records. No relationships were found 
between collaborative contract use, identified as service contracts in this report, and agency 
funding or full time employee numbers. The subcategory of grant contracts was significantly 
related (r = 0.71 and a one-tailed significance of p = .005) to agency funding. Service contract 
use increased slightly over the period and the difference between years, while statistically 
significant, had a minimal effect size and not fully consistent with the hypothesized change. 
Caution is suggested in interpreting the result due to minimal effect size and in light of finding 
no corresponding statistically significant increase in expenditures for the service contracts. 
Hypothesized increases in the number or dollar amounts of contracts with governmental and 
non-profit organizations (NGOs) were not found.  
CDOW collaborative contract use was not related to fund availability or personnel over 
the 12 fiscal-year-period. The number of collaborative contracts over the 12 fiscal-year-period 
did significantly differ between years while the value of the contracts between years did not 
significantly differ. The number of contracts with government agencies and NGOs also did not 
show significant increases over the time period. This mixed set of findings can be further 
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understood by the finding that grants and capital property acquisition contracts are significantly 
related to both total funding and total funds from sources outside of the legislatively appropriated 
funds. These non-traditional funds vary and account for a large part of the variation in total 
agency funds. The non-traditional funds and the amount of grant and capital property acquisition 
contracts are significantly related. The results taken together suggest that CDOW has not 
significantly expanded its use of collaborative management contracts while the use of grants, a 
component included in the collaborative contracts, is closely related to both total agency funds 
and the total available non-traditional funds.  
Introduction  
The history of government contracting has a long and surprisingly contemporary tone. 
Kettl’s (1993) narrative on George Washington’s complaints about contractors to the 
revolutionary army has a timeless quality. Now as then, a decision to contract reflects a series of 
decisions that integrate agency needs, options, procurement system capacity requirements and 
the agency impacts from vendors and effected publics during the development and delivery of 
services (Cohen and Eimicke 2008). 
Much is made of government contracting for goods and services under what has become 
an umbrella argument of economy and efficiency (Boyne 1998, Christensen and Lægreid 1999, 
Kettl 2002a, Cooper 2003, Brown et al. 2006). Arguments on efficiency and economy are often 
situational and grounded in political or philosophical assumptions (Frederickson 1996, Cohen 
2001, Salamon 2002a, Brudney et al. 2005). Skepticism of government, a focus on efficiency, 
preferences for markets and avoiding growth in government have animated the variously named 
“reinventing”, “new governance” and so on but all rest on contracts for implementation 
(Thompson and Riccucci 1998, Salamon 2002a, Kennedy and Malatesta 2010). Using 
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contractors to provide services normally provided directly by government employees is referred 
to by some as indirect government (Kettl 2002a, Salamon 2002b).  
Viewed in aggregate, government contracting covers a very wide range of products and 
services. Yet, contract use varies based on the level of government considered, agency missions, 
and situational factors (see for example Van Slyke 2003, Hefetz and Warner 2004, Brudney et al. 
2005, Ni and Bretschneider 2007, Fernandez 2009, Brown et al. 2010). Federal government 
departments or agencies have been a preferred unit of analysis in studies of contracts and 
collaborative management methods (Salamon and Elliott 2002). The focus has chiefly fallen on 
health and human welfare programs or the occasional large procurement programs embedded in 
the military and NASA.  
The focus on state and local government’s use of indirect government approaches has 
largely fallen on health and human services and some direct service programs like waste 
management. Minimal information is found about state wildlife management agencies in the 
literature on indirect government or use of contracts in collaborative management approaches. 
State wildlife agencies also present an interesting subject because of the agencies Public Trust 
Doctrine responsibilities (Bacheller et al. 2010) and their roots in the progressive era ideology 
(Hays 1959). State wildlife agencies are also not “intermediaries” in the sense of the more 
commonly studied federal, state and local government arrangements. The Public Trust Doctrine 
does not contemplate trust responsibilities below the state (Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller 
et al. 2010) and there are generally no local government analogs to state wildlife agencies.  
State level pressures to limit growth of government, improve efficiency and improve 
services would be expected to reach to state wildlife agencies. The public trust responsibilities, 
user funding, wildlife specific legal environment and wildlife specific institutional features such 
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as funding from non-tax revenues suggest state wildlife agencies use of service contracts and 
indirect government approaches may not coincide with the use reported other state and local 
governments settings (Brudney et al. 2005). Agency funding by non-tax revenues may also 
lessen growth limits that otherwise would apply. This study intends to addresses the limited 
availability of information on state wildlife agencies use of contracts by exploring twelve years 
of fiscal and accounting records (fiscal years 1999-2010) of the Colorado Division of Wildlife 
CDOW) based on hypotheses derived from the literature about use of contracts in indirect 
government and collaborative management.  
State wildlife agencies use a variety of means to facilitate planning or participatory 
processes. While increased understanding and commitments to collaborative management is 
essential, they are noted as insufficient in themselves to facilitate and maintain collaborative 
management (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Schusler et al. 2003). Structural support and 
processes are needed to sustain joint action (Schusler et al. 2003). At some point collaborative 
processes require some degree of sharing of authority or resources to be effective (Trauger et al. 
1995). Sharing of authority or resources is accomplished by contracts. 
As government agencies, state wildlife agencies comply with statutes, rules and policies 
intended to insure government accountability. Agreements involving money or special 
authorities, no matter their collaborative or delegation intention, are subject to accountability 
requirements that inform the controls, procedures and authorizations embodied in the state’s 
formal procurement and contracting process (deLeon and Varda 2009). The contract accounting 
records are used as a direct measure of collaborative management activity in the Colorado 
Division of Wildlife. In this use, the records for contracts for third party professional service 
provision and grants are used as indicators of collaborative management activity. Grants are 
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viewed as inherently collaborative, requiring boundary spanning action (Agranoff 2007). Service 
contracts are more difficult to definitively characterize as the potential uses encompasses both 
delegated task and collaborative management implementation. However, Colorado’s fiscal 
policy requires service contractors to operate independent of direct control of the state as well as 
being independent entities (Controller 2009b; 2010). The accounting records limit the ability to 
identify the specific purpose of the contracts themselves. In this analysis, service contracts are 
included as a contract type used to support collaborative management.  
In selecting specific types of contracts as measures of collaborative management, it is 
recognized that other collaborative management support such as employees’ time or advice are 
not captured in the contract accounting record. While these soft supports are important, the direct 
measure of shared resources and authorities through contracts as captured in the state’s 
accounting system are the focus of parts of this analysis. Further, the public administration 
literature describes the evolving and spreading use of indirect or third party service provision, yet 
little published information is available on state wildlife agencies’ use of indirect contract tools. 
This project will begin to address the limited information by exploring the extent of contracts for 
collaborative wildlife management in a state wildlife agency. 
This analysis approach assumes that contracts for services and grants identified in 
Colorado’s accounting records substantially represent the state wildlife agency’s use of indirect, 
collaborative management approaches. Employing this assumption, CDOW accounting records 
are summarized, descriptively characterized and compared available resources for the same 
periods. Contract use is compared across the time period for changes in use and differences in 





 It is generally hypothesized that CDOW’s pattern of contract use will not match the 
contract use patterns for state and local agencies reported in the literature. To test this general 
supposition, five hypotheses were formulated in reference to the government contracting 
literature. The hypotheses focus on the relationships between funding, agency personnel, 
numbers and types of contracts and change in use over the time period. Three additional 
hypotheses are developed that are related specifically to state wildlife agency literature and state 
government contracting literature.  
Money, whether measured as revenue capacity or legislatively allocated spending 
authority is reported to influence contract use by state and local government agencies (O'Toole 
Jr. and Meier 2004, Brudney et al. 2005, Ni and Bretschneider 2007). This relationship is more 
complex than the obvious and simple proposition that without funding, contracts are not 
possible. Rather, a positive relationship is reported between fiscal resources and contracting. 
During periods of resource availability, contracting increases are driven by an agency’s interest 
in service improvements and other non- efficiency reasons, but during resource scarcity, 
contracting is reduced as agencies avoid the scrutiny and transaction cost of contracts (Boyne 
1998, O'Toole Jr. and Meier 2004, Ni and Bretschneider 2007).  
H1 The amount of service contracting measured as total dollars awarded  
by the CDOW is positively related to the fiscal resources available (ρ>0).  
Narrowing the focus to the subset of contracts that includes grants, governmental service 
contracts and other indirect purchase of services allows the examination of the relationship 
between this subset of collaborative management contracts and funding. The hypothesized 
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relationship is expected to be positive based on the same concepts presented for H1. The positive 
relationship described in the literature may be stronger within this contract grouping. 
H2 The total value of grant and indirect service contracts reported for the CDOW 
is positively related to available fiscal resources (ρ>0). 
The availability of personnel or expertise is a significant factor in decisions to contract 
(Auger 1999). Efforts focused on controlling government size, cost and efficiency have favored 
the use of contractors or service networks. The effect of this preference has at times resulted in 
diminished agency capacity or the “hollow government” noted in some public administration 
literature (Frederickson 1996, Milward and Provan 2000, Cooper 2003, Frederickson and Smith 
2003, Goodsell 2004, Terry 2005, Kennedy and Malatesta 2010 and others). Many state and 
local government agencies regularly obtain a variety of services by contract due to insufficient 
numbers of employees or missing skill sets (Curry 2009). Often, these agencies also face 
obstacles in adding personnel to address these limitations (Van Slyke 2003) leading to reliance 
on contractors. Therefore, service contracting is hypothesized as negatively related to the number 
of full time equivalent employees.  
H3 The amount of service contracting is negatively related to the number of full 
time equivalent positions available to the CDOW (ρ<0).  
A primary rational for the increased use of indirect government is that the complexity of 
public management is growing and exceeds the capacities of government agencies to directly 
address it (Salamon 2002b). Use of contracted services has steadily increased in government 
agencies (Cooper 2003, Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, Cohen and Eimicke 2008, Koliba et al. 
2011). Contract use is influenced by past contract success and through institutional normative 
behaviors (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Gulati 1995, Brown and 
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Potoski 2003b, Van Slyke 2009, Gazley 2010). Positive reinforcement of contract use increases 
the number of employees with contract experience, the number of positive contractor 
relationships and increases the agency acceptance of contracting (O'Neil 2007, Yang et al. 2009). 
Increased acceptance strongly influences the current modes of service acquisition and delivery 
(Lamothe et al. 2008). More experience over time would be expected to increase experience 
levels and positive outcomes favoring expanded use of contracts. These factors would be 
expected to influence the CDOW’s use of indirect government approaches. Therefore increased 
use of service contracts over the 12 year time period would be expected and would be seen as 
increases in both the number of service contracts and the contracts total value. 
H4 The number of service contracts increases over the 12 year time period 
(µ1<µ2< …<µ12). 
H5 The expenditures on service contracts has increased over the 12 year time 
period (µ1<µ2< …<µ12). 
Government agencies are reported to prefer non-governmental organizations (NGOs; as 
used here, refers to non-profit organizations) active in similar issue or policy areas due to goal 
convergence (Brown et al. 2007). Additionally, goal commitment by the people active in NGOs 
enhances trust (Brown et al. 2007) and provides leverage for added services on agency payments 
than would be expected from a for-profit partner (Cooper 2003). NGOs are often politically 
active and advocate for their goals and the programs in which they participate (Cooper 2003). 
Advocacy and NGO participation can also enhance the credibility of an agency and its programs 
with the public and politicians (Foster 2001). The converse is also possible, where incongruence 
in goals reduces government agency contracting (Hefetz and Warner 2004). Contract partner 
preference rankings of other government agencies, trusted non-profits, less trustworthy non-
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profits and finally for-profit organizations has been reported in other government agencies 
(Brown et al. 2006, Van Slyke 2007). It is theorized that wildlife agencies would display similar 
preferences leading to an increased use of governmental and non-profit contractors over time.  
H6 The number and monetary value of contracts with governmental agencies 
increases over the 12 year time period (H6A
 =µnumber1 < µnumber2 <…< µnumber12 and 
H6B=µdollars1< µdollars2 <…<µdollars12). 
H7 The number and monetary value of contracts with NGOs increases over the 12 
year time period (H7A = µnumber1 < µnumber2 <… <µnumber12 and 
 H7B = µdollars1< µdollars2 <…<µdollars12). 
Methods 
Twelve years of contract accounting records were obtained from the Colorado Division 
of Wildlife. The records covered fiscal years 1999 through 2010. The data sets were supplied as 
individual fiscal year transactional records which included all actions initiated by the CDOW 
associated with commitment documents. The commitment documents have different names and 
are recorded as purchase orders, contracts or intergovernmental agreements depending on the 
circumstances. Requirements and use of commitment documents are established by the State of 
Colorado’s purchasing guidelines and fiscal rules (Controller 2009a, Controller 2010). The 
contract data was extracted from the Colorado Financial Records system using the predesigned 
system reports. The report for each fiscal year was provided as individual Excel spreadsheets.  
Data preparation steps.– The fiscal year data were examined to develop an 
understanding of the data sets. The accounting format of single entry for awards, changes and 
payments were modified to create separate categories for contract amounts, payments, contract 
modifications and cancelations. The separation transformed the accounting report structure into 
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one allowing comparison of the categories and simpler manipulation of the data. The modified 
spreadsheet data was imported into an Access database. The resulting database contained 79,361 
records, each representing an individual transaction tied to individual commitment documents 
(contracts). The structure of these individual records is depicted in the example found in Table 
5.1. Queries were developed in Access to explore, consolidate and characterize the contract data. 
Data intended for statistical analysis were exported as Excel spreadsheets. Excel was used to 
visually inspect and standardize the format (variable names, spacing, orientation, etc.) as needed. 
The data sheets were imported into SPSS, Inc.’s PASW Statistics 18 analysis software. Data sets 
and variables were visually compared to the import source. Any import errors or missing data 
were corrected prior to analysis. Legislative appropriation and expenditure reports (Joint Budget 
Committee 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 
2011) were obtained, as were additional fiscal years covering a year prior and post of the 
contract data set period. The reports for fiscal years 2002 through 2011 were obtained from the 
Colorado Legislatures Joint Budget Committee Staff Reports web page at 
http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/jbc/apprepts.htm. Reports for fiscal years prior to 2002 
were made available by the CDOW or the Colorado Department of Natural Resources (CDNR) 
from which the portions relevant to the CDOW were scanned. The appropriation reports provide 
summaries of the state agencies official budgets in both dollars and employees. Generally, each 
report contains the agencies’ prior fiscal year expenditures and the full time equivalents (FTE) 
used. The number of FTE used equals the number of full time employees the agency employed 




Table 5. 1 Data Format of Excel and Access data files displaying sample data from fiscal year 2005.  
 
Fiscal YR1 PURCHASE ORDER VENDOR NAME TRANSACTION DATE MOD FUND APP ORG PROG 
2005 OEPBA05000000297 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY PVPBAAV050000946 3/18/2005  410 50O 5780 7120 
2005 OEPBA05000000297 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY PVPBAAV050000946 3/18/2005  410 60O 6710 7550
2005 OEPBA05000000297 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY OEPBA05000000297 5/25/2005 M 410 60O 6710 7550 
2005 OEPBA05000000297 COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY OEPBA05000000297 6/1/2005 M 410 21O 2120 7550 
 
 
  (Continued from above) 
 
OBJT SO GBL Comment DESCRIPTION AMOUNT Tran Type IA expend PV Amount Rolled In Rolled Out Lapsed 
4220  CASH  DIVISION OF WILDLIFE  PV  -$212.50    
4220  CASH  DIVISION OF WILDLIFE  PV  -$2,762.50    
4220  CASH   -$637.50 OE      
4220  CASH   -$212.50 OE      
 
 
1 Fiscal YR= Fiscal Year, Purchase Order = Contract, agreement or purchase order number, Vendor Name = Contractor,  
Transaction = Individual transaction identification number, Date = Date transaction entered, MOD = Modified entry, Fund = Agency fund  
identification, APP = Appropriation identification, ORG = Agency organizational unit identification, PROG = Program identification number, OBJT = Code 
identifying purchase type, SO = Sub-object code used to further identify purchase type (applies to only select object codes), GBL = General budget ledger 
identification, Comment = Comment field, Description = Contract or transaction descriptors, Amount = amount encumbered by contract or modifications to the 
encumbered amount, Tran Type = transaction type code, IA expended = Interagency agreement payment amount, PV Amount = Payments made, Rolled In = 
Contract amounts rolled forward into this fiscal year from previous fiscal years, Rolled Out = Contract amounts rolled forward into the next fiscal year, and 




Reports for fiscal years before and after the contract data timeframe provide full records 
of the appropriations and expenditure data for the period. The content and format of the fiscal 
year reports have changed over the period. The changes modified or eliminated elements of the 
reports. Appropriation and expenditures of state and federal funds are consistently reported in all 
years. FTE allocation report formats have changed over time, however additional data on FTE 
obtained from the CDOW allowed the FTE data to be adjusted to a similar basis. The 
appropriations data was collected into an Excel spreadsheet, reviewed for quality assurance, and 
imported into PASW 18.  
Descriptive statistics and graphic representations where developed from the 
appropriations and contract datasets. Contract types were categorized using the object coding 
system mandated for state agencies by the Colorado State Controller’s Office (2011). The codes 
are recorded for all contracts in the dataset and allow grouping of the contract records by 
commodity, service, and capital property and grants contracts. Table 5.2 summarizes the object 
code groupings applied. The use of “service contract” identifies the combination of contracts 
identified as personal services, grant, governmental and indirect service contracts. This grouping 
is equivalent to collaborative management contracts as used in this document. The data 
collection and preparations steps taken were informed by the data sets and past experiences as a 
CDOW administrator. Chapter 4, Personal Narrative provides an overview of this experience. 
The data set variations and the steps taken to address those variations are more fully described 
Chapter 3, Methods. The complexity of the data sets and the transformation of the individual 
fiscal year data into a single data set suitable for the analysis took several steps. The end result of 
the process could vary based on the experience of the individual recreating the data set. 
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Table 5. 2 Object code category grouping by commodity, service and capital expenditures. A  
Accounting Group General Content C/S1 
 Purchased Service-Personal Srv Personal Services S 
 Operating Expenses   Utility Services  C 
  Rentals  C 
  Utility Services  C 
  Cleaning Services  C 
  Maintenance & Repair Services  C 
  Motor Veh Maint/Repair Svcs  C 
 Other Purchased Services  Marketing C 
  Communications  C 
  Data Processing-Purch Serv  C 
  IT Security-Purch Serv  C 
  Education Services  C 
  Printing & Reproduction  C 
  Legal Services  C 
  Purchased Medical Services  C 
  Inmate Pay  NI2 
  Other Purchased Services  C 
 Purchased Construction Svcs   Purchased Construction Svcs  S 
 Capitalized Professional Svcs   Capitalized Professional Svcs  S 
 Debt Service   Bond/Note/Cop Principal  NI 
  Bond/Note/Cop Interest  NI 
  Bond/Note/Cop Premium Amortizn  NI 
  Refndg Gain/Loss Amortization  NI 
 Capital Lease Payments   Capital Lease Principal  C 
  Capital Lease Interest  C 
 Supplies And Materials   Other Supplies & Materials  C 
  Agricultural Supplies  C 
  Automotive Supplies  C 
  Clothing And Uniform Allowance  C 
 Custodial And Laundry Supplies C 
  Data Processing Supplies  C 
  Purchase/Lease Of Software  C 
  Educational Supplies  C 
  Food And Food Serv Supplies  C 
  Laboratory & Medical Supplies  C 




Table 5.2 Continued.  
 
  
Accounting Group     General Content    C/S1 
  Office Supplies  C 
  Photographic Supplies  C 
  Postage  C 
  Printing/Copy Supplies  C 
  Recreational Supplies  C 
  Repair & Maintenance Supplies  C 
  Road Maintenance Materials  C 
  Noncapitalized Equipment  C 
  Noncapitalized Building Mat'ls  C 
  Noncapitalized IT Purchases  C 
  Noncapitalized Furniture  C 
  Noncapitalized Fixed Asset Other  C 
 Energy   Energy  C 
 Other Operating Expenses   Other Operating Expense  C 
  Awards, Judgments, Losses  C 
  Bad Debt Expense  C 
  Depreciation Expense  C 
  Dues And Memberships  C 
  Interest Expense  C 
  Sales/Collection Related Expns  C 
  Miscellaneous Fees And Fines  C 
  Official Fnctns/Customer Wkshp  C 
  Patient & Client Care Expense  C 
  Purchase Discounts  C 
  Purchase Of Highway Row  C 
  Employee Training  C 
  Royalties  C 
  Employee Moving Expense  C 
  State Employee Benefit Plan  C 
  Nonemployee Reimbursement  C 
  Loan Cancellations  NI 
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Table 5.2 Continued. 
 
 
Accounting Group     General Content    C/S C/S1 
  Cofrs Inventory Adjustments  NI
 Capitalized Property Purchases  Real Property-Direct Purchase  CP 
  Buildings-Direct Purchase  CP 
  Land-Direct Purchase  CP 
  Land Improvements-Dir Purchase  CP 
  Leasehold Improv-Dir Purchase  CP 
  Other Real Property-Dir Purch  CP 
  IT Capital Asset-Dir Purchase  CP 
  Office Furn/Off System-Dir Pur  CP 
  Motor Veh/Boats/Planes-Dir Pur  CP 
  Library Materials-Direct Purch  CP 
  Laboratory Equipment-Dir Purch  CP 
  Other Cap Equipment-Dir Purch  CP 
 Intergovernmental Payments   Intergovernmental Grants  S 
  Intergovernmental Purch Serv  S 
  Intergovernmental Distribution  S 
  Intergovernmental Refunds  S 
Other Payments   Fed Grts Pass-Thru To Agencies  S 
  Pass-Thru Fed Grant Intrafund  S 
  Grants To Nongov/Organizations  S 
  Grants To Individuals  S 
  Distributions To Nongov/Organ  S 
  Distributions To Nongov/Organ  S 
  Distributions To Individuals  S 
  Other Refunds  NI 
  Refunds To Other State Agency  NI 
  In-Kind Match  NI 
 
A Some object codes included in this list do not appear the data set. 
1 Object codes grouped into: C = Commodity, S = Service, CP = Capital property and NI = Not included. 
2 Object codes dealing with inventory, fund adjustments and tracking codes are not included and do not appear in the 





Variables and test.– Independent variables are fiscal years operationalized as the state’s 
fiscal year covering the July 1 to June 30 time period using the last calendar year as the 
identifier, full time equivalents (FTE), operationalized as FTEs used as permanent positions, and 
fiscal resources operationalized as the total reported expenditure for each fiscal year. Total 
expenditures report all the fiscal expenditures of the CDOW, regardless of fund source or 
expenditure type. The legislative appropriations figures in the Joint Budget Committee reports 
include different components over the time period. Variations in the reporting of allocated funds 
and grants render the reported appropriations unsuited as a measure of the available fiscal 
resources as evidenced by the difference between the reported appropriations and expenditures. 
The total expenditure data, while not a complete measure of all fiscal resources available in any 
given year, provides a consistent measure of the fiscal resources under CDOW control in any 
given fiscal year in the period. 
Dependent variables come directly from the contract data set or a re-coding of values 
within the data set. Service contracts were operationalized using the object codes identified as 
services (Table 5.2). The object codes were also used to identify, group and operationalize all 
grant contracts as grants. Contract values were operationalized as the encumbrance (awarded) 
amounts in the object code groups. The dependent variables of the number of government and 
NGO contracts were operationalized by creating a vendor identification variable and coding the 
contracts dichotomously as belonging to the group or not. Those coded “government” were 
vendors identified as federal, state or local governments and any contracts identified as 
interagency, or using interagency fund transfer codes. The government category includes 
universities and colleges. NGOs were identified by name and, in case of unclear status, verified 
using the organization’s web site or the Colorado Secretary of State’s database of Colorado 
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organizations (available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/). Government and NGO contract amount 
variables were created by including award values of contracts within the groups. 
Test for relationship between available funds as an independent variable and the total 
value of all collaborative type contracts grouped as service contracts (H1) or grant contracts (H2) 
used Pearson’s correlation statistics. Pearson’s correlation statistics were also used to test for a 
relationship between employee numbers (H3), the independent variable, and the total service 
contract values. Test of differences were conducted by applying the Chi-square statistic in the 
cases of the number of service contracts (H4), governmental contracts (H6A) and number of NGO 
contracts (H7A) which use a dichotomous true-false coding of the contracts and the categorical 
fiscal year variable. Test of the values of service contracts (H5), value of government contracts 
(H6B), and value of NGO contracts (H7B) between fiscal years employed Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) statistics with fiscal years as a categorical variable and contract values as a 
continuous variable. 
Results 
Summaries of the legislative appropriation of both dollars and FTE are found in Table 5.3. The 
headings used in this table reflect the funds subject to legislative controls and include cash funds 
(license fees), select federal assistance funds, a listing of exempt funds not subject to 
appropriation and FTEs, the full time employee count. As noted, appropriation rules have 
changed over the reporting period and Table 5.3 also includes summaries of the CDOW’s budget 
request from fiscal year 2001 for comparative purposes. Note the exempt funds rules changed 
over the time period and do not reflect all non-appropriated funding available to the CDOW. For 
example, Great Outdoor Colorado grants are not consistently reflected in the appropriation 
reports as a result of changes in legal interpretation and administrative policy. 
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Table 5. 3 CDOW request and appropriations by fiscal year. 


















FY99 $50,812,364 $7,217,560 $4,850,000 $62,879,924 732.6 - A - A 
FY00 $51,442,697 $7,973,611 $4,046,390 $63,462,698 744.1 - A - A 
FY01 $52,705,034 $8,729,630 $8,871,830 $70,306,494 752.5 $99,746,468 752.2 
FY02 $55,319,012 $9,325,325 $8,268,974 $72,913,311 752.5 $85,077,916 749.4 
FY03 $55,998,887 $9,455,731 $7,180,000 $76,966,422 764.2 $97,479,911 753.5 
FY04 $56,303,382 $10,246,134 $12,491,126 $79,040,642 764.2 $113,094,215 764.3 
FY05 $54,732,005 $10,236,556 $15,000,000 $79,968,561 762.4 $105,727,780 764.2 
FY06 $53,638,072 $9,425,310 $16,000,000 $79,063,382 762.4 $122,284,477 764.2 
FY07 $60,126,619 $10,514,472 $8,400,000 $79,041,091 652.4B $106,383,191 762.4 
FY08 $51,305,097 $10,903,729 $20,361,289 $82,570,115 652.4 $110,957,765 652.4 
FY09 $58,491,644 $10,399,532 $18,063,333 $86,954,509 651.4 $114,495,599 652.4 
FY10 $64,178,202 $10,197,576 $12,742,183 $87,117,961 651.4 $121,958,801 652.4 
A= Comparable budget request data were not available for years prior to FY01 




Table 5.4 summarizes the reported expenditures by year. The data in Table 5.3 and Table 
5.4 come from CDOW’s official budget request and Joint Budget Committee reports (Joint 
Budget Committee 1998; 1999, Colorado Division of Wildlife 2000; 2001, Joint Budget 
Committee 2001, Colorado Division of Wildlife 2002, Joint Budget Committee 2002, Colorado 
Division of Wildlife 2003; 2004, Joint Budget Committee 2004, Colorado Division of Wildlife 
2005, Joint Budget Committee 2005, Colorado Division of Wildlife 2006, Joint Budget 
Committee 2006, Colorado Division of Wildlife 2007, Joint budget Committee 2007, Colorado 
Division of Wildlife 2008, Joint Budget Committee 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011).  

















   
  1Actual expenditures include all expenditures regardless of type or source of funds.  
  2Calculated by subtracting the number of FTE used for temporary positions from  
the total FTE used. Data taken from the CDOW budget request and Joint Budget 
 Committee reports. Data to calculate the amounts prior to FY01 were unavailable. 
 
Total amounts contracted, grouped by the object code categories and fiscal year, are 
reported in Table 5.5. These totals represent the amounts contained in commitment documents 
(contracts, purchase orders, intergovernmental agreements etc) by fiscal year. The amounts 










FY99 $89,489,588 687.7 - 
FY00 $88,745,789 719.6 - 
FY01 $90,714,821 704.8 648.5 
FY02 8 7,780,001 701.3 642.8 
FY03 9 0,589,648 750.1 651.4 
FY04 $98,355,375 758.9 651.4 
FY05 $108,215,615 754.5 623.7 
FY06 $98,938,913 750.3 613.4 
FY07 $95,388,270 622.1 622.1 
FY08 $129,229,505 652.7 652.7 
FY09 $125,653,605 652.4 652.4 
FY10 $127,555,472 651.4 651.4 
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Table 5. 5 Contract amounts by object code and fiscal year. 
     
Object Code Group Fiscal Years >             
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Temp Prof Serv $3,937,710 $1,325,459 $1,471,400 $1,143,744 $926,207 $754,525 $756,825 $803,291 
Purchase Prof Serv $953,191 $5,616,869 $4,887,921 $5,714,907 $5,791,130 $5,948,592 $4,557,103 $5,476,707 
Misc Prof Serv $188,477 $15,125 $0 $978,584 $939,196 $1,199,875 $1,128,299 $783,340 
Operating Expense $1,717,395 $1,952,930 $2,186,698 $2,230,817 $2,181,943 $2,737,871 $2,045,593 $2,240,921 
Construction Serv $7,466,408 $8,917,823 $6,775,257 $7,949,600 $6,368,024 $3,748,855 $4,602,993 $4,656,399 
Marketing $18,524 $34,410 $183,218 $93,601 $16,705 $8,175 $24,760 $42,515 
Other Serv $1,743,545 $1,937,008 $2,164,931 $2,890,453 $2,467,121 $2,931,882 $3,397,946 $3,406,645 
Supplies & Material $3,335,452 $4,043,990 $3,730,511 $4,592,990 $4,409,317 $3,822,058 $6,327,317 $4,227,920 
Non-capital PC $0 $0 $0 $0 $773,680 $527,223 $419,448 $642,013 
Leased Software $0 $22,400 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Energy $0 $0 $57,541 $31,344 $83,165 $69,701 $124,776 $75,444 
Other Operating $198,028 $257,646 $234,376 $190,404 $208,654 $240,295 $277,776 $303,132 
Intergov Grants $4,315,045 $6,245,411 $5,454,381 $5,474,465 $4,496,356 $4,399,294 $3,761,255 $4,816,665 
Intergov Distribution $0 $3,779 $29,546 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Grant Pass Through $262,557 $617,447 $326,769 $238,727 $211,965 $521,604 $667,585 $501,147 
Grants to NGOs $0 $0 $0 $0 $150,000 $70,250 $31,750 $85,000 
Grants to Individuals $0 $35,000 $18,000 $41,800 $9,300 $4,140,000 $678,973 $605,635 
Other Grants $10,210 $0 $12,513 $0 $0 $0 $0 $13,000 
Distribution to NGO $288,816 $0 $12,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Grants to Students $503,033 $514,770 $541,410 $557,382 $643,426 $515,916 $759,862 $699,266 
Payments to Individuals $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $12,133 $0 
Capital Prop Purchase $5,208,440 $7,595,413 $11,671,733 $3,072,202 $2,333,675 $4,460,351 $12,845,429 $3,418,471 
Lease Purch Real Prop $9,400,200 $12,300 $23,893 $120,625 $55,593 $143,222 $169,536 $117,760 
Capitalize Prof Serv $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $101,100 
Capital Lease $0 $0 $0 $0 $9,340 $0 $0 $0 










Table 5.5 Continued. 
    
Object Code Group Fiscal Year         
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Totals all 
years 
Temp Prof Serv  $614,650 $624,572 $322,226 $336,310 $13,016,919 
Purchase Prof Serv  $4,601,872 $3,869,988 $3,812,583 $4,410,842 $55,641,707 
Misc Prof Serv  $590,819 $439,386 $277,821 $162,459 $6,703,380 
Operating Expense  $4,309,464 $4,548,830 $4,176,130 $3,755,768 $34,084,360 
Construction Serv  $3,032,971 $5,796,175 $4,567,345 $5,580,997 $69,462,846 
Marketing  $77,563 $57,868 $109,641 $30,583 $697,562 
Other Serv  $3,642,565 $3,661,470 $2,772,667 $3,918,501 $34,934,733 
Supplies & Material  $5,223,376 $5,362,887 $5,299,479 $5,213,890 $55,589,188 
Non-capital PC  $327,866 $457,321 $465,725 $488,687 $4,101,964 
Leased Software  $0 $0 $0 $0 $22,400 
Energy  $108,000 $112,719 $100,898 $112,500 $876,089 
Other Operating  $307,835 $207,287 $118,777 $106,329 $2,650,539 
Intergov Grants  $3,686,119 $3,732,529 $6,081,132 $6,065,711 $58,528,364 
Intergov Distribution  $0 $0 $0 $0 $33,325 
Grant Pass Through $1,251,904 $992,997 $1,761,794 $1,757,370 $9,111,867 
Grants to NGOs $1,034,749 $1,382,001 $1,666,521 $1,958,694 $6,378,965 
Grants to Individuals  $746,875 $916,845 $686,931 $917,047 $8,796,406 
Other Grants $13,000 $0 $0 $21,525 $70,247 
Distribution to NGO  $88,000 $86,298 $2,800,000 $1,338,177 $4,613,291 
Grants to Students  $731,083 $538,743 $76,948 $504,938 $6,586,778 
Payments to Individuals  $0 $0 $0 $0 $12,133 
Capital Prop Purchase  $6,097,797 $27,394,382 $21,628,643 $9,896,446 $115,622,982 
Lease Purch Real Prop $62,516 $9,411 $17,505 $0 $10,132,561 
Capitalize Prof Serv $151,550 $1,264,008 $570,685 $345,501 $2,432,844 
Capital Lease  $52,300 $0 $0 $0 $61,640 
Total $36,752,877 $61,455,718 $57,313,451 $46,922,275 $500,163,088 
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Colorado Fiscal Rules (Controller 2009a). The average total dollar amount contracted during the 
12 year period is $41,680,257. The lowest level occurred in fiscal year 2003 in which 
$32,074,799 was contracted while the highest level occurred in fiscal year 2008 with a total 
$61,455,718 contracted. The difference between the low and high figures is 92% or almost 
double and is a difference of $29,380,919. The top five contract expense categories were: capital 
property purchases, construction services, inter-governmental grants, purchase of professional 
services and supplies/ materials. A graphic depiction of the contract categories and their relative 
ranking expressed as totals for all years is presented in Figure 5.1.  
A total of 13,448 commitment documents were recorded over the 12 year period. While 
the majority of these contracts were active for a single fiscal year, many were multi-year 
agreements active over multiple fiscal years. Many contracts contain multiple object codes and 
organizational codes and have entries for payments, adjusting funds or moving the contract to 
future fiscal years and other actions. The result is that any single contract can have multiple 
entries within the data set. Summarizing this complex data set’s occurrence of object codes is 
found in Table 5.6 which also includes the number of active contracts in each fiscal year. The 
object code occurrence summary in Table 5.6 along with Figure 5.2 provide a snap shot of the 
occurrence rates of the object codes within the accounting records without regard to the purpose 
of the action.
Collapsing the object code groups into commodity, services and capital property (Table 
5.2) provides a summarized categorization of contract spending. Table 5.7 summarizes the three 
types by fiscal year based on the contract values. Also included are percentages by contract 
group for each fiscal year. Values from the contract data show that, on average, commodities 









Table 5. 6 Contract numbers and object group frequency of occurrence by fiscal year. 
Fiscal Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Individual Contracts 1115 1138 1222 1175 996 1084 1135 1134 1118 1111 1103 1117 13448
Object Group - Frequency of Occurrence in Complete Data Set – All Actions      
Temp Prof Serv 1247 883 863 1310 801 937 686 527 421 447 373 364 8859
Purchase Pro Serv 257 859 1140 887 677 643 689 609 561 516 526 476 7840
Misc Pro Serv 94 10 0 197 214 255 239 158 113 101 33 30 1444
Operating Expense 996 1079 1165 1191 922 860 797 858 1075 956 1044 994 11937
Construction Serv  572 626 568 458 501 464 458 504 312 342 389 358 5552
Marketing 62 63 69 65 60 53 63 66 20 10 12 6 549
Other Services 434 480 473 529 585 621 739 703 795 934 647 737 7677
Supplies & Material 1053 1145 1414 1297 1101 934 1232 1179 1404 1463 1673 1606 15501
Non-capital PC  0 0 0 0 219 158 74 81 48 73 92 146 891
Leased Software 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Energy  0 0 61 55 104 106 100 59 46 65 136 177 909
Other Operating 85 157 112 82 53 100 134 92 98 72 58 51 1094
Inter Gov Grants 580 758 670 495 921 1291 1293 1391 688 369 640 556 9652
Inter Gov Distribution 2 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Grant Pass Through 50 61 40 16 15 15 17 49 64 77 74 72 550
Grants to NGO 0 0 0 0 20 18 10 6 467 520 496 372 1909
Grants to Individuals 0 4 4 6 3 12 24 34 35 45 45 53 265
Other Grants  4 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 9 19
Distribution to NGO  42 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 12 12 76
Grants to Students 184 130 174 171 87 116 113 105 103 58 16 24 1281
Payments to 
Individuals 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Capital Prop Purchase 209 215 146 259 235 229 285 231 250 329 261 162 2811
Lease Purch Real Prop 5 6 11 31 18 35 35 32 4 4 2 0 183
Capitalize Prof Service 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 18 57 123 114 329
Capital Lease 0 0 0 0 12 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 18




















Object Group Occurance Over 12 Fiscal Years
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Table 5. 7 Total contract values percent of total represented by commodity, service and capital property contracts. 
   
  Fiscal Year >           
Major Grouping 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total Services $17,925,447 $23,291,685 $19,529,197 $22,099,209 $19,535,604 $21,298,910 $16,944,645
Total Commodity $7,012,943 $8,248,384 $8,557,274 $10,029,609 $10,149,927 $10,337,205 $12,617,615
Total Capital Prop. $14,608,640 $7,607,713 $11,695,626 $3,192,827 $2,389,268 $4,603,573 $13,027,098
Grand Total $39,547,029 $39,147,781 $39,782,097 $35,321,645 $32,074,799 $36,239,687 $42,589,358
% Total = 
Commodities 18% 21% 22% 28% 32% 29% 30% 
% Total = Services 45% 59% 49% 63% 61% 59% 40% 
% Total = Capital 




            
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total All years 
$18,541,549 $16,543,594 $19,643,542 $22,623,986 $23,399,571 $241,376,938
$10,938,590 $14,048,970 $14,408,383 $13,043,317 $13,626,258 $133,018,475
$3,536,231 $6,160,313 $27,403,793 $21,646,148 $9,896,446 $125,767,675
$33,016,370 $36,752,877 $61,455,718 $57,313,451 $46,922,275 $500,163,088
33% 38% 23% 23% 29% 27% 
56% 45% 32% 39% 50% 48% 







made up an average of 48% with a range of 32% to 63%. Capital property contracting averaged 
25% of the contracted values and ranged from 7% to 45% in fiscal year totals. Combining capital 
property and commodities shows on average that 52% of the contract value was for non-service 
expenditures. Table 5.8 compares the contracted values with the reported expenditures for each 
fiscal year. Commodity contracts represent an average of 11% of total expenditures with a range 
of 8-15%. Service contracts average 20% with a range of 15-26% and capital property averaged 
10% with a range of 3-21%. Combining commodity and capital property yields an average of 
21% of the total agency expenditures in non-service categories. The agency’s total contract 
expenses averaged about 41% of total expenditures ranging between 33-48%. 
Hypothesized relationships between the annual expenditure for contracts categorized as 
services and agency fiscal resources expressed as the total expenditures were not significant. 
Collaborative contracts operationalized as the total value of grants was significantly related to 
the available monetary resources with a reported Pearson’s correlation coefficient of r = 0.71 and 
a one-tailed significance of p = 0.005 (N=12). The number of full time employees per fiscal year 
was not related to service contract values. The hypothesized relationships posited in H1 and H3 
are rejected and the null hypothesis of no relationship between service contracting and available 
fiscal resources or full time employees is accepted. In the case of H2, the proposed positive 
relationship between the available fiscal resources and use of grant contracts is accepted.  
Chi-square analysis of the number of service contracts, the number of service contracts 
with other government agencies and the number of service contracts with non-profit NGOs are 
reported in Table 5.9. The Chi Square statistics report that the yearly differences in the number 
of service contracts is significant at p < 0.001 (Х2 = 77.69) indicating that there is a statistical 
relationship between the fiscal year and number of service contracts. However, the effect size is 
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Table 5. 8 Contract totals by category, total agency expenditure and contract group percentage of total expenditures. 
  Fiscal Year > 
Major Grouping 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total all Services $17,925,447 $23,291,685 $19,529,197 $22,099,209 $19,535,604 $21,298,910 $16,944,645 
Total all 
Commodity 
$7,012,943 $8,248,384 $8,557,274 $10,029,609 $10,149,927 $10,337,205 $12,617,615 
Total all Capital  $14,608,640 $7,607,713 $11,695,626 $3,192,827 $2,389,268 $4,603,573 $13,027,098 
Grand Total $39,547,029 $39,147,781 $39,782,097 $35,321,645 $32,074,799 $36,239,687 $42,589,358 
Total Reported 
Expenditure 
$89,489,588 $88,745,789 $90,714,821 $87,780,001 $90,589,648 $98,355,375 $108,215,615 
% Operations 8% 9% 9% 11% 11% 11% 12% 
% Services 20% 26% 22% 25% 22% 22% 16% 
% Capital 
Property 
16% 9% 13% 4% 3% 5% 12% 
% of Total 
Expenditure as 
Contracts 
44% 44% 44% 40% 35% 37% 39% 
 
 
             
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total All Years 
$18,541,549 $16,543,594 $19,643,542 $22,623,986 $23,399,571 $241,376,938 
$10,938,590 $14,048,970 $14,408,383 $13,043,317 $13,626,258 $133,018,475 
$3,536,231 $6,160,313 $27,403,793 $21,646,148 $9,896,446 $125,767,675 
$33,016,370 $36,752,877 $61,455,718 $57,313,451 $46,922,275 $500,163,088 
$98,938,913 $95,388,270 $129,229,505 $125,653,605 $127,555,472 $1,230,656,602 
11% 15% 11% 10% 11% 11% 
19% 17% 15% 18% 18% 20% 
4% 6% 21% 17% 8% 10% 
33% 39% 48% 46% 37% 41% 
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 Table 5. 9 Chi Square analysis of the numbers of service, government and NGO contracts. 
                                  
   Fiscal Year    
Variable Count 





Service Contract            77.69 >.001 .07 
 No 89.4
1 88.0 87.0 88.3 87.5 84.4 83.5 82.5 82.4 83.3 83.4 82.1    
 Yes 10.6 12.0 13.0 11.7 12.5 15.6 16.5 17.5 17.6 16.7 16.6 17.9    
Government Contract            48.65 >.001 .06 
 No 83.1 82.6 85.2 86.3 88.9 86.1 83.2 82.1 83.6 86.5 87.3 86.4    
 Yes 16.9 17.4 14.8 13.7 11.1 13.9 16.8 17.9 16.4 13.5 12.7 13.6    
NGO Contract             18.28 .075 .04 
 No 95.6 96.0 95.8 94.0 95.8 95.2 94.7 93.8 94.3 94.2 94.0 94.9    
 Yes 4.4 4.0 4.2 6.0 4.2 4.8 5.3 6.2 5.7 5.8 6.0 5.1    




minimal (Cramer’s V = 0.07) indicating low practical significance. The Chi-square statistic’s 
sensitivity to sample sizes (Vaske 2008) which suggests finding a significant but minimal effect 
in a sample of this size here would not be unexpected. Examining the distribution of contract 
services numbers shows an increase in the number of contracts from about 10.6% to 17.9% with 
the major increase coming prior to fiscal year 2005 and nearly stable numbers after. The change 
in contract numbers is equal to 82 contracts using the lowest and highest contract numbers. 
Exploring the increased use of service contract finding further, the mean for service contracts per 
fiscal year is 504 with a standard deviation of 76. The 95% confidence interval, based on the 
mean statistic, includes all of the individual year’s actual service contract totals. The data show a 
slight but uneven increase in the number of service contracts over the 12-year period. However 
the hypothesized incremental increases were not found and H4 is rejected and the null hypothesis 
of no yearly increase is accepted. ANOVA testing for increases in service contract use based on 
increases in the total dollar amount contracted was not found to be significant. An increase in the 
dollar value of service contracting by the CDOW is rejected and the null hypothesis of no 
statistical difference between the fiscal years for spending on contracted services is retained.  
The number of contracts with other government agencies was hypothesized to increase 
over the 12-year period (H6A) as was the awarded amount (H6B). The number of contracts with 
government agencies was tested using Chi-square as previously described. The Chi-
squarestatistic for the government contracts is Х2 = 48.65 with a p < 0.001 with a Cramer’s V = 
0.06, indicating a minimal effect size. The percentage of contracts in each fiscal year with other 
government agencies in Table 5.9 reveals year to year variations with the highest occurrence of 
governmental contracts occurring in the middle of the fiscal year period studied. The statistical 
result is significant but without the directional component of the hypothesized relationship. 
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Therefore H6A is rejected and the null hypothesis of no yearly increases in the number of 
contracts with government agencies is retained. Likewise comparing total service contract 
amounts by fiscal year employing ANOVA techniques reported no significant differences 
between fiscal years. Therefore H6B is rejected and the null hypothesis of no differences in the 
amount of contracting with government agencies between fiscal years is retained. Test for 
significance for increasing service contract use with non-profit NGOs using Chi-square test 
found no significant differences in the number of contracts. H7A is rejected and the null 
hypothesis of no significant difference in the number of contracts with NGOs over the period is 
retained. An ANOVA comparison for increases in the value of service contracts was found no 
significant differences between years. H7B is also rejected and the null hypothesis of no 
significant difference in contracted amounts to NGOs over the fiscal years is retained.  
Additional considerations on grants.– Finding that grant contract expenditures were 
positively correlated with fund availability (r = 0.71 p = .005) provides additional insight into the 
CDOW’s use of collaborative contracts. The category identified as grant contracts is composed 
of three grant types: inter-governmental grants (the largest component), general grants, and pass 
through grants. A visual representation of the grant expenditures is presented in Figure 5.3. 
 














Govmt Grants Pass Thrgh Grants Genrl Grants All Grants
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To help portray the relationship between grants and funding, Figure 5.4 depicts the legislative 
appropriations to CDOW and CDOW’s total reported spending.  
 
 
Figure 5. 4 CDOW total expenditures used as total available funds and appropriated funds. 
 
Considering the statistical relationship between grant expenses and financial resources, 
and comparing the steady increase in legislative appropriations compared to the variable un-
appropriated or “non-traditional” portion of the CDOW’s spending suggest the variation in grant 
spending is related to the variable availability of the non-traditional funds. The dollars spent in 
excess of appropriations are not identified in the documents available. The missing identity and 
amounts in the appropriation data strongly suggest the funds are from legislatively exempted 
grants. Earlier appropriation data identified GOCO funds as one source of funds in this category. 
To the extent that the funds represent grants, the year to year amount would be expected to vary 
and possibly have specific restrictions or use requirements. Using these funds directly or 
indirectly to fund CDOW grants to others rather than day-to-day operational or personnel cost 
would be consistent with the conservative and traditional agency management approaches 
reported for state wildlife agencies (Nie 2004a, Anderson and Loomis 2006, Jacobson and 

















Available funds not subject to legislative control are identified here as the difference 
between the appropriation and actual agency expenditures in each fiscal year (Figure 5.4). These 
funds would be outside of the legislative appropriation process but subject to the CDOW’s and 
the grantors requirements. Spending these funds would still be subject to the procurement and 
contracting process. An example is the Great Outdoor Colorado funds for habitat protection. To 
obtain a grant, the CDOW must secure approval from the Great Outdoors Colorado Board which 
frequently imposes partnership, cost sharing and local support requirements. Additionally pass 
through grants from federal agencies and other federal grants require cost sharing in addition to 
coordination and partnerships elements.  
A relationship between the size of grant and capital property acquisition contract values 
and the amount of non-traditional funding is hypothesized base on: 
• Conservative management policies of the agency 
• Non-traditional funding is targeted to specific objectives often in areas of private 
land habitat protection or land acquisition actions 
• Non-traditional fund sources require partnerships and political support 
• Grants expenditures are statistically related to total agency funding  
• The slow, stable growth of legislatively appropriated funds and stable FTE 
numbers 
 The relationship of total grant and capital spending to the amount of non-traditional 
funds was not originally hypothesized. In light of the finding of a statistical relationship between 
grant expenditures and total agency funds and the visual similarity of the descriptive data (Table 
5.7 and Figures 5.3 and 5.4) suggest a stronger relationship between grant and capital property 
expenditures and total available funds. Testing the hypothesis that that spending on grants and 
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capital property is positively related to the amount of non-appropriated funds was conducted 
using the difference between the appropriated funds and total expenditures as the independent 
variable of non-traditional funds and the sum of the grant and capital property contract values as 
the dependent variable. A Pearson’s correlation was used which returns a correlation coefficient 
of r = 0.98 with a p < 0.001. Interestingly, the reported expenditures for capital property and 
grants consistently exceeded the total of the non-traditional funds by an average of 26% over the 
12 year period suggesting a cost sharing component which would be consistent with 
requirements from granting entities such as GOCO and many federal grants. 
Discussion 
The 12 fiscal years of CDOW’s contract accounting data portrays a use pattern that varies 
only slightly in the number of total contracts year to year (Table 5.6). As part of this relatively 
stable number of contracts, collaborative management contracts (defined here as professional 
personal services and grants) did increase slightly, about 7%, or 82 additional contracts. Over the 
period, most of this increase occurred in the earlier fiscal years as the later fiscal years numbers 
were essentially stable. No statistically significant changes in expenditures were found for the 
period. Total funds available to the agency regularly increased over the period but the increases 
varied year to year, sometimes substantially (Figure 5.4). However the increases in total funds 
did not lead to increased use of collaborative contracts or to statistically significant changes in 
collaborative management spending as suggested by some literature (Boyne 1998, O'Toole and 
Meier 2004, Brudney et al. 2005, Ni and Bretschneider 2007). However, grants, which are a 
component of the collaborative contracts, did show a statistical relationship between total funds 
and the grant expenditures (Pearson’s correlation coefficient r = 0.71 p = .005). The relationship 
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of this component rather than all collaborative contracts to total available funds suggested the 
CDOW applies different decision criteria on use of grants. 
Steady increases in contract use to increase public service capacity demands (Cohen 
2001, Cooper 2003, Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, Koliba et al. 2011) were not evident in the 
contract use pattern observed. Likewise the suggestion that use of contracts increases as 
employees become familiar with and successful employ contracts to meet the agency’s needs 
was not seen in the relatively stable numbers found in the data (Brown and Potoski 2003b, 
O'Neil 2007, Van Slyke 2009, Yang et al. 2009, Gazley 2010). The relatively constant number of 
collaborative management contracts does not rule out the influence of experience and capacity as 
influences. Other decision factors or perhaps less positive contracting experiences may be more 
influential. 
Reductions in direct service capacity as a result of reductions in employees has been 
suggested as a path to increased reliance on contractors (Frederickson 1996, Milward and Provan 
2000, Cooper 2003, Frederickson and Smith 2003, Goodsell 2004, Terry 2005, Kennedy and 
Malatesta 2010), and has often been referred to as “hollow government’. This type of change 
was not evident. The CDOW’s number of permanent employees was essentially unchanged over 
the time period. Finding no relationship between employee numbers and use of collaborative 
contracts was not surprising given little change occurred in either variable. The CDOW’s need 
for special skills also appears to have remained relatively unchanged as contract spending did not 
significantly increase as Curry (2009) suggest occurs when unavailable skill sets are needed and 
employee numbers are limited.  
Preferential use of government or NGOs in collaborative contract applications related to 
similarities in goals and degree of trust (Cooper 2003, Brown et al. 2006, Brown et al. 2007). In 
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the CDOW no statistically significant increases in use of collaborative management contracts 
with other government agencies and NGOs were found. No statistically significant pattern of 
increased use of governmental or NGO service contracting or expenditures with those entities 
were evident. Instead numbers of contracts with either entity varied year to year but expenditures 
with those entities were not statistically different over the time period.  
These results do not portray a state wildlife agency that is actively expanding its use of 
collaborative contracting in wildlife management. The results are interpreted as maintenance of 
an established pattern of contract use with small increases in the number of collaborative 
management contracts over time. Annual spending on services varies year to year but does not 
display statistically significant growth or any relationship to agency’s total expenditures and 
FTEs. The lack of a significant finding occurs without adjustment for inflation which would be 
expected to increase the likelihood of finding increased spending. 
The pattern of CDOW contracting suggests the influence of two general management 
approaches that inform the extent of collaborative management contracting. The first informs the 
agency of the types, extent and the entities that are included in collaborative management 
actions. It draws on the model of a traditional wildlife agency sketched by some authors where 
path dependency works to maintain traditions and relationships (Nie 2004a, Jacobson and 
Decker 2006, Decker et al. 2011) and the interaction of behavioral norms, professional values 
and experience (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Fleishman 2009) limit the extent of collaborative 
management contracting. The stability in personnel numbers with increasing funding would 
buffer agency from stimuli to increase use of collaborative management contracts.  
The second is applying the variable non-traditional funds to grants and capital property 
acquisition. This approach allows the agency to address habitat management needs that require 
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the use of exchanges or collaboration (Fleishman 2009) while retaining a direct service approach 
in other program areas. Additionally grants can be easily adjusted to accommodate the 
fluctuations in the non-traditional funds. It is also probable the fund requirements are related to 
habitat projects implemented through grants. 
This analysis of collaborative management contracting in a state wildlife agency used the 
official accounting records to assess the extent and change in use of these contracts. 
Acknowledging that contracts do not capture all collaborative activities of a state wildlife 
agency, they do document the transfers of funds or authorities which are a direct measure of the 
active engagement in collaborative management through third parties. The introduction to this 
chapter hypothesized that state wildlife agencies used collaborative type contracts differently 
than literature described uses in other state and local governments. The result confirms a 
different pattern of collaborative management contract use by the CDOW’s than typically 
described in other state agencies in the literature. Specific characteristics that may partially 
explain the differences reported include: relatively secure agency funding; shared organizational 
norms; professional beliefs; statutory authorities; and trustee obligations under the Public Trust 
Doctrine.  
Limitations.– This study uses contract records as measures of collaborative management 
in the CDOW. The selection of specific categories of contracts as collaborative using the state’s 
contract codes is subject to different interpretations. Additionally some contracts within the 
categories may be more delegative than collaborative. The use of contracts does not account for 
other collaborative actions the CDOW may participate in but do not require contracts. The 
exclusion of capital property acquisition contracts could be questioned. This contract category 
includes an unknown number of conservation easement acquisitions. The conservation 
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easements could be considered a collaborative management agreement in that the landowner and 
the CDOW are entering into a long-term shared ownership of real property. The capital property 
contracts tend to be large and account for a large part of the year to year variation in contract 
spending. Inclusion of these contracts in the collaborative contract count would affect the 
contract numbers and perhaps influence the results of the hypothesis testing related to 
expenditures. 
Statistical test applied were limited in some cases by the specific data characteristics as in 
the dichotomous variables on government or NGO contract numbers. Other data collection 
methods could have been applied to obtain different insights as either an independent analyses or 
to add to the interpretation of the contract data set. Interviews intended to explore collaborative 
actions or survey methods could provide insights into other collaborative efforts to capture a 
larger description of the CDOW’s involvement in collaborative management. 
General limitations in this study are imposed by the steps necessary to prepare and 
interpret the accounting data set. The personal experience of the author with Colorado’s 
accounting system helped in the data preparation but would likely not be duplicated except by 
someone similarly skilled. Personal experience with a number of the specific contracts in the 
data set is believed to be advantageous to this analysis. However this same experience may 
indirectly influence the results in ways that would not be immediately recognized. Specific 
limitations are imposed by the accounting system characteristics and the transaction metaphor 
the data set is based on. The data set required transformation steps and consolidation to facilitate 
analysis procedures. Considering the size of this data set, the data management steps could have 
created as yet undetected errors in spite of the quality assurance steps applied. The accounting 
record is also an artifact that partially reflects the decisions and actions by the parties involved in 
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the state’s contracting and accounting processes. The aggregation of funding and contracting 
data as used in the analysis is based on the categories and codes in the data set. The coding was 
accepted as correct and no effort to assess the reliability or accuracy of the codes was 
undertaken.  
The use the total expenditures as a substitute for total fund availability was a compromise 
made to allowed for comparing collaborative contract amounts with total funds. The use of the 
annually reported total spending by CDOW was necessitated by the unavailability of any 
consistent and comprehensive reporting of total available funds. The total expenditure data is 
believed to represent a lower value than the total available funds in any fiscal year. However, the 
data sets available provide no reliable method to verify this belief or calculate total available 
funds. The total expenditures data reports all expenditures which includes the groups of contracts 
identified as collaborative contracts in this analysis. This does not impact the analysis of the 
contract numbers or collaborative contract expenditures between fiscal years. It is a 
consideration and a caution applicable to the interpretation of the statistical relationships 




6)   AN AGENCY THEORY EXPLORATION OF STATE WILDLIFE AGENCY 
CONTRACTING: THE PARTICIPANTS PERSPECTIVE. 
Synopsis 
An a priori agency theory framework was used to explore interview transcripts of state 
wildlife agency staff, state procurement staff and contractors in Colorado and Wyoming. 
Interviews were conducted as part of an exploration of the use of contracts in wildlife 
management activities by two state wildlife management agencies. An agency theory framework 
was used to characterize the interview content by coding direct and indirect references to moral 
hazard, adverse selection and monitoring references in a setting with two executive agencies and 
contractors as the units of analysis. A “multiple principal” reading of the transcripts was 
employed when the content supported different assignment of principal or agent roles for the 
executive agencies.  
Agency theory references were found in higher numbers in two principal and agent 
arrangements. In the first, positioning the state wildlife agency as principal with contractors as 
agents, adverse selection references predominated and arose from performance and asymmetric 
information concerns. Relational or experience-based monitoring approaches were most 
frequently reported. This pattern is consistent with the interviewee’s reports of limited numbers 
of accepted and skilled wildlife contractors with whom the agency has had long term 
relationships. In the second principal-agent arrangement of purchasing agents and the wildlife 
employees, a conflict over which group is the principal and which the agent emerges. 
Exchanging the principal and agent roles between the purchasing and wildlife management 
functions presents different agency theory conflict profiles. Regardless of which was assigned 
the principal role, moral hazard concerns driven by goal conflicts were most frequently 
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identified. Performance concerns and hidden information were the most frequently mentioned 
adverse selection problems. However, the occurrence rates were different in the two 
arrangements of principal and agent reflecting differing concerns of the procurement and wildlife 
staff. The most frequently applied monitoring approach was obtaining information about the 
agent’s actions for both procurement and wildlife.  
The agency theory analysis provides insight into how implementation boundaries and 
capacities differ across the entities needed to successfully apply collaborative management 
contracting. First, the internal state agency conflicting goals and administrative charges to the 
agencies present capacity needs that are different from those needed in the relationship and 
experienced based between the wildlife agency and contractors. The insight provided by the 
application of agency theory can be used to inform the selection of theoretical approaches for 
future inquiries.  
Introduction 
Agency theory features prominently in exploring contract use and contracting 
relationships. The theory’s formulation uses the concept of a contract between a principal, 
desiring some action it cannot accomplish and an agent to whom the task is delegated along with 
the incentives needed to insure the agent’s action. Agency theory is often applied in more 
complex situations than the dyadic relationship use in the proceeding description. It is often 
employed to analysis relationships between legislative and executive branch agencies, as a 
generic unified “state” and other entities or in private organizational settings. In all applications, 
agency theory collapses complex situations into a principal and agent dyad. In this exploration 
agency theory is applied to a small scale case focused two executive branch agencies with 
differing responsibilities and one agency’s contractors. The interaction of the three entities and 
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the influence of the relationships on use of collaborative management contracts are considered. 
This exploration applies fixed model of agency theory elements to the relationships and actions 
described by participants during interviews about the use of collaborative management 
contracting by state wildlife agencies. This approach provides an insight into characteristics of 
the relationships between state wildlife agencies, procurement staff and contractors active in 
implementing collaborative management contracts.  
Participants are drawn primarily from one state wildlife agency with a second smaller 
group of participants from a second state wildlife agency as a comparison to the larger group. A 
structured agency theory framework was applied to identify agency theory content in interviews 
conducted to inquire into state wildlife agency’s use of collaborative management contracts and 
associated implementation concerns. The evaluation of interviewee statements using agency 
theory examines the relationship of the two executive branch agencies for the occurrence of 
agency theory elements, roles the participants assume. The results are used to characterize the 
extent to which agency theory elements influence use of collaborative management contracts or 
identifies capacity or boundary management concerns.  
Literature Review 
State wildlife agencies.– State wildlife agencies differ from the governmental 
environments typical of the service delivery relationships reported in social and protective 
services settings by authors such as Kettl (2006) or Salamon (2004). Governance and wildlife 
management policy discussions in the most recent wildlife management literature focuses on the 
merits of change in institutional elements of wildlife management (see for example Jacobson and 
Decker 2008, Buck 2009, Jacobson et al. 2010). The literature also contains numerous references 
to natural resource agencies’ efforts to manage and engage the public, communities, contractors 
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and corporate interest through various collaborative management, regulatory processes and local 
decision making processes. These efforts are described under a variety of terms, most often as 
collaborative management or public participation initiatives which employ collaborative 
processes and social interaction measures (see for example Leach 2006, Ansell and Gash 2008, 
Margerum 2008).  
 The general forces reported to drive use of contractor in other government programs 
(Frederickson 1996, Rhodes 1996a, Gilmour and Jensen 1998, Kettl 2000b, Kettl 2000a, 
Salamon 2004 and others) would also be expected to apply to state wildlife agencies. However, 
natural resource agencies are reported to have mixed views of contractors which encompass a 
range of roles including: political allies; service providers; sources of labor; sources of expertise; 
incompetents; and, occasionally threats to the agency (Jacobi and Wellman 1983, Trauger et al. 
1995, Foster 2001 and personal observations). Also, natural resource agencies are often 
portrayed in the literature as viewing third parties as a way to benefit the agencies’ objectives by 
completing tasks, “leveraging funds” through cost sharing or generating political support, 
managing and providing volunteers, or analyzing projects for suitability to distribute to other 
non-agency parties (Jacobi and Wellman 1983, Trauger et al. 1995, Foster 2001). Literature 
reports of third party impacts on wildlife agency policies typically focus on regulatory or 
allocation decisions in which the third parties are either characterized as representatives of 
traditional wildlife user groups or as groups not aligned with traditional wildlife interest groups 
(Mutter et al. 1999, Nie 2004a, Jacobson and Decker 2008, Buck 2009). 
Agency theory.– Exploring contracts and contractors necessarily invokes consideration of 
agency theory. Simply described, agency theory presents the aspects of a relationship where one 
party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent) using a conceptual contract as a 
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construct to highlight the elements of the relationship (Eisenhardt 1989, Shapiro 2005). Agency 
theory distills all types of relationships including elements of power, power inequalities and 
delegations into a question of control of the agent and the limitations presented by the 
asymmetrical information existing in the relationship (Eisenhardt 1985, Mitnick 1992, Whitford 
2002, Shapiro 2005, Moe 2006, Erridge 2009). Agency theory is applied in many settings and 
uses discipline specific aspects to highlight specific relationship elements, control issues or 
compensation approaches.  
Agency theory assumes all parties are self interested, risk adverse, and exhibit bounded 
rationality. The parties are assumed to have conflicts and information about the relationship is a 
commodity that can be obtained for a cost (Eisenhardt 1989). The formal literature cites two 
types of agency problems: moral hazard (generally characterized as the shirking agent), and 
adverse selection (generally characterized as an unfortunate selection of an agent based on 
misrepresentation of the agents abilities) (Arrow 1985, Eisenhardt 1989). In either case, the main 
problem addressed by agency theory arises from the assumption that the principal cannot easily 
or inexpensively verify information about the agent or the agent’s actions (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Government service contracting creates at least two separate agency relationships: one 
between the voters (principals) and the bureaucracy (agent), and the second between the 
contractor (agent) and the bureaucracy (principal) (Kennedy and Malatesta 2010). It can be 
argued that multiple principal agent relationships are routinely created in government contracting 
and, depending on the setting, a network arrangement results. The existence of multiple principal 
and agent roles for members of service provision networks has been described and an agency 
theory analytical framework applied (Provan and Milward 2001). In these networked agency 
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relationships, information becomes the critical component in organizing the multi-party, multi-
principal and agent role relationships (Kettl 2000a).  
Agency theory is criticized for its use of the self-interested individual metaphor which 
ignores cooperative behaviors (Lambright 2009). Often stewardship theory or relational 
contracting behaviors are invoked in situations where agents are not expected to be self-
interested maximizers as when non-profits are contracted to provide services related to their 
mission (Lambright 2009). Agency theory is also criticized as misunderstanding the conflicting 
interest problems created in multi-principal systems where agents cannot opt out of acting for 
multiple principals (Shapiro 2005). Ultimately agency theory’s scope is limited to providing 
direction on how a principal can control its relationship with an agent to promote goal alignment 
and reduce opportunistic behavior by employing monitoring, sanctions and incentives (Van 
Slyke 2009). These agency theory based mechanisms are also reported as less effective in 
traditional government agency settings than traditional structural controls (Whitford 2002).  
Agency theory is applied here as a tool that accommodates examination of multiple 
parties’ relationships in the application of wildlife management contracts by state wildlife 
agencies. The literature on state wildlife agencies application of collaborative management 
approaches include few references to contracted use and suggest that contractors would be 
viewed more as the stereotypical agent. Accounting data from the CDOW shows collaborative 
management efforts employing contracts and the frequent use of a small number of contractors is 
ongoing. Agency theory provides an approach to characterize interview transcript content and 
explore the extent to which the participants identify with the roles and control mechanisms 
assumed by the theory. The participant characterizations of agency theory elements may also 
138 
 
provide insight into the informant’s attitudes about collaborative management, trust and control 
elements imbedded in agency theory (Van Slyke 2009). 
Methods  
Transcripts developed from interviews conducted as part of a case study of collaborative 
management contracting by the Colorado Division of Wildlife (CDOW) and the Wyoming Game 
and Fish Department (WGFD) were analyzed by applying an agency theory coding construct. All 
interviews were conducted under the Colorado State University’s Institutional Review Board 
approved protocol #09-1432H which included written informed consent.  
A total of 23 interviews were conducted in Colorado representing the following groups 
(number of interviews per group in parenthesizes): purchasing administration staff (3), CDOW 
field staff (4), CDOW program staff (11), for profit contractors (2), non-profit contractors (3). 
Four WGFD program staff positions were interviewed for comparison and triangulation purposes 
as well as indications of the extent the CDOW case might be representative or idiosyncratic (Yin 
1998, Decrop 1999). Selection of Colorado interviewees began with purposeful selection of the 
initial interviewees based on contract use data in the agency accounting records and the 
investigators personal experience. Additional interviewees were selected using a 
snowball/network sampling approach (Teddlie and Yu 2007) in combination with accounting 
records. In the Wyoming case, two initial interviews were purposely selected from a list of 2010 
professional service contract administrators provided by the WGFD. Two additional interviews 
were completed based on referrals. Interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder, 
transcribed, returned for member checking and imported into QSR Internationals NVivo 9 for 
coding and analysis. 
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Interview procedures.– The interview process used was similar in both the WGFD and 
CDOW with contact and arrangements made following the Research Protocol #09-1432H. The 
interview format was semi-structured and conversational (Patton 2002b, Glesne 2006). Codes 
were used to identify the transcripts. The transcripts were provided to the informants to facilitate 
member checking (Yin 1994, Creswell 2009). General contracting themes explored focused on:  
• How extensively were contracts used in the last 5 to 10 years to accomplish service, 
biological or habitat objectives?  
• Why were contractors used? 
• Descriptions of the contracting relationships.  
• Were issues related to implementation, capacity or boundary management 
encountered? 
• How were capacity, implementation or boundary management needs addressed? 
Transcripts were imported into QSR International’s NVivo 9 software to facilitate coding 
and analysis. A fixed deductive coding scheme was developed and applied to the interview 
content. The coding scheme consisted of three main elements. First, agency theory elements 
derived from selected literature describing, applying or comparing agency theory in various 
situations. The main elements contributed to this coding structure are depicted in Table 6.1. In 
the table, the two main behaviors described in agency relations, adverse selection and moral 
hazard, are fractured into the descriptors employed by the cited authors and summarized in Table 
6.2. Additionally codes were used to identify the principal/s and agent/s referenced, direct 
references to control of any party or process and references to criteria used to select agents. 
Moral hazard and adverse selection coded sections were also over-coded to an “other theory” 
code if the content suggested other theoretical lenses would enhance or improve the  
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Econ1 Arrow (1985) X 
Org2 Banks (1995) X X 
Org Barney and Hesterly (2006) X X X 
Econ Dees (1992) X X X X 
PloS3 DiIulio and DiIulio (1994) X X 
Org Eisenhardt (1985; 1988; 1989) X X X X 
PAdmin4 Goodsell (2004) X 
PAdmin Kettl (2000a) X 
PAdmin Knott and Hammond (2003) X X X X? 
Econ Laffont and Marimort (2002) X 
Org Lambright (2009) X 
PAdmin Lane (2009) X X 
PAdmin Mitnick (1992) X X X X 
PAdmin Moe (2006) X X X X 
Sociol5 Shapiro (2005) X X X X X 
PAdmin Van Slyke (2009) X 
Org Weimer (1995) X 
PloS Worsham and Gatrell (2005) X X 
 
1 Econ = Economics; 2Org = Organization; 3 PolS = Political Science; 4PAdmin = Public Administration; 












































 Econ Arrow (1985) X 
 Org Barney and (2006) X X 
 Econ Dees (1992) X X 
 PolS DiIulio and DiIulio (1994) X 
 Econ Dixit (2002) X 
 Org Eisenhardt (1985; 1988; 1989) X X X 
 PAdmin Goodsell (2004) X 
 PAdmin Kettl (2000a) X 
 PAdmin Knott and Hammond (2003) X 
Econ Laffont and Marimort (2002) X 
 Org Lambright (2009) X X 
 PAdmin Lane (2009) X 
 PAdmin Mitnick (1992) X 
 PAdmin Moe (2006) X 
 Sociol Shapiro (2005) X X X 
 PAdmin Van Slyke (2009) X 
 Org Weimer (1995) X 





Table 6. 2 General definitions used in agency theory coding. 
 
interpretation of the content. Some interview passages also contain references to two or more 
coding elements of the agency code framework and were coded for all elements. As a result, 
some portions of the transcripts are coded for more than one code from the coding structure. The 
Agency Theory Element/Sub- 
element Descriptors 
Description of Coding Criteria 
  
 
Adverse Selection  
 
The Principal Selects An Agent Who:
Behaviors 
Behaves in unforeseen or unexpected ways damaging 
the principal’s interest. 
Performance 
Fails to perform or performs in a substandard, 
inconsistent, or unexpected way causing loss to the 
principal.  
Hidden Information 
Omits, obscures or avoids providing information 
important in selecting the agent or actions most 
beneficial to the principal. 
Information Asymmetry 
Has more or better information and possesses skills or 
abilities to apply the information to their benefit.  
Professionalism Conflicts 
Applies their own professional norms, behaviors, or 
practices which conflict with or jeopardize the 
principal’s objectives. 
Risk Aversion 
Has a higher or lower risk tolerance than the principal 





The Agent “Shirks” By:
Goal Conflicts 
Pursues individual goals which conflict with those of 
the principal. 
Hidden Actions 
Takes actions that are not easily detected and do not 
benefit the principal.  
Opportunism 
Uses the relationship or resources available to benefit 
themselves. 
Political Action 
Uses political action to influence the principal to 
benefit the agent.  
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coding was explored using internal NVivo analysis tools and a thematic analysis process was 
used to develop theme maps from the structured coding (Decrop 1999, Charmaz 2005, Braun and 
Clark 2006). The full coding set is summarized in Table 6.3. Coding similarity measured as the 
codes used and extent of their use between transcripts was analyzed using NVivo’s comparison 
tools. The comparison of coding provides an overall assessment of extent and which transcripts 
share similar coding characteristics. 
Results 
Table 6.3 summarizes the sources and occurrences of coding for each main and sub-code within 
the a priori coding framework. Adverse selection coded sections were found in all interviews 
with a total occurrence of 389 instances. Moral hazard codes and were recorded in 25 of the 27 
interviews occurring in 221 instances. References coded to control occurred in all interviews and 
the occurrence fell between the frequency of adverse selection and moral hazard coding with 335 
occurrences. Passages coded to both agency theory and to alternate theory approaches are found 
in all interviews with 267 occurrences.  
The results of the NVivo coding comparison are presented pictorially in Figure 6.1. The 
comparison uses Jaccard’s coefficient to cluster the transcripts by code frequency (Naumann and 
Herschel 2010). In the figure, lines are used to connect transcripts with a Jaccard’s coefficient 
value of 0.70 or greater based on code occurrence similarity. This grouping of the transcripts 
provides a visual depiction extent of coding similarities. The diagram illustrates that a number of 
the transcripts are related based on the agency theory coding. Note that the Wyoming transcripts 





Table 6. 3 Agency coding structure and coding summary. 
Main Code 
Sub-codes Aggregated to 
Main Code Sources References
Adverse Selection  – 27 389 
–  Adverse behaviors 22 90 
–  Adverse performance 21 65 
– Hidden information 23 84 
–  Information asymmetry 22 80 
– Professionalism 5 5 
–  Risk Aversion 20 65 
Adverse Selection CDOW view – 14 124 
Adverse selection- Purchasing 
principal 
– 22 80 
Adverse selection- Wildlife 
principal 
– 24 167 
Adverse selection Wyoming view – 4 19 
Agent = Contractors – 24 126 
Agent = Government entity – 10 18 
Agent = Purchasing  – 19 88 
Agent = Wildlife agency – 24 116 
Agent = NGO – 14 49 
Agent Monitoring – 26 180 
– Embedded agent 5 7 
– Experience 11 23 
– Expertise 3 4 
– Information cost 17 76 
– Relationships 15 33 
– Reporting 11 18 
– Trust 12 19 
Control – 27 336 
– Authority control 18 63 
– Control of outcome 21 55 
– Controlling Behaviors 21 87 
– Process Control 26 131 
Criteria for agents – 25 168 
– Agent preferences 20 64 
– Agents used for 18 49 
– Agents used when 20 55 
Moral Hazard – 25 221 
– Goal Conflicts 21 91 
– Hidden Action 23 98 
– Opportunism 8 12 
– Political action 12 20 
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Table 6.3 Continued.    
    
Main Code 
Sub-codes Aggregated to 
Main Code 
Sources References
Moral Hazard – Purchasing 
principal 
– 17 59 
Moral Hazard CDOW view – 14 110 
Moral Hazard- Wildlife as 
principal  
– 22 91 
Moral Hazard Wyoming view – 4 16 
Non-agency theory  – 27 267 
Principal = Contractor  – 7 10 
Principal = NGO  – 1 1 
Principal = Political  – 12 17 
Principal = Public  – 1 2 
Principal = Purchasing  – 23 108 
Principal = State administrators  – 9 22 




































Figure 6. 1 Transcript coding similarity with lines connecting similarly coded documents 
(Jaccard's coefficient > 0.70). 
 
Content coded to adverse selection and moral hazard varied by informant with the range 
of occurrence depicted graphically in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. Eleven informants account for 75% of 
the moral hazard coding and 13 informants account for 75% of the adverse selection coding. 
Eight individual informants appear in both groups. CDOW informants occur at approximately 





Figure 6. 2 Moral hazard coding frequency by transcript. 
 
 
Figure 6. 3 Adverse selection coding frequency by transcript. 
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majority of the coding for both moral hazard (55%) and adverse selection (69%). CDOW 
informants constitute 55% of the total informants.  
Codes were used to identify the entity referenced as principal and which was the agent 
during the coding of agency references. Shapiro (2005) notes that agency theory transforms 
complex relationships by way of “an assumption of methodological individualism” yet Shapiro 
and other authors note that multiple principals and agents are often present in situations where 
agency theory is applied ( For example; Ross 1973, Dees 1992, DeGeorge 1992, Provan and 
Milward 2001, Dixit 2002, Worsham and Gatrell 2005, Lane 2009, Kennedy and Malatesta 
2010). In the case developed here, the interview narratives often revealed multiple principal and 
agent relationships with contrasting viewpoints and conflicts depending on which party was or 
felt they should be considered principal. To capture the change in role and standing in those 
circumstances, the informants’ self identified role and relationship was coded along with agency 
theory elements (moral hazard, adverse selection, control and monitoring). Table 6.4 summarizes 
this coding by sources and coded segments separated into specific principal and agent scenarios. 
Mitnick (1992) noted that agency theory focuses on control or, as he puts it, the “inevitable” loss 
of control in all principal-agent relationships. Employing control as thematic path into the 
transcript coding identifies three main principal relationships. One is the control relationship 
between the purchasing authorities as principal and wildlife staff as the agents. The second 
reverses the roles by moving wildlife staff to principal and purchasing to agent (Table 6.4). The 
table also highlights the third agency relationship in the transcripts between the wildlife agency 
as principal and their contract agents. Note that some configurations of principal and agent have 




Table 6. 4 Source coding by agency theory area using exchanged principal and agent 
designations. 
Principal and Agent Focus  
Agency Theory Area  
Moral Hazard Adverse Selection 







All  Purchasing Contractors 2 3 9 18 
All  Purchasing Wildlife 16 51 20 66 
CDOW Purchasing CDOW 10 38 2 3 
WGFD Purchasing WGFD 3 5 4 8 
All Purchasing NGO 3 3 4 5 
All Wildlife  Purchasing 10 31 13 51 
CDOW CDOW Purchasing 6 24 9 43 
WGFD WGFD Purchasing 0 0 2 2 
All Wildlife  Contractors 19 37 20 90 
CDOW CDOW Contractors 12 29 13 70 
WGFD WGFD Contractors 2 2 3 8 
All Wildlife  NGO 10 25 7 25 
CDOW CDOW NGO 5 11 4 9 
WGFD WGFD NGO 2 4 0 0 
 
1 Coded sections of individual transcripts may appear in more than one category due to multiple concepts in 
a response or from exchanging the role of principal and agent.  
 
 
The distribution of coding between the main principal-agent combinations for moral 
hazard elements, adverse selection elements and monitoring preferences are visualized in Figures 
6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. Each depicts the occurrence of sections coded to individual elements making up 
moral hazard and adverse selection (Table 6.1). Monitoring and control elements are those 
indentified in Table 6.3 by various authors. Monitoring references are less frequently 
encountered in the transcripts and are reflected in the lower occurrence rates (Figure 6.6). 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 group selected moral hazard and adverse selection excerpts from purchasing 
staff and wildlife staff and display them as side-by- side contrast of principal’s view of the main 





Figure 6. 4 Moral hazard coding occurrence in all transcripts.  
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Figure 6. 7 Moral Hazard elements from differing principal agent perspectives.    
Purchasing = Principal  
Agent = Wildlife Agency 
Wildlife Agency = Principal 
Purchasing = Agent 
They get some new people on 
staff. These are new young people 
eager to do the job well and 
they’re reading the rules pretty 
much black and white and if you 
don’t exactly meet up, then all 
these new people will throw up the 
same kind of road blocks. CO-11 
They just want to go do what 
they’re doing. CO-18 
I’m not sure value is the right 
word but they don’t seem to 
realize why it’s so important to 
do things correctly. WY-06 
And so some of our employees 
believing they are doing it for 
wildlife can justify violating the 
fiscal rules because we’re doing 
it for the right reasons. CO-16 
Goal Conflicts 
It’s no longer a support 
service in Denver. I really 
don’t see that. CO-16 
Not their problem, they don’t care 
about financial liability, 
landowner relations or political 
legislative outcomes 
unfortunately. My experience. 
Their orientation and focus is over 
here [on] how we fit in the rules. 
CO-31
You know you end up 
kinda trying to work the 




That causes problems for us not 
just in terms of biological 
windows but in terms scheduling 
my field people and staffing up 
for the project or whatever. When 
there is uncertainty about when 
you are going to start it causes 
problems. CO-13
.. it feels as though there’s an element of 
mistrust that you guys are trying to cheat 
the system and what are you hiding on 
me that I haven’t caught yet. CO-31 
Opportunism 
I can say this is an exceptional 
project or proposal in answering 
what we want to do. But there will 
be people above me, not within 
my agency, but fiscal people who 
raise questions about it and have 
no basis for understanding what 
the answer would be anyway. CO-
11 
Obviously [it] has become a concern 
and as a result there is more of a 
concentration on the rules, trying to 
explain why the rules are there and 
really trying to get people to realize 
that you need to go through a certain 
amount of steps. CO-48 
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Figure 6. 8 The three most frequently occurring adverse selection elements from different 
principal-agent perspectives.  
Adverse Selection 
Principal = Purchasing 
Agent = Wildlife Agency 
Adverse Selection 
Principal = Wildlife Agency 
Agent = Purchasing 
Behaviors 
Performance 
Hey that’s not cool you know. You 
didn’t follow the procurement rules. 
Before that can be paid for; here’s 
what needs to happen and there 
needs to be ratification. But again 
everyone[s] expecting that 
ratification to come through. CO-15 
And so if you’ve got an idea, you need to 
put it out there instead of making deals 
and that’s the way the procurement code 
works. So if people.. if some people think 
that it’s problematic doing that I’d 
probably agree with them. CO-18 
You try and ask where is it or 
can someone help me and no 
one can help you. CO-14 
Yea I could make your job easier 
but that’s not what I’m here for. 
I’m here to do XXXX and that’s 
what I’m gonna do. I’m here to 
make myself look good and if I 
can look good to the State 
Controller or whatever so be it, 
that’s what I’m here for. CO-16 
You know I think it the minute it starts 
looking like you have an old boy network 
or giving it to your friends or somebody 
you worked with a long time or your 
relatives or anything like that I think 
that’s trouble. CO-18 
And that’s the one part that you 
really need help from staff with; 
you know the people in the field 
that said we really need this 
contract. You need them to really 
help you with that and you don’t 
really get a lot sometimes. CO-20 
Oh yeah, it’s horrible and it’s not 
something that state employees are 
supposed to [do] go to a non-profit that 
whisper, whisper, nudge, nudge if you do it 
this way. But the reality is that 
unfortunately things like that can happen. 
CO-15 
Typical with a field biologist, they are 
wanting to get work done so they don’t 
always cross all the i’s and t’s from a 
fiscal accounting process. So we will get a 
little ruffle there here and there. WY-02
It’s very irritating when there is 
someone above us [who] thinks they 
know something about it and starts to 
ask questions that really don’t have a 
good answer or demonstrates that 
they didn’t understand what we sent 
them to begin with. But they feel it’s 
part of their job to ask wildlife 
related questions. CO-11 
What that also does is some of these 
problems are time sensitive. You need 
the answer. You need the work done 
in a pretty rapid time. The contracting 
process is pretty cumbersome at best 
and there are times that we have to 
factor in can we afford to wait for the 
contracts to go through, the money to 




That’s one thing that I’ve 
noticed that in the last 15-20 
years that things that you could 
do before suddenly you’ll call 
up and say I want to do that 
and they’ll tell you oh you 
can’t do that you know what 





Figure 6.7 demonstrates through the comments that the main moral hazard element 
identified in the agency relationship between purchasing and the wildlife agency arises from the 
goal conflicts between the purchasing and wildlife management functions. It should be noted that 
in both the CDOW and WGFD significant amounts, but not all, of the purchasing functions and 
authorities are located within the same departments. The transcripts offer numerous comments 
that identify the conflict and frustrations of wildlife staff with contracting requirements. The 
frustrations focus on the purchasing process requirements and often the purchasing staff who are 
sometimes characterized as impediments to accomplishing assigned tasks and agency objectives. 
In the words of one respondent: 
“And so they just look at it as that annoying agency that is keeping them from doing 
things.” CO-203 
 
Those charged with purchasing express frustrations with wildlife staff’s lack of attention to 
contracting or procurement. Goal conflicts between wildlife agency staff and procurement staff 
were widely mentioned and in some cases strongly expressed. As one Colorado respondent 
summed up the conflict:  
“That(s) just an administrative function but they are both statutes. So it isn’t, given my 
personal opinion is, it’s not given the importance that it is due. There is personal liability, 
somebody can write a $13,000 check. It’s going to take one employee to write a $13,000 
check or whatever their statutory violation is. I honestly think that needs to happen at 
some point. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve processed a statutory violation going 
‘they know; they just did it’. It’s easier to ask forgiveness than ask permission is what I 
hear.” CO-15 
 
The tensions arising from the conflicting goals of wildlife staff and procurement staff as the 
primary source of agency conflict given the low occurrence of hidden actions and opportunism 
elements compared to the occurrence of goal conflicts. The lack of references to political action 
                                                 
3 All informant comments are edited to add punctuation, delete repeated words and verbal tics. Words added for readability are 
identified by [ ]. 
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in the agency relationship of the wildlife-purchasing staffs is likely related to the shared 
government and departmental status of both entities.  
Comparing the Colorado Case to the Wyoming Case does not suggest significant 
differences in the perspectives of CDOW and WGFD employees. While the number of 
transcripts from WGFD is fewer and the total coding to moral hazard elements occurred only in 
the purchasing as principal reading. However, the WGFD coding patterns are similar to the 
CDOW moral hazard coding and content was also similar. An example from Wyoming echoes 
the CDOW participant’s identification of the role and goal dichotomy: 
“It’s very easy, especially when you’re a field biologist you know or a field biologist 
supervisor like I was for the majority of my career, to become frustrated. It’s like: ‘you 
guys should just make my life easy you know? Here’s what I need you to do. How come 
we can’t make that work you know?’ You get back because the auditor, you know, it’s 
illegal for state statute or the auditor says we can’t do it like that. And so: ‘Whatever, I 
just want it done so I can go on to deal with wildlife not deal with fiscal paper work.’” 
WY-05 
 
Adverse selection coding based on purchasing and wildlife staff views repeat the 
different goals and outlooks influences. Figure 6.8 provides selected text coded for the top three 
adverse selection elements. In the adverse selection, the two most frequently coded elements 
regardless of the assigned principal role were behavior and performance elements. The third 
most frequently coded element was asymmetrical information with purchasing as principal and 
professional differences when wildlife was used as principal. The adverse selection comparison 
shows the impact of the goal and objective conflicts are detected in the coding of behavior and 
performance concerns. These differences appear regardless of the location of the purchasing 
function. Behavior and performance features are found in the WGFD where the purchasing 
functions are a part of the agency and in the CDOW  where the purchasing function is distributed 
between CDOW and the Colorado Department of Natural Resources of which it is a part. The 
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CDOW’s and WGFD’s perspectives are similar as one informant’s comments voice the general 
theme running through the wildlife agency and purchasing agency relationship in both states: 
 “I think wildlife people typically see fiscal people as impediments to them getting their 
jobs done. Fiscal people see wildlife people as sloppy and they don’t care.” WY-05 
 
Contractors as agents.– Wildlife agency perception of contractors shows that moral 
hazard is a less frequent concern than are adverse selection issues (see Figures 6.4 and 6.5). The 
moral hazard elements of goal conflicts, hidden actions and opportunism occur at almost equal 
rates. Political action was mentioned infrequently and in the context significant departures from 
expected agent behavior. Most moral hazard occurrences originated from a limited number of 
informants. The combination of the limited number of moral hazard references in total and the 
small number of transcripts referencing moral hazards in contractors suggest moral hazard is 
either less common or less likely to be identified by wildlife agency staff. The limited occurrence 
of moral hazard references in the WGFD interviews restricts comparison of the two agencies. 
However, the few references generally contain similar content. Example statements drawing 
from one of the stronger voiced statements on hidden action, opportunism and political action 
follows: 
“We have had contractors that have sort of inserted maybe some bias into their reports or 
opinions. That’s less than beneficial to the agency.” CO-03  
 
 “That had sort of reached a point where everybody was assuming there was good work 
being done. And then you dug into it just even a tiny little bit you realized that the work 
that was being done was minimal [and] was counter to what the Division’s mission was.” 
CO-03 
 
“We’ve had people that we actually had contracts with for years who went down in the 
legislature and testified against the agency.” CO-03 
 
Adverse selection was the focus of the majority of the wildlife agency as principal and 




Figure 6. 9 Examples of adverse selection elements- state wildlife agencies as principal and 
contractors as agents.   
They don’t want to oversee that or be the bad guy. If we’re 
doing an improvement project and requires two growing 
season of livestock rest or something like that, so that makes 





However they have failed to deliver on some contracts to the 
original extent of our agreements with them. That’s caused some 
recent hard feelings. But they do great projects and we’re almost 
always happy with the projects in the end. CO-28 
Right now we’re having some issues relative to contracting with 
a contractor that we have worked with for years. They are just 
not getting the work done in a timely basis CO-72 
Information 
Asymmetry 
To their credit they have learned. Again these are bright people, 
enthusiastic people, but we do things that are so removed from 
their education or training or background that we spend a lot of 
time explaining it. CO-55 
Professional 
Conflicts
So it’s really difficult to get that exact scope of work. Then once it’s 
contracted, when you run into those bumps, then it gets difficult 
because they’re like, ‘well we said it was going to cost this much and 
now there’s a bump and either we can’t do it or we need more money 
to do it.’ CO-14 
The ones I’m familiar with are; you were unaware that the 
contractor had not only technical knowledge but some 
preconceived knowledge or bias either against the agency or 
against the position that the agency was thinking about taking. 
CO-03 
So you do have to put time and effort into at least thinking 
about what you want or else you’ll get someone who just 
says, ‘oh yeah I can survey for it’. But they don’t have the 
expertise. CO-48 Hidden 
Information 
The flip side of that is [the] contractors we’ve had problems 
with. Even though they say they’ve got capacity and expertise 
[they say] ‘we can get it done’. Wait a minute! You know we 
may want to talk to you because we remember a couple projects 
that didn’t go so well. CO-26 
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factors previously identified as adverse selection. Most references to adverse selection relate to 
performance issues of poor performance or hidden information about either contractor 
capabilities or using practices that hinder contract evaluation and outcome assessment. The 
coding identifies a preference for experienced contractors with existing relationships where 
monitoring is by purchasing information. Purchasing information in this context is characterized 
by the informants as spending more time administering contracts, coordinating, inspecting and 
monitoring the contractors work. A limited number of references are made to trust, expertise, use 
of reporting and embedded agents as monitoring approaches (see Figure 6.6).  
Agency elements.– The agency code transcripts of procurement and wildlife staff (see 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5) viewed through the agency theory lens is one in which goal conflicts (moral 
hazard) predominate and is echoed in the adverse selection coding where the thematic elements 
of adverse behaviors, performance, information asymmetry and professional conflicts are 
interpreted as manifestations of the goal conflicts. Since both wildlife and procurement are 
elements of the state, conflating the agency issues into an overall goal conflict theme provides a 
different vantage point from which to interpret agency coding results. In this interpretation, the 
parties have three general goal sets which are informed by the legislative charge, administrative 
goals and profession based goals. The differing goals in these three areas inform the 
administrative and professional boundaries the participants assume and are captured in the 
agency coding. Implementation and capacity needs are expected to be impacted and are reflected 
in informant comments. Examples from Colorado informants that broadly illustrate the suggested 
links in the legislative and administrative goals areas are: 




• Delegation of new authorities to the procurement staff negatively impacted past 
relationships and cooperation. 
• Partial delegations of authority from the Colorado State Controller changed the 
responsibilities/reporting relationships, noted by some informants as putting more 
distance and barriers between the wildlife agency and the procurement and 
contract administration staff. 
• A shift to a risk reduction- risk avoidance procurement philosophy disrupts or 
eliminates familiar procurement processes. 
•  Changes in policy and statute (for example changes to Colorado Revised Statute 
Title 24) impact agency operations, contract administrators and added new 
procurement requirements without added resources. 
 Wyoming participants also identified changes in approval practices and contract 
justification requirements following rule changes and political direction. Universally participants 
noted state contracting has steadily become more rule and process oriented and has created new 
interpretations, forms and enforcement requirements which reduce the ability to implement 
collaborative management and requires increased capacity to maintain current uses. The tone of 
the participations is illustrated by: 
 “I would just, you know, I’d like all the people in the Division to see us more as a 
partner than as an enforcer.” CO-18 
 
“It’s difficult to see where you have a hand in hand working relationship. Trying to get a 
project done as compared to: ‘you’re a square peg and I’m the round hole and I’m going 
to pound you into it and you’re going to fit into this’ and that kind of stuff.” CO-31 
 
“It just seems that what I see in Wyoming and Colorado is maybe almost a lack of trust of 
the contractor and the state biologist or a lack of communication.” CO-42 
 
“Oh yeah it is a lot more difficult than it was, like I said, even 10 or 15, 20 years ago. 
And you know before you could have got on the phone and called somebody down at the 
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controller’s office and said, ‘Hey you know what? I need this contract for whatever it is, 
[with] Ducks Unlimited and we could get it accomplished.’ You don’t get that done any 
more.” CO-16 
“It doesn’t seem to matter now. We just seem to be getting more and more strict in our 
fiscal responsibility and due diligence at every level. That [and] there’s no trust until the 
state controller says ‘OK let’s do this’. Everyone seems to be covering their piece of the 
action by putting up road blocks and stuff or asking questions that really don’t pertain.” 
CO-11 
Wildlife agency staffs display a different perception of contractors illustrated by the 
lower occurrence of moral hazard coding with adverse selection coding occurring at almost 
double the moral hazard coding amount. The moral hazard elements coded reflect an essentially 
equal distribution of references to goal conflicts, hidden action and opportunism. Political action, 
defined as use of political actors to influence the principals for the benefit of the agent, was not 
coded in the purchasing and wildlife principal-agent role comparisons. Political action was 
identified in a few instances in the case of contractors as agents. Wildlife agency staff more 
frequently identified adverse selection elements coded as performance problems or hidden 
information with contractors. Coding of information asymmetry, risk aversions and professional 
conflicts were found but at rate less than half of those in performance or hidden information. 
Monitoring of contractors was most frequently coded to experience or past relationships with the 
contractor and purchasing information which largely means spending time with the contractor in 
this context. The transcripts also note long term, continuing relationships between some 
contractors and the wildlife agencies. Taken together the wildlife agency coding suggest that 
moral hazards or “shirking” by contractors is less frequent encountered but performance issues 
captured in the coding as performance problems or hidden information occur more frequently. 
The moral hazard and adverse selection configuration appears to match the monitoring method 
preferences identified which are based on knowledge of the contractor based on past experience 
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or procuring information by spending time with contractors. Spending time with the contractor 
also facilitates building experience. This configuration would facilitate development and 
maintenance of a preferred set of contractors which share some agencies objectives and whose 
performance is predictable and reinforces past experience.  
The number of experienced or suitable contractors surfaces in other contexts not directly 
included in the agency coding. References to the limited number of acceptable or suitable 
contractors occur regularly in wildlife agency staff transcripts. Examples from some of the 
transcripts are:  
“The thing is we have a pretty limited range of people that we contract with. I mean it’s 
primarily universities and then like a handful of NGOs that can do the work. There are 
some specific natural resource related consulting firms that we’ve done work with too. 
But it’s a pretty narrow band and, you know, the conflicts arise more with NGOs [more] 
that anything else.” CO-72 
“I use the appraiser side of it. There is a fairly limited number of appraisers who actually 
have the expertise to appraise conservation easements. So you have a very limited pool of 
consultants from which to pull from.” CO-09 
“The other thing is there’s only so many. The state of Wyoming is kind of a smaller state 
and so there’s also a limited number of the people that do any one certain type of work in 
the wildlife arena.” WY-07 
 
The combination of low numbers of “acceptable” wildlife management contractors and 
some regularity of wildlife agency contracting would lead to contractor-agency familiarization 
and ongoing relationships. Relationships and experience reduce but do not eliminate moral 
hazard problems for the wildlife agency. Lower rates of moral hazard associated with contractors 
who are known and with which the agency has an ongoing relationship with is consistent with 





The interview transcripts were subjected to a structured a priori agency theory coding 
protocol for exploratory purposes. The interview transcripts were not solicited to develop or 
facilitate an agency theory analysis line of inquiry. The interviews focused on state wildlife 
agencies use of collaborative management contracts to accomplish address wildlife management 
needs. However, issues found in the interviews and associated with content about capacities, 
procurement requirements and shifting responsibilities suggested agency theory would provide 
insight challenges in collaborative management implementation using contracts. This use of 
agency theory to explores collaborative management implementation by focusing on 
procurement and wildlife as individual entities rather than as a consolidated state actor. Similar 
approaches are found in business applications, while in governmental settings a consolidated 
principal and agent formulation is often used (Eisenhardt 1989, Shapiro 2005, Kennedy and 
Malatesta 2010). The relationships revealed by this analysis provide insight into internal state 
wildlife agency implementation capacity issues. 
 Characterizing the principals and agents.– State wildlife agencies describe their 
contracting environment as one where “suitable” wildlife contractors are limited in number and 
whose capabilities and performance are known to them. The wildlife agency, as principal, uses 
this knowledge and experience to mitigate moral hazards. Contractor knowledge is based on 
relationships that are often long term and with ongoing contracting relationships. These 
characteristics suggest that transaction cost economics or control of vendors via incentives as 
used in transaction cost or agency theories may not adequately capture the wildlife agency-
contractor relationship. A relational contracting theory approach (Brown et al. 2006, Van Slyke 
2009) may provide a richer characterization of the interaction which is described as a 
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relationship by the state wildlife agencies. Conflicts with contractors are largely performance 
related and the content suggest are often successfully addressed. Contractors are also described 
as often sharing agency goals. This characterization of the wildlife contractors suggests wildlife 
agencies do not view contractors through an agency theory lens. Dependency on a limited 
number of “capable” wildlife contractors provides added experience with the contractors further 
reducing agency type problems. 
Agency theory related issues arising from the purchasing staff and wildlife agency staff 
content is interesting, particularly since in both the Colorado and Wyoming settings, significant 
elements of the purchasing functions are internal to the departments. While other State 
departments retain oversight, significant delegations of procurement authority have been made to 
the departments housing the wildlife agencies. Each state’s procurement functions reflect the 
basic political and financial control functions found in state government procurement processes. 
The literature suggest that the formal controls of the procurement and accounting systems 
designed to promote government accountability (deLeon and Varda 2009) often come into 
conflict with collaborative management approaches (Agranoff 2007). This analysis supports this 
observation. 
The agency’s staff identified the principal’s role to the functional unit of purchasing or 
wildlife management rather than a consolidated “state” principal in the interview content. The 
resulting conflict over primacy of legislative charge plays out in the contract implementation 
process. Independently wildlife contractors confirm the conflict between procurement and 
wildlife. Contractors generally identify the wildlife agency as the principal and purchasing as a 
powerful agent whose actions are independent of the wildlife agency’s desires or direction and 
whose demands must be met. Contractors describe unforeseen negative outcomes over which the 
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wildlife agency exerts little or no influence as part of the contract process. This characterization 
further supports the interpretation that contractors consider view the interaction with the state 
wildlife agency as a collaborative relationship rather than agency theory’s self-interest agent 
description. 
The procurement-wildlife agency relationship is captured in conflicts over goals with 
performance and information concerns arising from the goal conflicts. The results and interview 
content point to a power conflict about which goals, procurement’s or wildlife’s, are served. 
Control over the use and decisions on contracts are present. Control is the basis of agency theory 
formulations (Mitnick 1992, Van Slyke 2009). Enforcement of rules is noted as desirable from 
the procurement view. The results suggest that the procurement and agency staff apply an agency 
theory framework in defining the power components of their relationship, where the principal 
sets the goals of the relationship and the agent is expected to comply. In other aspects of the 
relationship, agency theory elements are reduced or absent as the case of procurements relying 
on trust as a monitoring approach while wildlife relies on information gained from spending 
time. The less intensive monitoring approaches also fit with the interdepartmental setting. 
Collaboration is not surface as conflict reduction approach suggesting the contested elements 
could be mitigated to some degree by appropriate management intervention. 
 Agency theory and collaborative contracting.– The multiple parties involved in wildlife 
management contracting highlights the reality that employing agency theory to methodologically 
collapse multiple parties into unitary entities of principal and agent oversimplifies the number of 
parties involved in design and implementation of complex wildlife management programs using 
collaborative management contracts. The concept of multiple principals and agents in 
collaborative programs has been noted in a broader context (Milward and Provan 2000). These 
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findings located at the implementation level reveal tensions between state wildlife agencies and 
procurement staff that are rooted in formal contract control and accountability needs and the 
wildlife agency’s approach to collaborative management contracts with their trusted contractors. 
The content also points to the impact of devolution of authorities on state agencies. The content 
notes that delegation of some authorities held by the state controller were made to the 
procurement staff. Wildlife staff noted negative changes in the relationship were a result of the 
authority change. Future exploration of these types of delegations could provide more detailed 
understanding of the impacts from authority delegations.  
A more complete picture of the contact administration and contractor relationships may 
be available by application of other analysis frameworks, particularly considering the internal 
purchasing and wildlife staff elements and the long term nature of many contractors -state 
wildlife agency relationships. Adding policy network analysis approaches, such as those 
identified by Bartelli and Smith (2010) or Agranoff (2007) would be one approach to deepening 
the analysis. Institutional theory approaches after those of Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) would 
provide a different analytical insight into the boundaries established around purchasing and 
wildlife management functions that support the existing system. Intuitional theory consideration 
of the wildlife agencies and their favored contractors could expand on the role of relationships 
and professional influences. 
Limitations.– The use of transcripts from interviews conducted to address questions 
related to use of collaborative contracts rather than exploring agency theory elements may bias 
the coding results. Representation of agency theory relationships may be influenced by the 
interview focus. The multi-principle reading used is dependent on the coder’s interpretation of 
the interview content which could be influence in undetectable ways by personal experiences 
166 
 
with the parties. Knowledge of the interviewer’s background and experience may have directly 
or indirectly influenced the informants as well. The extent to which past experience and personal 
relationships may have influence interview content and the agency theory coding is not known.  
The use of an a priori coding structure limits the extent of coded materials to the 
established codes. In this study the coding structure is not viewed as a significant limitation. 
However the constrained code set excluded other potential coding structures. As the results and 
discussion report, other theoretical approaches could deepen the understanding of the 
relationships. This study applies agency theory at the intra-departmental level of state 
government. This approach is not widely applied in government settings but is reported by some 
authors in business settings. The approach highlights the conflicts and tensions within state 
government departments with formal contract control responsibilities and the need to implement 
collaborative management using contracts. Areas for future research consideration is the tensions 
created by the accountability requirements of grants received by state wildlife agencies which are 
then used in collaborative management contracts with third parties and the impacts of authority 




7)   THE INFLUENCE OF PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS ON COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT CONTRACTING BY 
STATE WILDLIFE AGENCIES 
Synopsis  
This study focuses on the factors influencing state wildlife agencies decisions to use 
contracts for wildlife management purposes. It was hypothesized that state wildlife agencies 
would apply agency or profession specific factors in decision on the use of collaborative 
management contracts. Interviews with state wildlife agency employees and contractors were 
used to explore wildlife management contracting as part of a case study of a state wildlife 
agency. The interview content was explored employing an approach based on grounded theory 
methods. Two themes emerged from the interviews as important influences of contract use. One, 
a systemic theme, includes influences of legislation, budget and procurement policies and 
available contractors which are largely outside of the state wildlife agency’s control. The second, 
an institutional theme, includes socially constructed realities about the relationship and role of 
procurement processes, norms related to control and wildlife management and the influence of 
professionalism. A contract implementation decision model in which these themes operate is 
developed from informant descriptions.  
State procurement staff and the agencies contractors provide support for elements found 
in the state wildlife agency institutional theme and decision model. CDOW accounting data for 
professional service contracts, contract numbers and frequency of vendor use are reviewed and 
contrasted with the systemic and institutional themes. The contract use record provides evidence 
of the influences of the systemic and institutional themes influence on the contract types and 
vendor preferences. A smaller confirmatory case study based on interviews of employees of the 
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WGFD supports the thematic influences from the CDOW case study. The hypothesis that state 
wildlife agencies apply wildlife profession specific norms and boundaries to decisions about 
contract use in collaborative wildlife management is supported by the informant materials and 
records of contract use. 
Introduction 
Wildlife management in the United States is based in the legal principles of the public 
trust doctrine in which wildlife ownership is held by “the people” and managed on their behalf 
by the states and the federal government as trustees. From this legal foundation, today’s state 
wildlife management agencies arose and developed during the progressive era. They exhibit 
professional management and instrumental/normative objectives which are characteristic of 
natural resource agencies arising during the period. State wildlife agencies are funded by various 
user pay approaches and have historically addressed increased service demands by adding 
professional staff. However, the public trust doctrine provides authority to state wildlife 
management agencies to manage wildlife populations but does not include authorities to manage 
the habitats on which wildlife depends. Critiques of public trust doctrine have noted the limits of 
the professional management model of the agencies and the poor record of habitat management 
and protection in particular (Buck 2009, Jacobson et al. 2010). The need to expanding use of 
collaboration and partnerships in wildlife conservation efforts, including sharing of authority or 
resources to address complex management problems, has long been noted (Trauger et al. 1995).  
Shifts in public attitudes toward government size and increased desirability of market- 
driven services have lead government agencies to increase indirect service provision using 
various collaborative management approaches largely implemented by contract. In light of the 
unique development path and historical backgrounds, state wildlife agencies are hypothesized to 
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apply profession specific criteria in decision on use of collaborative management contracts. 
Collaborative management contracts are defined here as contracts for wildlife management 
services or grants for wildlife management purposes. Factors influencing the use of wildlife 
management contracts and contractors are explored in this case study of a state wildlife 
management agency. The following questions are considered:  
• What are the main influences on decisions to use collaborative management 
contracts in state wildlife management?  
• How are decisions to use collaborative management contracts made and does the 
process influence implementation? 
• Do capacity or boundary considerations influence state wildlife agency use of 
collaborative management contracts and how?  
Literature Review  
The characteristics potentially denoting state wildlife agencies as unique governmental 
entities include:  
1. Management responsibility for public trust resources, 
2. Legal origins are a shared foundation in all state wildlife agencies, 
3.  Fiscal resources linked to founding principles and conditions, 
4. Progressive Era ideologies of professional management and efficiency, 
5. Employees largely trained and developed through programs designed by the 
professional elites and the agencies leaders.  
Each factor is briefly reviewed in the following sections.  
Public trust doctrine and the Progressive Era.– Freyfogle and Globe (2009) note that 
perhaps the single most interesting feature of wildlife in America is the legal position of wild 
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animals as owned by the people with the individual states as trustees. This status dates to the 
success of the American Revolution, as American law coalesced into a uniform legal doctrine 
vesting citizens as beneficiaries of a public trust ownership of wildlife managed by the states 
(Sax 1970, Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010). The public ownership and trustee 
elements have been upheld by courts up through the U. S. Supreme Court (Sax 1970, Bean and 
Rowland 1997, Connolly 2009, Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010, Bruskotter et 
al. 2011). State laws and state and federal court actions continue to affirm the legal concept of 
the wildlife as a public trust resource under state management with federal jurisdiction over 
treaties, interstate commerce and endangered species (Freyfogle and Goble 2009, Bacheller et al. 
2010). Trustee responsibilities do not transfer below the state level creating a wildlife 
management authority dyad.  
Samuel Hays’ (1959) overview of the conservation movement during the Progressive Era 
notes professionalism and technical management of natural resources was a mutual goal of 
government officials and conservation organizations (Gonzalez 1998). Rational technological 
management favored by conservation groups complemented the government’s desire for 
efficiency. The resulting natural resource management construct was instrumental and normative 
with the government as the collective authority using professionally trained managers as the 
implementing agents (Adams 1992, Mullner et al. 2001, Nie 2004a, Dryzek 2005). Conservation 
groups along with other interest supported and pushed for changes in wildlife law, the expansion 
of wildlife programs and employing professional wildlife management techniques (Hays 1959, 
Gonzalez 1998, Brown 2010). 
State wildlife management.– State management of wildlife prior to the mid-1800s was 
generally accomplished through statutory restrictions on the take of selected species or the 
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manner or timing of take. Distribution policies were set by state legislatures and accompanied by 
limited enforcement as few states had “game wardens” (Leopold and Brooks 1933, Bean and 
Rowland 1997, Sherblom et al. 2002, Freyfogle and Goble 2009). In Colorado’s case, the first 
state legislature established a State Fish Commissioner and a set of fisheries-related laws in 1876 
(Barrows and Holmes 1990). In 1891 the legislature enlarged the State Fish Commissioner 
position into the State Game and Fish Commissioner and added the first wardens as state 
employees (Barrows and Holmes 1990). Similar founding timeframes during the Progressive Era 
are found in other states’ wildlife agencies as well as increased employment of professional 
wildlife managers (Williamson 1987).  
The wildlife management profession.– The beginning of wildlife management as a 
profession is generally located in the 1930s and attributed to government demand for wildlife 
management professionals in the newly created technical management positions (Leopold and 
Brooks 1933, Swanson 1987). Brown (2010) notes Aldo Leopold was named the first professor 
of wildlife management at the University of Wisconsin in 1933. Leopold is also credited as one 
of the key leaders in efforts to establish wildlife management as profession (Organ et al. 2001). 
The 1935 federal legislation establishing the Cooperative Wildlife Research Units as a joint 
federal, state and university program for wildlife research and training and is an instrumental 
contributor to the wildlife profession’s development (Poole and McCabe 1987, Organ et al. 
2001). The Wildlife Society, the profession’s scientific and professional organization, was 
formed in 1937 by Leopold and others with a charge to develop and further professional 
management of the wildlife resource (Swanson 1987, Organ et al. 2001).  
Institutional characteristics of state wildlife management.– Geist et al.’s (2001) 
presentation at the 66th North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference was not the 
172 
 
first discussion of what is called the North American model of wildlife management (the model), 
but it is perhaps the best known. The model incorporates a range of normative elements 
including the public trust doctrine, professional management and the user pay financing of 
wildlife management. The model is a conflation of wildlife management history and delineates a 
set of boundaries around future wildlife management policy options (Geist et al. 2001, Organ et 
al. 2001, Jacobson and Decker 2006, Dratch and Kahn 2011, Lepczyk et al. 2011, Nelson et al. 
2011). Different authors opining on the model contest the alternate futures of wildlife 
management, however, the unique characteristics of state wildlife management summarized by 
the model literature is not contested. 
Other writers have characterized the wildlife management profession and wildlife 
agencies as institutions (Mullner et al. 2001, Jacobson 2008b, Buck 2009, Decker et al. 2011). 
This characterization follows DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991), Scott’s (1995) and Lawrence and 
Suddaby’s (2006) descriptive characteristics of institutions as having: regulative elements (i.e. 
formal rules and laws); normative elements (i.e. values and norms); and cultural-cognitive 
elements (i.e. what people in the institution know and their socially constructed reality). Gigilotti 
et al. (2009) argues institutional elements directly influence people to adopt specific management 
paradigms. The paradigms establish boundaries and inform how problems are framed as well as 
the acceptable methods, tools and behaviors applied inside the paradigm. Gigilotti et al. (2009) 
apply the paradigm approach to wildlife agencies. Path dependency (Greener 2002) effects of 
history, legal frameworks and professional training strengthen the wildlife management 
paradigm which is reinforced by communication between state wildlife agencies (Nie 2004a, 
Buck 2009, Jacobson et al. 2010). Professionalization and specialization in agency wildlife 
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employees would also be expected to contribute to increased institutional similarity (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Bartley et al. 2008). 
Contracting tools and challenges.– Governments’ role in delivery of services and 
products has evolved rapidly over the past 40 plus years from direct service provision into what 
has been termed “governance” which includes the use of service contracts, grants and other 
indirect service provision “tools” implemented via contracts (Salamon and Elliott 2002). 
Collaborative management is often linked to initiatives to improve services, governmental 
efficiency, or both without increasing the number of government employees (Frederickson 1996, 
Rhodes 1996b, Gilmour and Jensen 1998). Expanded use of contracts and contractors is noted 
for creating policy, accountability and management dilemmas at all levels of government 
(Salamon 1981; 1987, Frederickson 1996, Kettl 1997, Gilmour and Jensen 1998, Kettl 2000b, 
Salamon 2004, Kettl 2006). Discussions of contract use often invokes devolution of public 
policy as a component or a cause for contract use. Devolution generally refers to the concept of 
relocating governmental authority and decision levels from central government agencies to lower 
government levels or non-government entities which incorporates outside parties into 
government action via contracts (Ellwood 1996, Auger 1999, Gainsborough 2003, Goodsell 
2004, Romzek and Johnston 2005) and introduces market based approaches and incentives into 
government operations (Ellwood 1996). Regardless of the rationale, devolution leads to 
increased contracting (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Van Slyke and Roch 2004, Romzek and 
Johnston 2005). Mutter et al. (1999) reported that devolution of federal natural resource policy 
making and regulatory authority to the states had not occurred. Yet Coggins’ (1999) article, 
which is critical of devolution of land and environmental decisions by the U.S. Forest Service, 
Department of Interior and the Environmental Protection Agency, appears contemporaneously 
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with Mutter et al. Management of federally owned public lands or waters are also subject to 
devolved federal government roles (Nie 2004b). Others note that natural resource activities most 
often devolved are licensing, fee collection, planning of land and water use, and environmental 
standard compliance (Bartley et al. 2008). Looking at devolution form another perspective, 
natural resource literature devotes significant attention to the use of partnerships, collaboration, 
co-management or co-operative environmental management as tools to achieve policy goals 
(Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). The collaborative management approaches identified in this 
literature depends on some degree of decentralization/devolution of authority and resources for 
success (Arnstein 1969, Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, Burns and Cheng 2005, Fung 2006).  
Contracting as policy.– Government purchases can be thought of as a binary 
classification of simple, commodity type purchases or complex products and services (DeHoog 
and Salamon 2002, Curry 2009, Kettl 2009, Brown et al. 2010). Brown et al. (2010) defines 
simple products as market-based exchanges involving easily defined products with verifiable 
cost and quality which are found in markets which have large numbers of buyers and sellers and 
the quantity supplied are known. Commodity purchase contracts are relatively complete 
specifications of buyer and seller roles in which competitors exist as backup (Brown et al. 2010). 
Complex products on the other hand are not so easily defined making the cost, quality and 
quantity difficult to develop and are in markets where suppliers are limited (Van Slyke 2003, 
Van Slyke 2007, Kettl 2009, Brown et al. 2010).  
Government uses contracts as the vehicles to execute collaborative management 
approaches such as grants, incentives, and waivers in exchange for desired behaviors or 
outcomes (Kettl 2002a). Collaborative management necessarily invokes elements used to 
describe complex products. Salamon (2002a) points out that meeting efficiency demands places 
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emphasis on use of indirect collaborative approaches which are managed and settled through 
contracts. These authors suggest the desired location of the skills needed to manage the 
collaborative tools, providers, contract content and reporting is within the agencies procurement 
staff and processes rather than within program staff (Kettl 2002a; b, Salamon 2002a). 
Contracting capacity.– Gargan (1981) noted that governmental capacity is simply the 
ability to “do what it wants”. Gargan elaborates that agreed-to definitions of capacity, its sources 
or its measurement do not exist, but local governments do differ in their ability to get things 
done. Gargan (1981) argues that capacity is a rhetorical device rather than a measurable term. 
Argranoff and McGuire (1998) support this view by invoking the “mysterious” nature of 
capacity and capacity building in public administration literature. Others posit that capacities and 
skills differing from those in traditional hierarchical government are required to use contracts, 
incentives, and grants (Kettl 2002a, Salamon 2002b, Brown and Potoski 2003a, Fernandez et al. 
2008). Both Kettl (2002a) and Gargan (1981) equate government performance to management of 
governance tools and accountability.  
The complexity of collaborative management tools, how they link to policy objectives 
and the application environment frustrate the formulation of widely applicable capacity 
measures. Honadle (1981) opined that a “consensus definition of capacity” was unlikely and that 
definition of the concept relative to its application was more appropriate. Capacity has been 
equated with inputs such as staffing or spending (Bowman and Kearney 1988), rules to control 
behaviors of political and administrative actors (Hou et al. 2003), information about management 
support (O'Neil 2007), political and administrative cultures (Mead 2002), personnel management 
(Donahue et al. 2000) or some 11 different descriptors of administrative capacities (Farazmand 
2009). Authors writing from a collaborative management view define capacity as the 
176 
 
characteristics needed to build, support or sustain collaborative process (Fleeger and Becker 
2008, Garcia-Ramirez et al. 2009), the age of the collaborative effort and extent of activities 
(Gazley 2010), the capacity to make “things work” while fostering changes in underlying 
assumptions and beliefs (Nowell 2009), or the ability to sustain both institutional goal 
commitment and social capital needed to support the partnership (Weber et al. 2007).  
Hale and Slaton (2008) present a framework that organizes capacity characteristics on a 
timeline starting with early concepts of governmental capacity base on public organizations and 
the local environment (as in Gargan 1981, and Honadle 1981) to more recent concepts of public 
entities in networked environments as described by Agranoff (2007), Weber et al. (2007) and 
Provan and Milward (2001). The framework supports the position that capacity is not a static set 
of parameters but is related to the specific environment, objectives, collaborative management 
approach and parties involved. Still the characteristics of indirect government tools suggest 
“programmatic” and “operational” management skills are important. Programmatic skills as 
characterized by Salamon (2002b) are activation, orchestration and modulation while operational 
skills are specific to the capacity for goal setting, negotiation, implementation, financial 
management, evaluation capability, communications and bridging abilities (Kettl 2002a, Brown 
and Potoski 2003a). Indirect government action is not considered self-executing and requires 
active management to mesh policy goals, tools used (regulations, contracts, grants, incentives 
etc.) and the application environment to efficiently manage the indirect actions.  
 Boundaries.– A consequence of contracts and the other indirect government tools is the 
development of networks focused on the specific policy issues and made up of the government 
agencies and individuals or organizations involved in the program (Kettl 2002a, Salamon 2002b, 
Cohen and Eimicke 2008, Johnston and Romzek 2008, Koliba et al. 2011). Not surprisingly, the 
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description of programmatic level capacities needed to support management of indirect 
government programs described by Salamon (2002b) are similar to the skills or capacities 
suggested for engaging in policy networks (Peters and Pierre 1998, Milward and Provan 2000, 
Kettl 2002b, Cooper 2003, Agranoff 2007, Koliba et al. 2011). Further, networks composed of 
government officials and contractors present added challenges in complex projects where 
interdependency of the parties raise questions about the boundaries between public and private 
actions (Frederickson and Smith 2003, Kettl 2006, Agranoff 2007, Brown et al. 2010). Use of 
third party contracting for complex products requires boundary management capabilities unlike 
those routinely found in procurement contract use (Kettl 2006). 
Organizational boundaries can be roughly equated to where or how lines between the 
organization and its environment are drawn and recognized, i.e. what is “of the agency” and what 
is not (Hernes and Paulsen 2003). Hernes and Paulsen (2003), taking a research perspective, 
warn that locating organization boundaries creates dilemmas as they have the potential to exist as 
both inner mental structures of the observer or as an external structures of an organization. Kettl 
(2006) takes a realist view in positing five boundaries in governmental agencies which he 
described as mission, resources, capacity, responsibility and accountability. All are challenged 
by use of indirect service provision and the associated networks (Kettl 2000b, Kettl 2002a, 
Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, Kettl 2006). Inclusion of non-governmental parties in government 
agency service provision also introduces new dynamics into boundary interpretation and shifts 
from the interaction of internal and external stakeholders (Rafaeli and Vilnai-Yavetz 2003). 
Buck’s (2009) analysis of wildlife management agencies capacity and boundary challenges 





Interviews and contract use data were used to develop a case study of the Colorado 
Division of Wildlife (CDOW) use of collaborative management contracts. An additional set of 
interviews with Wyoming Game and Fish Department (WGFD) staff were conducted to create a 
small comparison case. Transcripts from interviews conducted with the CDOW staff, Colorado 
state procurement staff, CDOW vendors and the WGFD staff were analyzed using an approach 
based on grounded theory methods. All interviews were conducted under the Colorado State 
University’s Institutional Review Board approved protocol #09-1432H which included both 
written informed consent and anonymity provisions.  
Case study development.– The case study design is characterized as a an exploratory, 
single case design (Yin 2003; 2009) compatible with hypothesis generation (Levy 2008, 
Seawright and Gerring 2008). The Colorado interviews comprise the main case. A second 
smaller case consisting of interviews of WGFD employees was created and used for comparison 
and contrast purposes. The design concept is similar to a multi-case design (Yin 2009) but the 
limited number of interviews in the WGFD case renders its use to triangulation and insight into 
the representativeness of the CDOW case (Yin 1998, Decrop 1999). 
Interview procedures.– The interview process was similar in both the WGFD and 
CDOW. Contact, interview arrangements and informed consent were completed per the 
Research Protocol #09-1432H. The interview format was semi-structured and conversational 
(Patton 2002b, Glesne 2006). Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Codes were used to 
identify transcripts and references to individuals. The transcripts were provided to receptive 
informants for member checking (Yin 1994, Creswell 2009). Five general questions structured 
the initial interviews and the subsequent interviews explored the themes and elements from the 
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initial interviews. The initial interview inquiries were directed toward: how extensively were 
contracts used to accomplish wildlife management objectives; why were contracts used in those 
cases; descriptions of the relationships with contractors; did capacity or boundary type issues 
arise from these contract efforts; and how were capacity, implementation or boundary 
management needs addressed? 
Interview analysis.– Interview transcript management and analysis followed an approach 
based on grounded theory methods as described in several different research traditions (Strauss 
and Corbin 1990, Charmaz 2005, Fendt and Sachs 2008). Interviews were transcribed and 
returned for member checking as appropriate. The transcripts were imported into QSR 
International's NVivo 9 software for review, coding and analysis. Grounded theory coding 
approaches were used in coding of all transcripts (Charmaz 2005, Fendt and Sachs 2008). 
Coding of the initial transcripts was not structured. Coding concepts developed directly from the 
content. Over-coding techniques were use to identify organizations and roles to assist in the 
analysis (Bazeley 2007). The analytic framework applied to the coded materials was an inductive 
thematic approach based on transcript content (Decrop 1999, Patton 2002c, Charmaz 2005, 
Braun and Clark 2006). Multiple coding (over-coding) (Bazeley 2007), was used to facilitate 
exploration of the interview content through the internal query and analysis tools in NVivo 9. A 
list of the open codes, free nodes in the NVivo parlance, along with brief descriptions is included 
as Appendix 7.1. 
 Results 
Transcripts were compared for coding similarity using the internal analysis tools in 
NVivo 9. The similarity of coding of each transcript is presented as a way to visualize not only 
the degree of coding similarity but as a way to group informant content based on coding. NVivo 
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calculates a Jaccard’s coefficient (Naumann and Herschel 2010) based on code use within each 
transcript which is a measure of the similarity of coding applied to the documents. In Figure 7.1, 
grouping was constrained to five groups and transcript similarity is indicated by like colored 
fonts. Individual transcript similarities are also depicted with brackets. The majority of the 
CDOW’s biological and field staff is included in a single group (dark blue). Informants from the 
Colorado contract administration and procurement staff are in a separate group (light blue) 
Figure 7. 1 Coding similarity grouping using a Jaccard’s coefficient to create five groups. 
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while a group composed of contractors and the WGFD staff are identified in another (brown). 
The code grouping shows procurement/contract administrators, the WGFD and contractors group 
were more similarly coded than the CDOW staff group. Three of the 27 total transcripts 
comprise the remaining groups. The groupings help visualize the similar of the transcripts based 
on occurrence of code topics. However, the groupings do not infer the content of the coded 
sections are equivalent.  
Decision to contract.– The informant’s explanations of why collaborative management 
contracts were used were similar regardless of the wildlife agency. Like other government 
agencies reported in the literature, their preferred option was to use employees rather than 
contractors. This preference was widely shared and several Colorado informants advised that the 
agency director preferred the use of employees over contracting effectively creating an informal 
agency policy. Other CDOW informants also referenced agreements among some managers and 
staff to minimize contract use. As two informants related: 
 “I’ve faced this before. Because in the past, when we mostly dealt with game fish, we as 
an agency, especially the fisheries managers, decided: ‘no we need to be the source of 
information for native fish and their conservation’. And so we went that direction. We did 
it within ourselves. We didn’t contract out. We did it ourselves.” C0-114 
 
“But, you know, in general work that’s done by contractors is looked down on, 
particularly biological work, by a large portion of the agency. And so I think if we had 
the staff to do the work internally we’d do all work internally. There is pressure from you 
know, the Director’s staff down to do as much work as we can internally without 
contracts.” CO-72 
 
The rationale behind the desire to limit use of contracts for wildlife management purposes was 
attributed largely in erosion of agency authority. As explained by CO-11: 
                                                 
4 All informant quotes have been edited to delete repeated words, duplicate phrases and pauses. Punctuation has 
been added for readability. [ ] identify content not contained in the transcript but added for readability. 
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“But that is always a point of concern for us. [It] is that our expertise will become 
obsolete or we won’t even have it. Other conservation organizations like The Nature 
Conservancy or Defenders, or Wildlife Federation or any other number of consultant 
groups that have developed expertise relating to wildlife and something, whether its 
energy or something like that, could become the go-to person because other agencies are 
used to working with them.” CO-11 
 
CDOW’s collaborative management contracting use rate gauged by dollar value 
contracted varied year to year around a 12 fiscal year average of $20.1 million. The yearly 
expenditures are depicted in Figure 7.2. As a reference, commodity expenditures increased while 
capital property purchases varied widely over the same period. The Wyoming Game and Fish 
Department (WGFD) informants also confirm agency staff shortages and preference to use staff 
over contracts. The WGFD also describe the use of “at will” employees as their preferred method 
addressing skills or staff shortages. 
 
Figure 7. 2 Total contract values in three categories by fiscal year.  
 
In both the CDOW and WGFD, the main reason cited in use of contracts was insufficient 
staff capacity to accomplish objectives. The lack of capacity was attributed to inadequate staffing 
levels for the assigned tasks, staff lacking the required skills and abilities or some combination of 
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priorities or policies, inadequate staffing was consistently reported as the primary trigger to 
considering service contracting. Internal agency policies affecting employee distribution within 
programs was identified as causing higher contract use rates in non-game/species conservation 
programs. 
Decisions on make or buy were also subject to individual manager’s criteria or 
considerations. Some reported volume and cost-benefit considerations:  
“We don’t have appraisers on staff to actually go out and be able evaluate what the value 
of a particular parcel of land might be. So we contract for that service. Probably as a 
primary reason; it’s not cost effective for us to have appraisers actually on staff.” CO-09 
 
Others include the characteristics of the work and its appeal to wildlife managers, relationship to 
game species management, or the potential to develop and recruit future employees. 
Exemplifying these considerations are: 
“I like to fund graduate students. I think it’s - you get a really good bang for your buck. 
The Division of Wildlife paid for my master’s degree and I guess I kind of feel like I’m 
paying it forward. If you look through the ranks of our biologists, most of them have 
master’s degrees. Most of them, the Division of Wildlife funded their graduate work. So 
my belief is that by funding, we’re training future biologists and researchers.” CO-47 
 
“And so you know, actually [the] number[s] of animals are a lot more important to the 
agency and agency culture than planning documents. So it would be a lot more 
acceptable to have a contract for a planning document rather than actual on- the-ground 
inventory things. Actually, there is a distinction between species too. It comes down to 
what’s fun and what’s not. What species are fun and which ones aren’t.” CO-72 
 
The WGFD informants report similar considerations in decisions on use of contracts and 
contractors. 
Contract management capacity figures directly into contracting decisions by managers 
and staff of the CDOW. CDOW informants focused on the demands placed on them or their staff 
in contract development and administration. Many suggest that the state’s contracting 
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requirements have imposed increasing and unreasonable burdens on those involved with 
contracts. The contract implementation requirements are identified as limiting factors on contract 
use and initiation of projects. As some examples show: 
“So there is a huge administrative overhead. If we were asked to double the number of 
contracts that we did, basically we would have to clone me and my program assistant 
because we could not handle the administrative overhead. It’s just too time consuming to 
deal with the paper work.” CO-47 
“But then you go through our contracting process and it’s so difficult and so time 
consuming you just go, ‘is this worth it’? Is the end product worth what I am doing? Do I 
have enough time, effort and brain power to do it?” CO-16 
“And it’s difficult because you just --the rules and the red tape are so hard to overcome 
that [at] the field level people don’t do things because it’s going to involve contracting.” 
CO-12 
WGFD personnel also observe that contract requirements have increased which has increased the 
work required to implement a contract. WGFD field staff also report the workload related to 
contracts is managed by limiting the number of contract based projects they develop or manage. 
As one informant noted:  
“So any one person can really only effectively handle implementing one or two projects a 
year because they’re assessing stuff. They’re monitoring stuff. They’re commenting on 
projects plus they’re working with kids at the school and all that stuff.” WY-03 
 
The WGFD possess the authority for “at-will” contract employees which have no direct 
counterpart in the CDOW. The WGFD process to hire at-will employees is described as 
uncomplicated and direct. While the individual “hired’ is a contract employee, bidding is not 
required and the contract terms are negotiable. The employment process is reportedly initiated 
using a simple and standardized form contract containing the agreed compensation and reporting 
terms. These contract employees operate similar to full time WGFD employees and are described 
as generally indistinguishable to the public, but they are technically contractors, not “employees” 
of the WGFD or the State of Wyoming. The number of active contract employees available to 
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the WGFD at any given time period is subject to state legislature allocations. The WGFD 
manages the number on contract to completely use the allocations according to the informants. 
Effectively the WGFD may employ more individual at will employees during the year by 
adjusting the terms of employment to maintain the count below the allocated number for any 
given time period. Descriptions of tasks assigned to the contract employees range from general 
labor to tasks requiring specialized wildlife, survey or public administration skills. An “at will” 
contract employee may work for consecutive years. WGFD employees note that the at will 
employees are widely used in the agency and provide ways to access to skills that would 
otherwise require using contracts. 
Available expertise is a consideration in the decision on use of contracts. Knowing the 
specific provider of needed expertise or skills is not characterized as an absolute need; rather the 
decision element is described as knowing the desired expertise or skill is available from 
acceptable sources or is anticipated to be available from those sources. The acceptable source is 
characterized as one where there are positive past experiences with the provider; or lacking past 
experience, the potential providers are anticipated to share similar professional and institutional 
viewpoints, don’t have undesirable agendas or organizational biases and are not overtly 
politically active. Using the informant supplied decision elements a simplified schematic of the 
contract decision path is presented as Figure 7.3. The decision model provides multiple decision 
nodes where rejecting contract use can occur. Relatively few paths lead to a positive contracting 
decision which is consistent with the CDOW informants’ description of the hesitancy to employ 
contracts. 
Systemic influences.– CDOW staff report that contracting for service and grants has 








limited, rather it is the difficulties in applying the tools. Informants point to elements such as 
limited numbers of acceptable contractors and negative impacts of state contracting rules and 
process.  
The system limitations identified are collected under a theme of systemic complexity. 
Figure 7.4 portrays the components of the systemic complexity theme and provides examples 
from informants. The organizing principle of this theme are the elements in CDOW’s contracting 
environment that are not directly under the agencies control which negatively impact decisions to 
use contracts. The complexity and timeframe of the CDOW’s planning and budgeting process 
creates uncertainty around project approvals and money availability which is further amplified 
by the varying requirements of funding sources which are often blended in program budgets. 
Fund sources such as federal assistance, grants from various entities, or combinations of grants, 
federal and state funds create a complex and dynamic approval and reporting process with 
differing timeframes on the ability to spend the money. As one informant closed the explanation 
of the complexity of matching needs and budgets: 
“It’s not nearly as straight forward as I am making [it] sound here. One of the big 
problems we have is our recognition of need for certain activities rarely match up with 
our budget planning cycle.” CO-11 
 
The timing mismatch between need and budgets directly impacts contract initiation. The 
procurement process requires the agency budget and funding approvals be noted and that the 
available unencumbered funds in the state’s budget and accounting system are at least equal to 
the anticipated cost prior to initiating procurement actions. Delays in internal agency budget 
decisions or outside fund approvals cascade into the timeframe available for procurement 
processes and subtract from the time available to the contractors to complete the work. 
Informants noted the reduced time for field work has led to more frequent use of more complex 
188 
 




multiyear contracts in order to match the increased contracting timelines to the timeframe needed 
to complete biological field tasks. The budget decision timelines and use of multiple fund 
sources predictably increases the difficulty of demonstrating funding for multiple years and 
contract management needs when multiple year agreements are used. The effects are noted in 
 both the CDOW and with contractors as one informant noted: 
 “It’s very difficult to secure the money over a time period to enter into a third party 
contract. It becomes sort of a disincentive for contractors to even get into this.” CO-11 
 
Complexity in contracting rules and documentation requirements are noted by CDOW 
staff as discouraging use of contracts. The disincentives are characterized as either the length of 
time required to obtain a fully approved contract and the difficulty of matching complex wildlife 
management tasks to a procurement system based on a commodity purchase metaphor of 
product, price, and delivery date. An example of the latter is the comment on product 
descriptions related to contracts to experimentally grow native seeds not commercially available:  
“Purchasing odd, you know, purchasing [a] growers half acre and his time and attention 
to detail to go out there and plant something that’s never been planted before? I mean 
how do you? There’s no product there? I guess I am buying his time, but really what I am 
trying to buy is seed.” CO-12  
 
Others point out that the time required to deploy a contract often do not match those that the 
contracted service was to address: 
“So what that also does is some of these problems are time sensitive. You need the 
answer. You need the work done in a pretty rapid time. The contracting process is pretty 
cumbersome at best and there are times we have to factor [that] in. Can we afford to wait 
for the contracts to go through, the money to be encumbered and everything; all the 
approvals? We have had situations in the past when that has been drawn out and took 
such a long time that the answer wasn’t really germane. The decision point within the 




The complexity of the contract procurement process is negatively perceived and feeds the desire 
to avoid contracting. The complexity and employee attitudes about contract use are linked as 
many noted: 
“The state procurement system is, as I mentioned before, is one of the most complex, 
difficult administrative systems we have. I’m a project manager. I’ve got a complex 
problem to solve. I’ve got a system that makes it hard for me to do that.” CO-81 
 
“I understand why people think that contracting is probably one of the worst punishments 
ever, you know? Like you just got put in charge of the contract? Like hmmmmm, I will 
take the death penalty.” CO-15 
 
The contract procurement system is also subject to changes in statutes, purchasing rules, 
judicial review or administrative requirements which have immediate and significant impacts. 
Informants pointed to different examples of changes to statues, fiscal rules, “authoritative 
interpretations” or implementation procedures. The topics mentioned included risk-based 
contract assessment procedures, independent contractor requirements, contractor registration, 
insurance requirements and administrative decisions to reassign long-used contract types into 
administrative classification that require more documentation, approvals and processing time. An 
example noted by CDOW informants pertained to changes in the approved uses and qualification 
requirements for temporary professional service contracts. As one informant stated: 
“I mean for example we used to contract, because of the 6 month limit on state 
employees. So we used to contract. Well now they’re limiting that. I mean they just keep 
on putting the screws to us.” CO-16 
 
The change in requirements or procedures which reduced or limited the use of temporary 
contracting was noted by several participants. Since this reference is to a specific type of 
contract, it allows comparison of the CDOW provided accounting data for the period. Figure 7.5 
shows the total contract amounts for all professional services contract categories reported for a 




Figure 7. 5 Fiscal year changes in professional service contract expenditures. 
 
categories between fiscal year 1999 and 2000 supports the informant’s claims of use restrictions 
on the temporary professional service contracts. The decline in all service contract expenditures 
over the 12 year period buttresses informants’ reported reduced use of some contract types in 
favor of other types and the early dramatic shift from temporary to purchase of professional 
services depicts a response to changed procurement policies.  
Informants identified overhead cost and increased capacity needs when contracts were 
used. The overhead cost concerns largely focus on documentary requirements and the 
administrative time demand to manage and coordinate the contracting process. Colorado’s shift 
to a risk reduction-risk avoidance procurement strategy was cited as causing increased 
documentation demands, process changes, restrictions or elimination of some contract types and 
added reporting requirements. Informants mention a range of causal factors for the changes 
including: changes in procurement personnel, statute changes, new Attorney General 
interpretations, departmental policy, delegation of approval authority to lower organizational 
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CDOW and WGFD informants both report limited numbers of suitable wildlife 
management contractors are available for contracted projects. The limited number of capable 
contractors is identified as a significant limiting factor on use of collaborative wildlife 
management contracts. Exploring the limited contractor theme reveals it is based on both an 
actual number component and a preference component. Physical availability described by the 
informants is a situation where contractor workloads, interest in working for a state agency or 
few or no contractors with the needed qualifications/skills lead to poor or no responses to 
contract solicitations. From an informant’s perspective: 
“In my experience across the state there’s a much smaller pool of third party contractors 
of any stripe that are able to deliver wildlife conservation services.” CO-11 
Limited contractor pools often result from the required skills not being available from 
instate vendors or when there are very few skilled providers nationwide. An example of this 
limitation was described as a circumstance where the only known individuals skilled in a certain 
species inventory were located in the eastern U.S. and the individuals were not interested in work 
outside of their state of residence. The informant stated the inventory was placed on hold in 
hopes of finding another skilled provider. In the case of preference driven limits, informants 
describe two preference types, one that operates at the level of make or buy and the other at the 
contractor selection level. The make or buy preference is an internal agency selection of tasks 
suited to contracts while preferentially retaining task such as game species inventories or other 
game species work as employee task. 
Contractor selection preferences informs the limited number of contractors viewpoint 
based on informant objectives to avoid contractors that were described as agenda driven, have 
poor reputations, or were considered un-trust worthy. Further description of these limitations 
include references agendas that are incompatible with the agency’s or would create doubts about 
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the product or the agency’s credibility, have been politically active or are considered a direct 
competitor in some program. Past poor performance or difficult relationships were widely 
acknowledged as reasons to avoid using a specific contractor. Several informants noted that 
previous poor performance by a contractor had been used a reason to reject potential contractors 
in the procurement process with varying success. The following comments, combined with those 
cited in Figure 7.5, further illustrate the limited vendor component of the system limits theme: 
 “The thing is we have a pretty limited range of people that we contract with. I mean, it’s 
primarily universities and a handful of NGOs that can do the work.” CO-72 
 
“There’s a limited number of people out there you can contract with. Typically they’re 
university people, researchers, who’re doing different projects [with] and have an interest 
in a specific species. Or they’re groups like Colorado Natural Heritage Program or Rocky 
Mountain Bird Observatory. So there’s a fairly limited group of people who really do it 
and do it well. Although you may get some independent contractor who may be a retired 
biologist who might have some interest in it. I think we’ve found over the years working 
with these more established groups works better.” CO-48 
An example confirming the limitation narrative in the WGFD is: 
“The other thing is there’s only so many. The state of Wyoming is kind of a smaller state, 
and so there’s also a limited number of the people that do any one certain type of work in 
the wildlife arena.” WY-07 
 
Exploring the concept of limited numbers of contractors using the CDOW contract 
accounting data provides an examination of the distribution of contracts across vendors over a 12 
year fiscal year period. The results are summarized in Table 7.1 and represent all contracts types 
(commodity, service and grants) based on individually named contractors in the data set. 
Contractors are grouped by into ranges based on the total number of contracts held in fiscal years 
1999-2010. Eighty-four percent of all contractors during the period held five or fewer contracts 
or 38% of the total contracts. One vendor, Colorado State University had 4% of all contracts 
during the period. A total of seven contractors (0.21% of the contractors) held 12% of all  
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Table 7. 1 Distribution of contracts by number of contractors who held similar numbers for 














493 493 1 4% 0.03% 
101-300 1055 6 8% 0.18% 
51-100 792 12 6% 0.36% 
21- 50 1546 50 12% 1.50% 
16-20 781 44 6% 1.32% 
11-15 1406 111 10% 3.33% 
6-10 2250 296 17% 8.89% 
2-5 3493 1235 26% 37.09% 
1 1575 1575 12% 47.30% 
Total  13391 3330 100% 100.00% 
1 Contract counts may be subject to potential discrepancies in contractor 
names such as spelling differences, use of abbreviations or name use.  
 
contracts issued. This group was made up of Colorado State University as previously mentioned, 
Colorado state government via interagency agreements, Rangen Inc. a fish food provider, the U. 
S. Department of Agriculture (as a department and as the U.S. Forest Service), the Colorado 
Board of Land Commissioners and Pheasants Forever Inc., a non-profit entity. The next group 
below these two groups adds computer equipment providers, various commodity suppliers, the 
Department of Interior, a helicopter service, the Rocky Mountain Bird Observatory (a non-profit) 
and Ducks Unlimited (a non-profit). The high rate of contracting with Colorado State University 
matches the expressed preference for this contract partner by CDOW informants. The listing of 
several NGOs in upper ranks of frequent contractors identifies other long-term contracting 
relationships noted by some informants. The federal governmental agencies listed in the top 
groupings are not unexpected in a state with a large federal landownership and a state wildlife 
agency involved in public accesses and habitat management programs. The commodities and 
flight services are procured through bids. 
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Institutional features.– Institutions have characteristics described as regulative elements 
(i.e. formal rules or laws), normative elements (i.e. values and norms) and cultural cognitive 
elements (i.e. the “what” people know and their socially constructed reality) (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991, Scott 1995, Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Interviews with CDOW and WGFD 
staff were not structured to specifically explore institutional factors. However, the interview 
content suggested a wildlife management paradigm as described by Gigilotti et al. (2009) was 
active in wildlife management contracting.  
The regulatory aspects of the CDOW and WGFD and their associated wildlife 
commissions are not examined or reported here. For those interested, the formal statutory and 
regulatory authorities of both wildlife agencies are accessible online as are those related to the 
states purchasing functions. The existence of these regulatory elements and the police powers 
allocated to selected agents of the CDOW and WGFD are noted as regulative elements as well as 
the CDOW internal policies and directives addressing agency and employee behaviors and 
performance. 
Figure 7.6 displays components used to describe an institution framework informing state 
wildlife agency use of wildlife management contracting. Institutional elements of cultural 
realities and norms are used to group interview themes and are illustrated by interview extracts. 
The institutional elements important to contract use in wildlife management projects are 
organized based on norms and internal understandings. Based on CDOW interviews, the agency 
culture reality is that wildlife biologists would prefer to work for a state wildlife agency. 
Understandings of “what is” wildlife management and “how” wildlife management is practiced 
are widely shared within the agency as elements of the wildlife profession. Wildlife management 



























































































“..people would rather work full time for a state wildlife agency than they would 
say, an RMBO or a CNHP.” CO-48 
“… if you think the answer is black and somebody comes and says its white it’s 
not gray at all, its white. Then all of a sudden you have a very difficult problem 
with how do you deal with that. You just have to be careful about that.” CO-03 
 
“A wildlife infraction of a statue is viewed (as) Oh My God you need to pay a huge 
fine or be behind bars or whatever. That’s (a purchasing violation) just an 
administrative function but they are both statutes”. CO-15 
“Some of our employees, believing they are doing it for wildlife, can justify 
violating the fiscal rules because we’re doing it for the right reasons.” CO-16 
 
“We like to be in control of what the project is and what the end product is. Just 
because its wildlife, as the state wildlife agency there’s not many other players” 
CO-11 
“If we can control then it we think it’s going to be better than if anybody else does 
it.” CO-16 
“I’m sure you remember but we don’t want to give up too much control on 
something that we’re ultimately responsible for.” CO-31 
“… we’re all in the same agency, we understand our roles and relationships and we 
have a little supervisory chain and everything. But you have certainly more direct 
control over the direct product.” CO-05 
 
“I think the culture is more specific to actual field work. I think there would be a 
definite line between things like inventory and say planning.” CO-72 
“...it’s our job to hire these people so they can be ready to become DWMs and 
biologist.” CO-05 
“Wildlife professionals are the independent, self motivated thinkers trying to get 
stuff done.” CO-31 
 
“We are the gate keepers on what the product should look like and no one above us 
knows that.” CO-11 
“It is so much about your own expertise and you know having a contractor do it 
makes it seem less like you’re in control or the expert.” CO-48 
 
“It’s secondary priority to game management activity.” CO-11 
“We are moving away from those kinds of attitudes because there’s a lot of 
sarcasm and stuff pointed at you working with small mammals.” CO-72 
 
“Having staff that has technical expertise; you want to have a staff that is 
technically capable of doing the work.” CO-09 
“You may not have the capacity (but) we should at least have the expertise.” CO-
26
Figure 7. 6 Institutional thematic elements. 
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of discretion in action so long as their actions fall within the what and how of the wildlife 
management boundaries. 
Norms consistently expressed in relation to contacts were: maintaining control; shared 
values about acceptable contract use; agency standing, expectations on maintenance of agency 
standing by employees; employee/agency standing as “the” state’s wildlife experts; and the 
priority of game management. A professionalism element related to the standing and reputation 
element but associated with hiring and maintaining employee skills and abilities was also 
identified. The professionalism element is noted as potentially helping to foster similarity in state 
wildlife management agencies following the description and processes in the institutional 
literature (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Bartley et al. 2008). The 
professionalism sub-theme also reflects staff desires for skills and abilities at or above the levels 
required for contracted tasks. Expression of this desire links the professionalism elements to 
agency theory components.  
The WGFD case maps to the institutional theme in Figure 7.6 but with fewer examples in 
the limited number of interviews. The preference for use of agency staff for wildlife management 
tasks is perhaps stronger in WGFD as “at will” employees are widely used and were identified as 
an approach that limited the need to use of third party providers in agency programs other than 
the agency’s grant programs. The WGFD preference for staff was voiced by a third party service 
provider who noted that the WGFD was more protective of its staff and privileged staff’s 
recommendations more strongly than in the contractor’s experience with the CDOW. WGFD 
informants noted regular use of third parties for license surveys, engineering design, and water 
rights analysis. Grant contracts for habitat improvement were identified as the major 
collaborative wildlife management contracting activity. Grant contracts were described as most 
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often between the WGFD and either a non-profit organization or a private landowner. Project 
details were cited as the factors influencing the contractor identification. The linkage of habitat 
improvement projects to specific entities using physical location information and the interest of 
the grant partners was noted as factors used by WGFD in selecting grant recipients. 
Institutional influences are seen in agency contractor preferences. In both the CDOW and 
WGFD cases, staff expressed a preference for universities for collaborative projects such as 
inventories, species research, management protocol development and similar projects. A stronger 
preference for universities with wildlife and natural resource programs over those without was 
identified. As previously noted the CDOW accounting data identifies Colorado State University 
(CSU) as CDOW’s most frequent contract partner. WGFD informants noted ongoing contracts 
for wildlife research and inventory with the University of Wyoming. Both wildlife agency staffs 
expressed an ongoing desire to work with these universities and also noted the benefit and 
importance of the university programs for review and develop potential employees:  
“If you look through the ranks of our biologists, most of them have master’s degrees and 
most of them, the Division of Wildlife funded their graduate work. So my belief is that by 
funding, we’re training future biologists and researchers.” CO-47 
 
“It’s our job to hire these people so they can be ready to become DWMs and biologists.” 
CO-05 
“We get a chance to look at those folks and they get a chance, through the university 
setting, which is a bit different than the Department setting, but they get a chance to 
interact with somebody, maybe multiple people, from the agency. We get to try each 
other on basically.” WY-05 
The university-wildlife agency relationship provides training and enculturation experiences 
through the university while also providing the wildlife agency simplified contracting processes, 
access to knowledge and skills sets, provides opportunities to evaluate potential employees and 
provides access to professional development opportunities for agency staff. 
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The interviews highlight elements of the wildlife management institutional paradigms 
that underlie decisions on use of contracts for wildlife purposes. The decision elements emerging 
from the paradigm in the CDOW interviews are summarized in no order as: 
1. Wildlife management activities are privileged over other activities or 
requirements. 
2.  State wildlife managers and other recognized wildlife professionals are 
privileged over others. 
3.  Game species are privileged over non-game species which are in turn privileged 
over administrative task.  
4. Universities with wildlife degree programs are privileged over other universities. 
5.  Select species specific or historically important non-profit organizations are 
privileged over other organized wildlife interest. 
6. Skeptical of motives or capabilities of non-profit and for profit organizations 
which do have not a history with the agency. 
7.  Distrust politically active non-profit or for profit organizations. 
8. Have a low tolerance for unexpected results or poor performance.  
9. Are attentive to and guard against threats to the wildlife agency’s authority, 
standing and control. 
Contractor’s perspective.– Colorado based contractors unanimously noted difficulties 
with Colorado’s state procurement process. Identified concerns fall into two areas: process and 
behaviors. The concerns were characterized as: overly strict limits on communication and 
collaboration with the CDOW prior to bid submission regardless of the project complexity or 
collaboration needs; time delays in the procurement steps and/or contract approval; undisclosed 
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delays in contract processing which impact timelines and cost; money and time cost imposed by 
procedures unrelated to the purpose of the contract; purchasing agents inappropriately assuming 
biological or agency evaluation roles; and contract amendment limitations which compromise 
the ability to address changed circumstances outside of the control of the contractors or CDOW. 
Three of the contractors also performed contract work for the WGFD. All three related that 
contracting with WGFD seemed to be simpler and less burdensome from their experience. 
However all indicated the extent of their involvement with the WGFD was less in both total 
dollars and the number of contracts. The contractors suggested the smaller size of the contracts 
with WGFD could lead to less complex processes. One non-profit contractor noted that WGFD 
seemed less attentive to contractor communication which created delays and increasing 
administrative. 
Three of the four contractors specifically located their concerns in the state’s procurement 
and contract approval procedures rather than in the CDOW. These contractors generally 
characterized CDOW staff favorably and as performing adequately under a process over which 
they had little control or influence. One contractor suggested that given the strict limitations on 
communication between the CDOW and potential bidders during the procurement process, the 
CDOW staff needed to put more thought into developing detailed task, timelines and including 
the relevant baseline data in the scope of work as a ways to improve both the bids and the end 
results. 
A fourth contractor described what was felt to be a change in circumstances which 
significantly and negatively impacted the projects the contractor would consider and had 
modified their interaction with the CDOW. The informant felt that other contractors experienced 
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the same impacts. This contractor specifically addressed the concerns toward the grants focused 
on habitat protection and enhancement. As related by this informant:  
“We have great relationships with every single one of our public agency partners except 
Division of Wildlife. We really struggle to meet the obligations that they put before us. I 
find that that a lot of what they try to do is really obstructional instead of being 
facilitators of great conservation work. It’s all through the contracts. The contracts are 
really, really difficult to work with. Every time you think you’ve got a standard contract 
it’s like, ‘great we’ve got a template. We’ll move on to this. The next contract should be 
just fine. We’ll have a standard and everyone’s going to be happy’. It changes every 
time! It’s more and more and more due diligence for the most part. It’s getting to the 
point where you actually can’t take those funds. The cost of using those funds is just too 
high. You just can’t meet their demands.” CO-43 
 
The informants’ opinion of the source of the problems was further explained by comparing past 
experience with the CDOW with current experiences with another Colorado state agency. 
Contract experience with the Colorado Water Conservation Board was cited as both simpler and 
as evidence that more contractor-friendly contracts are possible. The difference in contracting 
experience formed the basis of this informant’s opinion that CDOW was the source of the 
contract problems. Contract complaints were linked conversationally to the described loss of a 
favored relationship with the CDOW. The linkages suggested the contract requirements may be 
symptomatic of both changes in organizational relationships and procurement requirements. As 
the informant notes: 
“…he’s got, I don’t know how many contracts out there, but really he’s trying to 
administer all these different pieces as if you are a contractor instead of a partner.” CO-43 
While acknowledging the legislative, fiscal and legal demands have impacted the contract 
process, the informant attributes responsibility for the decline in what was described as a 
historically close and cooperative relationship with CDOW.  
The informant notes the organization is a national non-profit that has been active with the 
CDOW for many years. It was noted that as the CDOW began to use grants for habitat projects, 
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they had added staff to help implement the grant program. The past flexibility, tolerance for 
change and easy acceptance of substitutions in deliverables had now become focused on 
enforcing compliance with contract specifications. The flexibility lost was characterized as the 
ability to: make project substitutions; redesigns; alteration of schedules; changing completion 
dates; or, modify cost or cost share schedules all without necessitating a contract default or 
revision. Other informant disclosures suggest a more complex prior relationship existed and the 
current circumstance involves factors in addition to current contract concerns. As an example of 
the relationship complexity, the informant related an occasion where a direct intervention was 
made to the Colorado Wildlife Commission to override the CDOW staff’s recommendations on a 
project in which the organization had an interest.  
The informant expressed the view that the CDOW needed to restore the past working 
“partnership” relationship and to trust the organization to do good work without the current level 
of oversight. The expressed belief was this would allow a return to more liberal contracts and 
contract administration along with the favorable fiscal policies of previous years. The return to 
the partnership was also suggested as the way to restore favorable treatment of the organizations 
proposals for habitat grants.  
Procurement/contract administrator’s perspective.– Colorado contract administrators 
agree that the procurement process and documentation requirements have become more 
complex. It requires more detail and documentation from the requesting agencies and 
contractors. The administrators located the origins of the requirements in the legislative and 
administrative changes which they say are often precipitated by embarrassing contract outcomes. 
The independent contractor requirements were cited as a result of former service contractors 
claiming unemployment reimbursement from the state. The claims created secondary issues in 
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federal and state unemployment claims, tax and pension fund collections and other areas which 
led to political attention to state service contract procedures. The administrators noted that poorly 
performing state contracts often get reported in the state’s news media resulting in reactionary 
additions or adjustments to the state’s procurement requirements. Changes can also arise in any 
of the multiple agencies which administer different elements of the procurement and contract 
approval process. Informants noted that increases in mandatory procurement tasks seldom 
include added resources to implement them. An example provided was recent changes in 
Colorado’s statutes which added new review and reporting systems but did not include 
implementation resources to the agencies. The administrators noted that the requirements ended 
up as add work for agency staffs, added to contract processing times and more frustration. As 
one administrator noted:  
“I think probably the biggest problem with purchasing and contracting in the eyes of 
employees is it is so complex. ‘I just don’t even want to learn it. Just walk me through it.’ 
The frustrating thing from my end [is] I can’t hand hold 600 employees. That’s what they 
want, unfortunately.” CO-15 
Purchasing administrators concur that the CDOW has a significant volume of contracts 
with objectives which are both unique and often vary widely year to year. One administrator 
noted that few purchasing personnel get to deal with ordering specifically formulated fish food 
by the semi-truck load while working on a multi-party deer birth control trial contract. However 
the administrators did not consider contract complexity and the uncertainty related to unique 
projects or environmentally variable conditions as reasons to support a collaborative or 
interactive planning with potential contractors as suggested by staff and contractors to improve 
outcomes. Rather the contract administrators reacted negatively:  
“If you do a lot of research and start talking to a lot of people, you’ve done the selection. 
So you need to be able to do enough research to get enough information that you can put 
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together a scope of work that will be useful in selecting a vendor. But you can’t go far 
enough, so that you’ve made a selection.” CO-18 
 
Exploring contracts in collaborative efforts further, particularly use contracts to support 
collaborative formation, capacity building or providing funds to stimulate project completion in 
collaborative projects also receive a negative responses. Addressing contract support to 
collaborative efforts: 
“I’m on the end of the perspective that says; ‘why the heck are they doing that’? I don’t 
think the procurement rules are written to foster that sort of relationship.” CO-18 
“The procurement code really expects you to be doing fair and open competition with 
every entity, whether they be nonprofit or for profit. So if you’ve got an idea; you need to 
put it out there instead of making deals. That’s the way the procurement code works. So 
if some people think that it’s problematic doing that, I’d probably agree with them. 
Maybe they need training.” CO-18 
The contract administrators characterize the CDOW’s relationship with their contractors 
as being lax, suggesting familiarity or casual working relationships. This type of relationship was 
not noted as a significant concern to the administrators as one noted:  
“I would say that the Divisions attitudes towards its vendors are; I don’t think it’s 
problematic, sometimes I think it’s almost too lax. CO-15 
 
Contract administrators also commented on CDOW’s increasing use of grants and how 
grants can provide an agency administered selection processes outside of the standard formal 
bidding used by procurement. Fewer requirements and more agency control of the selection 
process were implied as reasons for CDOW’s increasing use of grant program approaches: 
“Wildlife, because we’re wildlife I’m convinced, likes to create their own grant programs 
vetted or not.” CO-15 
 
The administrators did express concerns about the use of grants and the grantee selection: 
“I think the minute it starts looking like you have an old boy network or giving it to your 
friends or somebody you worked with a long time or your relatives or anything like that, I 
think that’s trouble.” CO-18 
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The concerns appeared to be directed at the repeated appearance of some grantees in the CDOW 
grant awards and at a selection process subject to influences outside what would apply in a 
formal bid process. One informant cited a case where administrative staff over-rode the selection 
process and selected other recipients as evidence of problems in the CDOW grant program 
administration.  
The contract administrators believe the CDOW staff view them as “road blocks” as one 
put it. On the other hand, the administrators characterize CDOW staff as lacking interest in the 
procurement and contract processes and dismissing or reducing the importance of procurement. 
This theme is present even while the administrators acknowledge the complexity of the 
procurement process. Agency program staff are faulted for inadequately or inappropriately 
planning projects and failing to account for the time requirements of the procurement and 
contract development phases. Training was not considered beneficial in addressing these 
planning concerns, suggesting a defensive response to criticism of the process or their work and 
the expressed attitude that wildlife managers would not change their behavior.  
The WGFD case provides some limited support for the themes arising from the Colorado 
contract administrator’s interviews. While differences in agency organization and purchasing 
systems do not provide direct comparisons, common concerns and similarities are present. 
WGFD informants collectively identified similar themes that included: increased procurement 
system complexity; increased use of grants and grant funds; grant contract processing 
difficulties; increased agency involvement in collaborative management activities; difficulties 
arranging financial support for collaborative efforts; high levels of vendor-staff familiarity; and 
many long-term vendor-WGFD relationships. Another similarity was the attributes assigned to 
the biological and purchasing staffs. Similar to the CDOW, the WGFD biological staff 
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stereotyped the procurement staff as impediments to accomplishing their work, uncaring about 
wildlife needs and ignoring local concerns and needs. Procurement staff stereotype biologist as 
being inattentive, sloppy and dismissive of procurement and administrative requirements.  
Discussion 
The CDOW’s internal contract decision process that emerges from the informant’s 
comments is one governed by the interaction of systemic and institutional factors. The 
institutional wildlife management paradigm that emerges shares features similar to those 
identified in literature on change in wildlife management and public engagement (Jacobson and 
Decker 2008, Buck 2009, Gigilotti et al. 2009, Jacobson et al. 2010). Institutional elements 
inform internal decisions on use of collaborative management contracts and interact with the 
systemic theme components to further restrict the consideration and application of collaborative 
management contracts for wildlife management. Public administration literature has recognized 
the impacts of experience; institutions and professions on government agencies’ capacities and 
performance in “indirect government” settings (Kettl 2002b, Cooper 2003, Frederickson and 
Smith 2003, Kettl 2006). The elements noted in this result (Figure 7.6) differ from the public 
administration literature in the areas related to the influence of past experience; institutional-
profession derived boundaries on what is acceptable to contract; and, the effect potential partners 
has on the extent collaborative management contracts are used.  
The public trust responsibilities, professional management, management efficiency and 
instrumental goals maintain their influence and are promoted directly or indirectly as desirable 
characteristics of wildlife management (Organ et al. 2010). Interview content characterized 
professionalism, control, expertise, wildlife agency authority and privileging wildlife 
management as important institutional norms which are shared within the state wildlife agencies. 
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The existence of a wildlife management paradigm/institution construct and its impact on the 
inclusion of third party contractors in wildlife management shares features with the observations 
made on state wildlife agencies us of other public engagement activities (Kennedy 1985, Nie 
2004a, Jacobson and Decker 2008, Buck 2009, Gigilotti et al. 2009, Decker et al. 2011). The 
interaction of institutional features, boundaries and capacities has also been reported in other 
organizational settings ( Eisenhardt 1988, Brinkerhoff 2002, Brown and Potoski 2003b, Thoenig 
2003, Brown et al. 2006, Zietsma and Lawrence 2010, Koliba et al. 2011). 
The system theme component of the decision process is characterized by the informants 
as inhibiting contract use and is largely outside of the state wildlife agency’s control. The 
system’s sub-theme elements includes: staffing levels; procurement system cost; time and data 
conflicts from procurement requirements and biological systems; and, few qualified contractors. 
Several of the elements of this group are also part of the state’s control and accountability 
functions. The systemic theme interacts with the institutional theme indirectly by communicating 
the contracting systems expected requirements and performance. 
Decisions on use of third parties and collaborative management contracting are a 
decentralized and follow the described decision model (Figure 7.3). The distributed decision 
making provides considerable discretion to the managers. The decision model derived from the 
CDOW interviews and supported by the WGFD, share common descriptive features with other 
reported government contract decision processes (Brown and Potoski 2003b, Cooper 2003, 
Frederickson and Smith 2003, Van Slyke 2003, Hefetz and Warner 2004). However, the wildlife 
decision model elements link to the systemic and institutional themes reported here. Both the 
WGFD and CDOW report similar contracting decision elements suggesting that state wildlife 
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agencies apply similar considerations when evaluating options for use of collaborative wildlife 
management contracting.  
State wildlife agencies, as trustees lacking full control over the assets required to fulfill 
their responsibilities and face an inherent need to use collaboration to address two key issues 
arising from the misalignment of trust responsibilities and authorities and increased involvement 
of the trust holders in all aspects of wildlife management (Trauger et al. 1995, Gill 1996, Nie 
2004a, Jacobson 2008a, Buck 2009, Gigilotti et al. 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010, Jacobson et al. 
2010). This study identifies the formal state government’s accountability and control systems 
and the institutional characteristics of the wildlife agency as negatively influencing use of 
collaborative management contracts by state wildlife agencies. The state’s procurement system 
restricts collaboration approaches directly through exclusion of some types of agreements, 
adding cost and creating uncertainty about collaborative approaches requiring contracts. The 
institutional and professional norms identified informally limit the scope of collaborative options 
(Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Protecting an agency’s “turf”, as seen in the expert and authority 
narratives negative influences collaboration (Bardach 1996, Agranoff 2007) and incombination 
with the preference for institutionally compatible contract partners further narrows the scope of 
potential collaborative based actions. 
The accounting records on contract use by the CDOW show relatively stable contract 
numbers while the CDOW’s available fiscal resources increased during a 12 fiscal year period 
and full time employee numbers were stable. The informants note that work task and wildlife 
management needs exceeded the agency’s available capacities. However, the increase in 
available resources and increased service demands led to only small increases in collaborative 
management contracts over the 12 year period. The conclusion based on these data is that the use 
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of collaborative management contracts is essentially unchanged in the face of reported needs. 
From the CDOW contract accounting records, collaborative efforts fall into either development 
of wildlife species management information or habitat protection or management through grants. 
The species information would match the skills needed element in the decision model and 
institutional theme. The grants for habitat related actions fit with the areas that require 
collaboration to accomplish as noted in the introduction section.  
This exploration of state wildlife agencies use of third party contracts in state wildlife 
management supports the hypothesis that these agencies apply decision criteria that include 
elements that differ from the more general criteria reported in other government settings. Use of 
collaborative management contracts are limited by the interaction of the state’s contracting 
system and the wildlife agencies internal institutional elements. Expanding the use of 
collaborative management and the contracts needed to support of those efforts will require state 
wildlife agencies to address capacity and boundary limitations imposed by the states 
procurement systems and agencies own institutional characteristic. Near term change will require 
engaging procurement personnel in collaborative efforts to address wildlife specific 
implementation needs. Adding individuals skilled in procurement and contract management into 
program areas to assist managers may also provide some immediate and small scale relief. In the 
long term, legislative change to accommodate the implementation needs of collaborative 
processes within state procurement systems would be expected to require both demonstrated 
need and external support for changes. Institutional characteristics which limiting collaborative 
contracting share some characteristics and are compatible with the concerns of those in the 
agency change literature cited earlier. State wildlife agencies considering their future trustee 
responsibilities will find addressing the inclusion of collaborative management contracts and 
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inclusion of third party contractors compatible with the expanded trustee responsibilities 
described in this literature. Efforts to address the institutional issues outside of the agency change 
approach should look to the organizational and cultural change literatures for guidance and 
suggestions for practice and implement suggestions. 
Limitations.– The use of interviews as a basis for this analysis is subject to the limits 
imposed by the data collection method itself, the investigators skills and the analysis approach. 
Using contracts to structure interviews focuses the interview content and limits the consideration 
of other types of collaborative efforts. Other non-contract based collaborative efforts by state 
wildlife agencies are acknowledged. However, this study focused on the actions that shared 
resources or authorities with outside parties through contracts.  
The potential for informant bias exist in the interview content. Multiple interviews and 
confirmatory approaches with other informants were applied to reduce the likelihood of 
undetected bias or reflexivity by an informant. The interpretation and development of the themes 
arises from the investigators understanding and interpretation of the interview content. The 
investigators work experience with state wildlife agencies may provide a unique insider’s 
viewpoint. However the experience could also result in a bias based on familiarity.  
Survey methods would provide the opportunity to explore specific topics with larger 
numbers of participants that is was not practical using interview methods applied. Survey 
methods would also allow expansion to additional state wildlife agencies. This study also 
identifies the tensions between the formal control and accountability mechanisms in state 
government and state wildlife agencies internal evaluation and decision elements. The results 
suggest the interaction of the control or accountability requirements and collaborative 
components are more frequent and difficult to solve when received grant funds are used by state 
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wildlife agencies for collaborative projects. The grant funds potentially bring added 
accountability and collaboration/partnership requirements into the states already complex 
accountability processes. Examining these tensions in what are essentially four party 
arrangements (grantor, state accountability, state wildlife agency, and grantee selected by the 
state wildlife agency) would further understanding the barriers and limits currently imposed on 




8)   CONCLUSION 
State wildlife agencies face increased demands for wider public engagement in wildlife 
management and increasingly urgency habitat management demands (Jacobson and Decker 
2008). Much of the literature in this area of wildlife management focuses on public engagement 
initiatives and moving away from an expert based wildlife management paradigm to a more 
collaborative management approaches (Gill 1996, Nie 2004a, Jacobson and Decker 2008, Buck 
2009, Organ and Bacheller 2009, Bacheller et al. 2010, Decker and Jacobson 2011). These 
literatures often link the agencies trustee role from the public trust doctrine to suggested changes 
in agency governance. The literature on wildlife agency transformation stresses the importance 
of developing local understandings and management approaches but with limited attention to 
implications of devolved of decision making within the agency. Meanwhile, habitat management 
remains a difficult issue which has always required state wildlife agencies to collaborate or 
exchange resources with landowners. This study provides further insight into specific 
characteristics of contracting which influence the implementation of collaborative management 
projects. The results provide a mixed picture of the use of collaborative management and its 
implementation where decisions to use contracts are made at lower organization levels under the 
influence of procurement system issues and institutional influences. In the CDOW case, the 
result is essentially stable levels of collaborative management contract use over a 12 year period.  
This case study of the CDOW’s use of contracts explored selected types of contracts 
characterized as collaborative management contracts for changes in numbers or total value. 
These contracts types were used as direct indicators of changes in the extent of collaborative 
project implementation. As a frame of reference, the CDOW entered into similar numbers of 
contracts annually over 12 years but the total annual value of the contracts varied widely. The 
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variations in total contract values are primarily attributable to expenditures on capital property 
acquisition and grants. Grant and capital property contracts are statistically related to the amount 
of non-traditional funding available to CDOW. During the same period, full time employee 
numbers were stable and the amount of traditional funds available increased each year. Analysis 
of the CDOW accounting data on use of contract types identified as collaborative management 
found that the numbers increased slightly early in the 12 year period while remaining essentially 
stable since. The change in total value of these contracts was not statistically significant. No 
statistically significant increases in the number of NGO or government contract partners were 
found. Increased use of third party contracts is suggested as one mechanism that government 
agencies apply to complex problems and involve multiple interests (Salamon 2002b, Cooper 
2003, Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). The previously noted literature on the complex management 
issues faced by state wildlife agencies would suggest collaborative management contract use 
would increase over time. In the CDOW’s case collaborative management contract use was 
relatively stable. This invites questions about what is an appropriate use level, and are contracts 
an appropriate measure? Contract use is recognized as an incomplete surrogate for all 
collaborative actions of a state wildlife agency. Contracts capture an important element of 
collaborative management actions by recording the funds and authorities shared with third 
parties. However the contract data and interview content address collaborative contract use and 
are not a basis to speculate on appropriate use. 
Agency theory was applied at the implementation level to characterize the relationships 
between procurement and wildlife staffs and wildlife staff and contractors. This application also 
provides insights into the tensions between the state’s formal control and accountability systems 
and the implementation of collaborative management actions. Conflicts between the procurement 
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and wildlife staff arise from procurement’s goal to comply with fiscal and accountability 
requirements and wildlife’s goal to implement wildlife projects. The conflict is characterized as a 
control issue. This result highlights the important role played by government parties that are 
often subsumed into a unified state participant in collaborative management discussions and 
seldom considered as separate participants in collaboration theory discussions. Importantly, they 
may act more as principals in principal-agent arrangement rather than a collaborator. The impact 
limits implementation directly and indirectly through reducing the interest of potential partners to 
investing time in collaborative efforts. Future investigation of government agencies internal 
implementation challenges would provide additional insight into the capacities required to 
develop and implement collaborative management efforts that require contracts to share 
resources.  
Interviews with CDOW staff, WGFD staff, contractors and contract administrators 
provided insights that were not available through accounting records. Wildlife agency staff 
interviews describe a contracting environment with limited numbers of suitable contractors many 
of whom have long term relationships with the agencies. This is particularly true in the case of 
some educational institutions and wildlife interest nonprofit organizations. The long term 
relationship descriptions share many aspects described in the trust based contracting (For 
example  Milward and Provan 2000, Brown et al. 2006, Agranoff 2007, Brown et al. 2007, Van 
Slyke 2009) rather than a self-interested based relationship as described by agency theory. The 
described limited numbers of skilled contractors with long term relationships links the 
institutional elements to boundaries around tasks for third party implementation. When trusted 
third parties are defined in part by the existence of long term relationships, the effect is to 
reinforce the use of existing partners and limit development of additional partners. 
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Wildlife management challenges, particularly management of habitats are not reported as 
decreasing. Habitat and complex management questions have always required some 
collaboration with landowners and other stakeholders. More recent efforts to transform state 
wildlife management approaches target increased engagement of interest groups and 
collaboration by state wildlife agencies. Implementation of many collaborative management 
outcomes requires the use of contracts draw on the capacity to put the contracts in place and 
manage them to completion. Suggests on areas state wildlife agencies consider to increase their 
capacities to implement collaborative management projects follow. The suggestions require 
surfacing a set of assumptions about the environment state wildlife management agencies are 
part of: 
• Collaborative management in state wildlife programs will continue to expand and as a 
direct result increase the use of collaborative management contracts. 
• The current political climate does not favor changes to exempt or reduce the procurement 
and purchasing oversight of state wildlife agencies. 
• State wildlife agencies are unlikely to change the current distributed contract decision 
models. 
 Acknowledging the literatures diffuse approach to capacity descriptions, the following 
recommendations attempts to apply a pragmatic approach to recommendations state wildlife 
agencies could implement and address needs through this analysis. 
The limited number of contractors issue is heard in the context of both direct and 
collaborative management contracting scenarios. A limited pool of contractors makes all agency 
programs more susceptible to changes in the contracting environment from the legislature, courts 
or administration changes. The limited pool of “suitable” contractors creates a brittle system with 
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limited resilience to change. The state wildlife agency has little capacity to respond to reductions 
in the availability of suitable contractors. The limited capacity increases the risk associated with 
use of third party contracts and heightens the potential for conflict within the contract 
procurement chain. State wildlife agencies could increase capacity by developing additional 
contract partners through actions that: 
• Maintain a reliable contract volume in key subject or management areas.  
• Locate, encourage and develop contract partners. 
• Maintain existing contractors but not to the exclusion of adding new contractors. 
• Explore expansion of the concept of including development of contracting entities 
as part of collaborative partnerships to facilitate implementation. 
The state wildlife agencies understanding or mental model applied to contracts is largely 
based on commodity procurement i.e., buy an item or report. Agencies are encouraged to 
maintain that view by state procurement systems that are constructed and largely administered to 
purchase commodities. Preferences for internal service provision and control also favor the 
commodity contracting model. However, staff working in collaborative management programs 
or with indirect service provision identify the state’s procurement system and internal attitudes 
about contract use as impediments. Collaborative management approaches fit with the reported 
locally applied contract decision model. However decisions to increases collaborative 
management and the accompanying contracts will require added capacity to design, manage the 
contract process and assist in monitoring. The need is magnified with multiple contract partners 
and collaborative efforts to address complex problems. While the skills can be developed or 
acquired by hiring, to be effective they need to be available to the agency managers charged with 
implementation rather than as a centralized function responding to the state’s procurement 
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system. Beyond the interpersonal skills need to interact with multiple parties, the skills sets 
should include: 
• Contract design skills to decrease the procurement and implementation difficulties 
associated with collaborative management contracting.  
• Assist managers with implementation, management and monitoring of complex 
contracts and projects. 
• Horizontal management skills needed to interact with collaborative project 
partners and the state wildlife agency. 
The managers of state wildlife agencies are faced with two different tasks related to 
contract use in a collaborative and decentralized wildlife management environment. An 
important task is fostering institutional understanding and the changes needed to reduce conflicts 
between the traditional state wildlife management paradigm and the use of collaborative 
management approaches. Supporting and cultivating the skills and professional comfort needed 
in the indirect and less controlled collaborative approaches is directly related to the state wildlife 
agencies success in meeting their public trust responsibilities. Internal attention to and support to 
agency staff should include: 
• Directly action to understand and reduce conflicts and barriers between the 
procurement/accounting staff and wildlife agency staff.  
• Agency leadership participation in procurement and contract policy 
development with the procurement/accounting agencies and with the agencies 
internal staff. 




• Act to increase trust and reduce negative stereotyping.  
• Emphasize the role and importance of collaboration the use of collaborative 
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State agency actions or behaviors related to contracts or 
contractors. Note may be over-coded with other nodes such as 





Mention of overlaps in NGO missions and agency mission. 17 155 
Agency Section or 
Unit 
Descriptor of the organizational unit and or position held by 
interviewee - includes state, NGO and for profits under the 
agency title. Limited to general identification of interviewee's 
location or role. 
15 24 
Agenda Setting by 
Outside Groups 
Use of money, partnerships etc to attempt to set agency agenda 
via indirect tools. Direct attempts using legislation or 




Expression of anger or annoyance about contracting, contracting 




Comments from or about Aquatic Habitat Staff functions in 




Comments from or about the Aquatic Section. 2 64 
Biological 
Services WGFD 
Comments from or about Biological Services Staff functions in 
Wyoming Game and Fish Department 
1 48 
Bureaucracy 
References made to bureaucracy, bureaucratic processes, and 
actions by individuals or similar elements. Includes accounts of 
actions that may also be coded as other actions. 
27 228 
Capacity 
References to capacity of agencies or contractors. Includes 
























Identified challenges to state wildlife agency policy or position 
including challenges to agency as the state wildlife expert or 




References to collaboration and its relationship to contracting. 27 264 
Collective voice 
Assumption of or use of "organizational we - us " collective or 
group voice in reporting circumstances or events where the intent 




Description of consequences of contracting - all types 27 281 
Contract Support 
Services 
Reference to individuals, sections, units or other groups that do or 






Suggestions to modify or improve contracting process 20 73 
Contracting 
Decision Factors 
For agencies -Why contracting is used or how decisions are 
reached on use of contracts or staff.  For contractors- Factors 




Contractor actions or behaviors related to contracts, contract 
outcomes, and interactions with agency or interaction with others 
as part of contracts with agency. Note may be over-coded with 





Notation of contractor involvement or avoidance of processes 
dealing with agency policy, management decisions or 




Conditions or circumstances leading to contract use by agencies. 27 142 
Control 
Statements about risk posed by contracts, managing or controlling 
contract work or outcomes, and post contract response to issues. 
Includes noted steps to avoid, manage or respond to risk or 






Statements that identify refer to or describe organizational level 


















Identifying partner-collaborative considerations around the 
need to develop maintain or expand contractor pool or develop 
strategic partnerships. 
24 96 
DNR Contacting References from or related to DNR contracting unit 6 98 
Engineering Section 
CDOW 
Contracting comments related to or from the Engineering unit. 1 58 
Field Operations 
CDOW 
The Field Operations (regions areas and DWMs) - over coding 
to identify comments to field operations. 
3 118 
Field Staff- Biologist 
Identification coding for Biologist who are non-supervisory and 
assigned to field stations (not in a central office). 
3 3 
For Profit Contractor 
All for profit contractors. Over-code to identify comments by 
private companies or individual contractors. 
4 122 
Frustration 
Statement of or description of frustration due to contracts, 




Characteristics of contracts identified as important for positive 









Positions identification for agency managers through first level 
supervisors. Identification of agency positions falling between 
top administrators and line supervisors. 
7 11 
Negative Outcomes 
Experiences, outcomes or actions identified or described as 
negative, unwanted, undesirable or regretted. 
27 299 
Not For Profit 
Contractor 
Not for profit entities which may be referred to in transcripts as 
NGOs but are distinguished by this code from for profit entities. 
May be use as over-code to specifically identify comments 
made by non-profits. 
18 183 
Paradoxes 
Participant identification of or description of situations 
encountered in contracting that are paradoxical in nature. May 
not be described by participant directly as a paradox but 
commentary will have contrasting ideas, needs or outcomes in 


















Experiences, outcomes or actions identified or described as negative, 
unwanted, undesirable or regretted. 
27 299 
Not For Profit 
Contractor 
Not for profit entities which may be referred to in transcripts as 
NGOs but are distinguished by this code from for profit entities. May 




Participant identification of or description of situations encountered 
in contracting that are paradoxical in nature. May not be described by 
participant directly as a paradox but commentary will have 
contrasting ideas, needs or outcomes in close proximity in the 




References to the existence of, need for, or importance of individuals, 
relationships between individuals or specific individual’s roles in 
developing, managing, maintaining or enhancing a contracting 




Political issues or actions within or a result of contracts. 23 86 
Positive 
outcomes 
Contractor or agency descriptions or references to positive 




Characteristics, skills, background, abilities or other preferences 




Problems described or attributed to contracting or contractors. Note 









Contracting applications or processes that would or could be 
considered relational contracting as described in the literature. I.E. 
could include open-ended, mutually developed task, mutually agreed 




References specific to Resource Support Section of CDOW. Maybe 





Content that is specific to Species Conservation Section CDOW. 






















References to the state contracting processes including: rules, 





References to issues of state government politics or administration 
that impact contracting by agencies. 
19 78 
Strategies Used to 
Avoid Contract 
Problems 
Descriptions of actions used to avoid difficulties in state contracting 
process. Includes avoidance, work arounds, and efforts to deal with 
collaborative or open ended projects. 
24 96 
Terrestrial CDOW 
Terrestrial Section CDOW specific references within the transcript. 





Comments from or about Terrestrial Habitat Program 





Issues specific to matching contracts, budgets, contract processes 
and administrative processes with the time frame needed or 
available for a project. 
15 49 
Training 





Descriptions of contracting processes or contracts that are 
considered transactional or commodity contracting as described in 
the literature. I.E. commodity specific purchases, multiple sources, 
competitive bidding - smart buyer characteristics. 
11 47 
Trust 
References to existence of, development of, loss of or need for trust 
between agency or agency employee/s and contractor. May also 
include references to expertise, behavior, experience or other 
characteristics that are identified as creating or maintaining trust 




Comments from or about Wildlife Program Administration 
functions in Wyoming Game and Fish Department 
1 60 
Wyoming Game and 
Fish 
Comments related to Wyoming Game and Fish- General 6 236 
 
 
